Tag: AI data center

Rethinking Staunton Crossing

(Reading time: 4 minutes)

Much of tomorrow’s (April 9) Staunton city council meeting, which starts at 7 p.m., will be focused on next year’s budget and proposed increases in utility fees, neither of which is insignificant. But an even weightier matter, because of its long-term repercussions, will be taken up by council members at their work session preceding the regular meeting, when they will be presented with a long overdue “business plan update” for Staunton Crossing. What’s unclear is whether the “update” will include a reexamination of what should be built on this rather expensive chunk of real estate.

For the uninitiated, Staunton Crossing is a 300-acre site at the intersection of I-81 and U.S. 250 that is readily identified by its million-gallon water storage tank, perched on a concrete pillar abutting the interstate. The city purchased this acreage back in 2009 and spent nearly a decade figuring out what to do with it. A comprehensive design was finally prepared by the end of 2018, and millions of dollars have been spent before and since to pave the way for . . . well, that’s the question. Because while this project inched along, the rest of the world was hurtling into a once unimaginable future.

Case in point: one of the four core businesses envisioned for Staunton Crossing was, and is, a data center of the sort that has exploded across the country generally, and in Virginia most notably—indeed, the state now leads the nation with 579 such centers. As originally designed, Staunton Crossing’s data center would total more than 800,000 square feet, far exceeding the square footage occupied by offices (375,000), retail (162,300) or advanced manufacturing (a paltry 13,000 square feet). Various alternative options were also advanced, but in all of them the data center component remained unchanged—and, apparently, unchallenged.

There are several problems with this, not so much because of bad planning but because what seemed reasonable in 2018 is at least questionable today. Less than a million square feet of data center space might have seemed ambitious eight years ago, but today it’s quite a bit on the small side. The proliferation of data centers, primarily in northern Virginia but in other parts of the state as well, not only makes the Staunton site unremarkable but puts the city at a disadvantage for an industry that tends toward clustering. Most significantly, the metastasizing and increased size of these centers has highlighted just how environmentally taxing and destructive they are, driving up electricity and water consumption—and rates—while threatening air quality with their reliance on fossil fuel generators for back-up power.

The precarious state of Staunton’s water supply has been widely chronicled, due both to the aging-out of its supply infrastructure and because of our repeated drought alerts. Local electricity rates, meanwhile, have started climbing after years of being noticeably below those of other states, with Dominion Energy’s overall prices growing 11.6% over the past year and the generation portion of its bill increasing 16.8% over the same period, largely due to rising demand from all those energy-sucking data crunchers. Over the next year, Dominion ratepayers can expect to see another rate hike of around $11 a month.

There are, in other words, so many red flags popping up around the data center explosion that state lawmakers are mulling a slew of proposed regulatory and legislative constraints, raising the possibility that they will make Virginia an increasingly unattractive option for the industry. The feeling in Staunton should be mutual, but whether tomorrow’s business plan update will go in that direction remains to be seen. One line in the power-point presentation prepared by the Timmons Group is suggestive: on the “Current Trends” slide, item 4 is “AI Site Elimination vs Site Selection.” My vote would be for the first half of that equation.

One final note, sparked by that same slide. No. 6 on the list of current trends is the perennial question, “Where will my employees live?” Ironically, the original discussion of what should go into Staunton Crossing included the possibility of workforce housing—a possibility that was inexplicably dropped, with no known record of the thinking behind the exclusion. Eight years later, that looks remarkably short-sighted.

We have to know what we don’t know

(Reading time: 8 minutes)

One of the underlying issues pervading all aspects of the affordable housing discussion we’ve been having locally is the lack of reliable, timely data. There’s a lot we don’t know, and much of what we think we know is flawed.

There is, for example, the recently released regional housing study, which not only lacks a lot of needed information but is burdened by a significant load of outdated and incomplete statistics.  The problem this poses is a false sense of authority. Statistics just look so damn definitive. They’re precise and official looking, and they do such a nice job of reducing complexity into the numeric equivalent of a soundbite that it’s hard to put them aside. They brook no argument—even when they send you off on a wild goose chase.

But the regional housing study is far from unique. A couple of more recent pronouncements about the housing situation illustrate how apparently authoritative sources can paint a picture that on closer examination is at least questionable. Yet because such statements fit so well into a broader understanding of our circumstances, they get adopted and repeated and eventually blend into the background narrative without a challenge. They become accepted wisdom, shutting down further discussion.

Consider, for instance, the question of how much government regulations add to the price of a newly built home.  Developers may have to pay for environmental impact or traffic studies, as well as zoning, impact, utility hook-up and other fees, and have the additional costs of complying with OSHA regs and specific design standards. Builders must comply with building codes and architectural design standards, as well as foot the bill for permit or inspection fees. Could relaxing or amending some of this regulatory burden allow for cheaper housing to be built?

To ask the question is to answer it: of course it would. What that doesn’t tell us is how much of a cost-saving is possible, and whether that reduction would be significant enough to prompt the construction of more affordable housing. Are regulatory costs so high that they are a major disincentive for more housing development? Or are they relatively minor, in the overall scheme of things, and therefore unlikely to produce more than marginal gains if cut back, possibly at the price of lower quality?

We don’t actually know. All the meetings and conversations locally about “solving” the housing shortage have been remarkably unbalanced, in the sense that the people sitting around the table overwhelmingly are from the demand side of the housing equation. The supply side—developers, builders, lenders, underwriters, property managers—has been  remarkably rare.  

So when attendees at a recent SAW housing group meeting heard that $92,000 of a new home’s price tag is attributable to regulatory costs, it might have seemed that a significant information void had been filled. Moreover, given that this statistic was generated by the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB), it certainly sounded authoritative. And the implications are seemingly huge: with a new home in the SAW region going on the market for upwards of $326,000, as much as 28% of a new home’s selling price might be trimmed solely by government fiddling with the various requirements it imposes on builders and developers.

A closer look at that NAHB calculation, however, suggests otherwise. The actual regulatory cost calculated by the association was $93,870, of which it attributed $41,330 to developer’s regulatory costs and $52,540 to regulation during construction. The study was conducted four years ago. The developers’ costs were based on a survey sent nationwide to 2,071 NAHB members—with a scant 57 providing “complete and useable responses.” The association provides no information about which markets were represented in the responses, nor how widely they were distributed. The $41,330 number, in other words, is a wild-ass guess that has little to no relevance to the SAW region in 2025, despite its apparent precision.

Meanwhile, the survey based its conclusions about builders’ costs on 280 “complete and useable responses,” which sounds better than the developers’  stats but with no indication of whether this was a higher rate of return, since the NAHB doesn’t say how many builders were polled. And, again, the study provides no information about which markets were represented or what kinds of homes the builders were erecting. Nearly half of the increased costs those builders attributed to regulations were due to “changes to building codes over the past 10 years,” so there’s no applicability to localities with few or no changes to their building codes over that period. In addition, a substantial chunk of increased regulatory costs was attributed to “architectural design standards motivated by aesthetics, or possibly even, in some cases, a desire to price less affluent residents out of particular neighborhoods.” Is that relevant to the SAW region?

In short, the applicability of this extremely limited “study” to any particular housing market is less than zero— “less than” because using a misleading statistic can create a false sense of comprehension.  But with the NAHB distilling a complex issue into a seemingly authoritative data point, there’s the temptation to think there’s no need to research the issue any further. The regulatory cost burden on new housing construction? Asked and answered.

A different kind of false certainty based on an apparently authoritative source was seen at the Staunton city council’s March 13 work session, at which the planning staff was asked what role developers play in terms of the city’s housing strategy. As just indicated, an accurate answer would have been “little to none.” The staff response, however, was to assert that “most of the land for larger developments has already been purchased, so they are looking at more of the low hanging fruit of the single lots and other smaller cottage-type developments.”

That answer not only was unresponsive, but highly questionable. Even a cursory look at a map of Staunton will disclose an abundance of undeveloped and open land, especially in the city’s northern reaches. The city’s 2018 comprehensive plan, currently being updated, noted that of Staunton’s 12,800 acres, nearly 3,000 acres was vacant land zoned for residential use. Some of that land undoubtedly has been developed in the past seven years, and a significant chunk of it is undevelopable because of steep terrain or flooding hazards, but even with that there’s clearly a lot of room within city limits for more housing.

But land availability isn’t subject merely to physical constraints. Land use ultimately is subject to political choices, notably over zoning. Those 3,000 vacant acres are apportioned among four zoning classifications, with the lowest-density classification claiming nearly a third of the total. Medium-density zoning, meanwhile, had 415 vacant acres, while high-density zoning weighed in with 325.8 vacant acres—all more than enough, one would presume, for at least some significant housing developments. But if that’s not enough, how much more housing could be built through upzoning? Is that something that should be at least examined, without a prior dismissal of the possibility?

Other political choices are reflected in the city’s decision to set aside considerable acreage for an ag-forestal district, “intended to support the growth of active farm, forestal, nursey and related enterprise.” Given Staunton’s location within a heavily agricultural county, it’s not unreasonable to ask whether preserving still more farmland within the city’s boundaries is the most appropriate use of such property, especially if doing so penalizes development of sufficient affordable housing. How many hundreds of acres of the ag-forestal district could be carved out for other uses while still preserving its most attractive natural features, such as the Bells Lane corridor?

Then there are the decisions that went into designing Staunton Crossing, the city’s premier economic development effort. Early on, planners for the project contemplated housing as part of its development mix, presumably in recognition of the need for new businesses to have adequate housing for their employees.  But then, for reasons never made explicit, the housing idea got dropped, even as plans for an AI data center shrugged aside criticism that such centers provide only modest employment gains—the ostensible rationale for building Staunton Crossing in the first place.  Meanwhile, in the seven or so years since those choices were made, new data centers have grown exponentially in size and become omnivorous consumers of water and electricity, raising the question of how well suited such an industrial application is for a region that has had frequent drought scares. Should that part of the project be reexamined to assess its suitability for housing?

None of this is to say that the city should be upzoning any particular area, that the ag-forestal district should be trimmed or rezoned entirely, or that Staunton Crossing should stop trying to recruit data center providers. But it does point to the fact that these and other land-use decisions are inherently political, made at a specific time for reasons that may change or become obsolete, and that new priorities—such as the growing need for affordable housing—may take on greater importance. To dismiss a question about new housing developments by saying, in effect, that there’s no room for big projects is therefore untrue. It also is needlessly self-limiting, forestalling fresh thinking that could open new possibilities.