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As Staunton wrestles with the math of trying to make revenues match expenses, its options are actually quite limited. Roughly one-fifth of its income comes from the state, while a quarter or so comes from a grab-bag of smaller taxes that can’t be pushed much higher, primarily the local sales tax, restaurant meals tax and lodging tax. But the biggest slice of the income pie, at just under half, comes from general property taxes, and by far the dominant segment of that category is real estate taxes. It’s therefore disconcerting to realize, after even a little analysis, just how self-defeating it is to pin our city’s fortunes on such an economically stupid way of raising money.
Not that Staunton, or any other city, has much choice. Real estate taxes are the one significant revenue tool left to municipalities by a state that reserves for itself the lion’s share of other taxes, such as taxes on income. Even with that, however, a city’s taxing ability is severely circumscribed by Virginia’s embrace of the Dillon rule, which essentially prevents any kind of municipal initiative that isn’t explicitly allowed by state law. The result is a rigid set of constraints that strangle innovation.
That’s too bad, because the way real estate taxes currently function has at least two hugely deleterious effects. One, as briefly explored in my post Sunday, is as a brake on Staunton’s ability to raise sufficient revenue to fix aging municipal infrastructure before it becomes unserviceable. The second is the way real estate taxes contribute to housing blight while simultaneously raising housing prices overall, making a significant contribution to the affordable housing crisis we’re currently experiencing.
To understand why that is, take a minute to consider how property taxes work. The rationale behind them is that the bulk of city services—roads, sewers, waterlines, fire protection and, to a significant extent, police protection—go to property, not people. And as the value of property rises, so too does the value of the services it receives, so the tax should increase accordingly. That seems straightforward enough, but here’s the question that tends to be overlooked: why does a property’s value increase?
Why, for example, does property in an urban core get valued more highly than in agricultural areas? As should be readily evident, a parcel’s value is highly dependent on what’s around it. You can buy a larger house on more land in a rural part of Augusta County for the same price you’ll pay for a smaller home on much less land in Newtown, largely because of the latter’s proximity to downtown and Gypsy Hill Park. Ready accessibility to shopping, recreation and cultural pursuits is worth a lot, as is not having to foot the bill for maintaining a well and septic system. A significant portion of land value, in other words, is collectively and publicly created.
Meanwhile, the value of what’s on that land also goes up as improvements are made, be it an addition, a renovated kitchen or bathrooms, new windows and doors or a new roof. As a result, the owner of a well-maintained home pays more tax than the owner of a poorly maintained house across the street, even though the city’s cost of maintaining a paved road and the utilities between them remains unchanged. In purely economic terms, therefore, a real estate tax provides a negative inducement for improving one’s property. A slumlord who neglects his property because he views it in cash-flow terms, not as a home that is building generational wealth, nevertheless profits from the improvements made by surrounding homeowners, who by their stewardship raise the value of all the properties in the area.
But that’s not all. When housing is in short supply, as is true in Staunton and most cities today, cheaper homes will appreciate faster than more expensive homes because of increased pricing pressure caused by unmet demand. In simple terms, a million-dollar home may appreciate only a couple of percentage points from one year to the next, while a home that a few years ago may have gone on the market for $150,000 will be listed today for nearly twice that amount, as anyone following Staunton’s real estate listings can attest. That makes real estate taxes extraordinarily regressive, with low-income people getting priced out of homes they can no longer afford because their market value has gone up even as their actual value, measured by their physical condition, has deteriorated.
For numbers nerds eager to explore this subject more deeply, the University of Chicago’s property tax project provides a granular analysis of the subject nationally, with a look at Staunton’s 2023 property tax rates and their regressivity available here. This is truly wonky territory, but the bottom line is this: Staunton three years ago ranked as the 45th least regressive of the 131 Virginia cities and counties in the project’s sample, as its home values were above average nationwide and regressivity levels were in the bottom quartile. So compared to others, Staunton has been fairer than most.
That’s the good news. The bad news is that the data is three years old, and since then the city has seen a 14.45% increase in the median residential assessment. More to the point, pressure on the city to raise revenue is only going to increase as its infrastructure demands keep growing, but hiking real estate taxes—the one significant revenue source over which the city has any control—would fall most heavily on those who can afford it least. Is there no escape?
TO BE SURE, there are a few workarounds Virginia has made available to taxing localities, chiefly in the form of tax exemptions for low-income homeowners. But that approach, while individually helpful, must be seen as a limited patchwork that only underscores how unevenly real estate taxes are applied and doesn’t solve the bigger problem.
One theoretical, if politically unlikely, solution would be to make real estate taxes explicitly progressive, in the same way that income is taxed progressively—those who make more get taxed at a higher rate. Under that approach, homes appraised below a certain level would be taxed very little or not at all, while higher appraisals would be taxed at progressively higher rates. Instead of the current rate of 91 cents per $100 of assessed value, for example, Staunton could have a rate of 85 cents per hundred for homes assessed below the current median value of $251,240, then increase the rate by 5 cents for every additional $50,000 in assessed value, to a maximum of $1.35 per hundred dollars for homes assessed at $750,000 or more. Which, as it happens, is the tax rate in Alexandria, which is no stranger to homes in that price range.
Yet another approach, and one with some academic credentials, is to tax land but not the improvements—or as summarized by conservative economist Milton Friedman (yes, yet another University of Chicago reference point), “the least bad tax is the property tax on the unimproved value of land.” That would at least eliminate the tax disincentive for investing in one’s property, even if it would not address the underlying problem of speculators benefiting from their neighbors’ investments. Moreover, a land value tax (LVT) instead of the common real estate tax would be a huge deal for small land developers and builders, who don’t have the political muscle to push for tax abatements or other incentives. That could make a major difference for a city like Staunton that is trying to incentivize in-fill projects.
The curious thing about our current real estate taxes is that we already assess land and any improvements on it separately—but then combine the two into one assessment to which a single tax rate is applied. Theoretically, then, it would be a simple matter to separate the two and tax land at a higher rate, determined by its development potential, while dramatically reducing the tax rate on improvements that have already been made. Theoretically. Whether that’s even possible under the state’s Dillon rule is, however, questionable.
None of the exposition above will make any difference this Thursday, when the city council will be formally presented with next year’s budget. But it should prompt our elected officials and their administration to question what the city can do long-term to ensure adequate funding of our infrastructure while also protecting our most economically precarious residents, because without that discussion we’ll just find ourselves in the same bind—but worse—a year from now, and for many years after that. That could mean pursuing one of the ideas above. It could mean something entirely different. Whatever it is, however, the real estate tax should be a leading candidate for reform, even if that requires an assault on the Dillon rule.