Category: Affordable housing

Virginia goes where Staunton falters

(Reading time: 11 minutes)

Why are local land-use decisions, as defined by building codes and zoning ordinances, left up to cities and counties? Why do federal and state governments generally relinquish their claim over this aspect of our lives?

The answer is seemingly obvious. The residents of Staunton (and Waynesboro and Augusta County) are far more aware of their local land-use needs than a bunch of politicians in Richmond or Washington, D.C. City councils and county boards of supervisors are closer to their constituents, and thus more responsive to their concerns at the grassroots level—and what is more grassroots than the homes we live in and the businesses we support? Local control is democracy in its purest form.

And yet. . . .

In just a couple of weeks we’ll reach the three-year anniversary of the first SAW Housing Summit, followed six months later by a second such assembly, the two events attracting scores of participants seemingly united by their concern over the area’s homeless population and its lack of sufficient affordable housing. Working groups were created, ideas were brainstormed, regular public luncheons on housing topics were scheduled. The city of Staunton assembled a housing strategy group that met for more than a year, culminating in the creation of . . . a housing commission that meets four times a year, apparently to continue talking.

That’s hardly gangbusters. All those consultant-driven meetings and community energy and self-satisfied hype produced not one additional affordable home, failed to remove even one homeless person from the streets. If local control is rooted in the idea that the lowest levels of government are most sensitive to the needs of their constituents, what Staunton’s political leadership has demonstrated is an understanding that its constituents need to talk about problems but not necessarily do something about them.

It’s sobering, therefore, to realize that the Virginia Assembly seemingly is more attuned to our local housing needs than we are. While we dithered locally, our state’s political leadership stepped into the breach this past year by adopting three bills that revoke local authority over certain housing issues and pass the initiative to the private sector. By doing so, the state essentially has concluded that local authorities are more of an obstacle than a constructive force in meeting their local constituents’ housing needs. The irony is that local officials are still waking up to the implications of what that means and of what lies ahead.

Here’s the rundown:

a) Manufactured Housing

An amendment to the Code of Virginia, effective as of this past March 31, explicitly prohibits localities from regulating manufactured homes more strictly than traditional “sticks-and-bricks” site-built homes. That means manufactured homes now may be placed on any lot that already permits single-family use; prior to this amendment, manufactured homes were restricted primarily to agricultural zoning districts, which is why you see them in the county but not in the city.

That could now change, and to the extent that “manufactured homes” are synonymous with “travel trailers,” the results may not be to everyone’s liking. Although the city’s planners are recommending a code amendment to require such homes be affixed to a continuous perimeter foundation, eliminating the unsightly skirting that conceals the space beneath them, the state’s amendment otherwise opens the door to single-, double- and even triple-wide trailers to be moved into residential neighborhoods. And while the state change limits issuance of certificates of occupancy to five years following the date of manufacture—meaning you couldn’t bring in a 10-year old trailer and try to have it approved as a permanent residence—the fact remains that many house trailers are constructed according to the CATNAP principle: Cheapest Available Technology Narrowly Avoiding Prosecution.

On the other hand, the state change also opens the door to innovative construction methods that can be faster, cheaper and more efficient than traditional on-site construction. “Manufactured home,” as defined by state law, simply means a structure that is transportable in one or more sections, each eight or more feet wide and 40 feet or longer, that is designed to be used as a single-family dwelling. That definition includes not just conventional house trailers, but prefab housing that is built in panels or modules in a controlled environment before being transported and assembled at their final destination.

That sort of thing is still a novelty in the U.S., thanks in part to the kind of zoning restrictions that are now struck down, but is far more common overseas. About 15% of Japan’s new housing is built this way, as are nearly 80% of the homes in Sweden, a country that has refined its approach out of climatic necessity. A factory setting offers numerous possibilities for automation, standardization and quality control, and there are some fledgling efforts in the U.S. to adopt this model for obvious reasons of lower cost and product consistency. Whether prefab housing will get a local foothold is an altogether different question—although as an aside, it sure seems worth investigating, by someone with just a bit of vision, as a possible manufacturing tenant for Staunton Crossing.

b) YIGBY housing

Officially known as the Faith in Housing Act, the “yes in God’s backyard” legislation requires that localities permit qualifying affordable housing developments “by right”—meaning no special permits or review are required—on properties owned by tax-exempt religious organizations and 501(c)3 nonprofits. The new law will become effective Jan. 1, when it will supersede any local restrictions on building density, height or setbacks, in an effort to help declining church congregations make better use of their underutilized property. (It should be noted that the law sunsets after four years.)

The problem of once-robust congregations struggling to maintain buildings and property they can no longer afford is particularly acute in Staunton, which has 76 churches by one local count, or roughly three times the national per capita ratio. Some, like the Marquis Memorial United Methodist Church, have multiple vacant buildings and sit on a couple of acres of lawn and parking lots devoid of more than a handful of cars. But Marquis Memorial is hardly singular, and the Central Shenandoah Planning District, which encompasses the SAW area, has 970 parcels owned by faith-based organizations, totaling more than 2,700 acres.

The new state law smooths the way for congregations wanting to build housing on their property, providing that at least 60% of the homes are reserved for affordable housing, defined as no more than 80% of the median income for rental units and 120% of the median for homes that are sold. With Staunton’s median household income at approximately $66,000 and “affordable housing” defined as no more than 25% to 30% of household income, that would result in monthly rents of no more than $1,100 to $1,320.

Those are still relatively high housing costs for individuals at the low end of the wage scale, but manageable for working couples. But as with the manufactured housing initiative, there are aspects of this code change that may irk some Staunton residents. For example, the city will have to allow a minimum of 20 housing units per acre, as well as building heights of 45 feet (with exceptions in historic districts), regardless of surrounding land use. The developments also may use up to 30% of their floor area for publicly accessible non-residential uses that are “ancillary” to the organization’s mission, including child-care centers, health clinics, coffee shops, fund-raising thrift shops, and so on.

The Staunton planning commission, presented with these changes in state law, authorized city staff at its Sept. 17 meeting to draft the necessary zoning code amendments, so watch for more developments here.

c) Accessory Dwelling Units

If there was one housing initiative that the city’s nascent housing commission seemed to take seriously, albeit in the same ponderous manner with which the city has approached all housing issues, it was the idea of breathing life into accessory dwelling units (ADUs). Incredibly, the state proved itself more nimble in getting there first.

Virginia’s authorization of ADUs basically doubles the carrying capacity of almost all residential land by allowing a second single-family dwelling on the same property, regardless of other zoning limitations. An ADU can be an attached or detached dwelling, must provide facilities for sleeping, eating, cooking and sanitation, and must be allowed under the same site plan and other approval procedures already required for traditional single-family homes. The state law permits localities to exercise only a few discretionary options, including the possibility of requiring that ADU leases must be for 30 days or more—in other words, seeking to ensure that ADUs can’t be built simply as income-generating short-term rentals.

The law also quite clearly states that localities may not “require compliance with any other requirements except as provided in this section,” a prohibition that the Staunton planning commission apparently decided to ignore.

Having wrestled with the ADU provisions for the past three months, the commission this past Thursday decided to ban short-term rentals in a primary dwelling “if the property contains an ADU.” That restriction, planning commission members contended, is a necessary “clarification” of the state law that closes the “loophole” created by the commission’s decision to ban ADUs from being used for short-term rentals. After all, what would prevent a homeowner from building an ADU—then moving into it as his own residence and turning his primary residence into a short-term rental? If the logic works in one direction, why not the other?

There are at least a couple of problems with that reasoning, starting with its disregard of the express prohibition on adding restrictions the state hasn’t already enumerated. But the bigger problem is that Staunton doesn’t have a permitting process for short-term rentals—nor, for that matter, does it have much of anything at all to say about the practice, in keeping with the city’s general aversion toward addressing housing issues. The only thing you need to operate an Airbnb in Staunton is to fill out a quaintly named, one-page “Homestay Registration” form with the city’s revenue commissioner and pay a $50 annual registration fee. Even that low hurdle may be getting ignored.

While the planning commission’s possibly impermissible amendment was offered on the pretext of honoring the intent of allowing ADUs—to create more permanent housing, a problem about which the planning commission has previously had little to say—both the commission and the city have  avoided paying any attention to the root problem. It’s been nearly a decade since Staunton reluctantly addressed the issue of short-term rentals, and the number of Airbnbs in the city has proliferated ever since. Revisiting the phenomenon is certainly worthwhile, since short-term rentals indeed are whittling down the city’s available housing stock, but shoe-horning a limited backdoor limitation on them in this manner is just asking for a legal challenge.

Meanwhile, as planning commission members obsess over details over which they have no control, it appears they’ve been completely oblivious to the honking big problem in the language they’ve approved regarding ADU size. The state’s legislation does not cap the size of an ADU but does allow localities to do so, provided they allow a minimum of either 350 or 500 square feet, depending on lot size. That’s enough for a comfy cottage. Staunton’s ADU language, however, states simply that the ADU’s size “shall be less than” that of the primary dwelling—which is to say, there’s nothing to prevent the owner of a single-family home of 2,000 square feet from building a second home (lot size permitting) of, say, 1,990 square feet.

Interesting.

The ADU law won’t go into effect until July 1 of next year, so the planning commission has time to continue poking at the thing and doubtless will, regardless of how futile that might be. Then again, no one else seems to be paying much attention. No one spoke at Thursday’s public hearing on the matter, suggesting that the default mode on housing issues at the local level is indeed inaction—but just wait. Wait until the first single-wide pops up on one of those nice half-acre lots in Baldwin Acres. . . .

Renting in Staunton? Caveat emptor

(Reading time:14 minutes)

There are government agencies to ensure that the gallon of gas you pump at a service station is actually a gallon. Multiple government agencies assess—however imperfectly—whether the food you buy is safe for human consumption. Government agencies license barbers and hairdressers so you have some assurance they won’t accidentally cut your throat. Cars, airline flights, prescription drugs, amusement park rides, restaurants—almost anything or anyone to whom you entrust your body has some degree of government oversight for your safety and well-being.

Everything, it seems, except for rental housing.

Rent a house or an apartment and you must take it on faith that your new home won’t harm you or your family. That it’s not a fire trap because of faulty wiring, or a petri dish of mold and mildew, or that rotten floorboards won’t give way as you cross a room, or that cockroaches won’t be swarming your kitchen after the lights go out. In Staunton (or Waynesboro or Augusta County), there is no seal of good housekeeping from an inspector who has evaluated rental premises to determine that they’re decent, safe and sanitary. What you see is what you get, and if you don’t see something objectionable when you sign a lease, you’re on your own when trouble develops.

And it will. Not always, of course, but often enough. “Sewer leak in basement, decaying subfloor bathroom, broken/bowing flooring bathroom,” a city building inspector wrote in July last year about a single-family home in Staunton. “Electrical hazard—stove plugged into extension cord,” a Staunton inspector noted the previous month about a local apartment. “Gutters, paint, fascia, soffits, porches, windows,” reads a May, 2025 drumroll of nonspecific but failed inspection items at yet another single-family home.

Those and other reports, alas, came after the fact. They resulted from complaints, not as part of a proactive approach to identifying housing problems before someone was placed at risk. It’s as though we had decided that the best way to ensure a healthy food supply is to wait for people to get sick before inspecting food processing plants and agricultural operations. Or that public health is best served by letting pharmaceutical companies put whatever drugs they want on the market and then see what seems to work and what doesn’t—even if that means people die.

Put in those stark terms, most people will conclude that it makes sense to test and review for safety and efficacy before releasing any number of products and services on the market. Except for rental housing. Rental housing is the inexplicable exception.

THERE ARE LOTS OF REASONS to be concerned about the condition of Staunton’s rental housing, starting with its age. Roughly 40% of city residents live in rented quarters, which exceeds both state (33%) and national statistics. Staunton also has an above-average number of old homes: one-fifth of its housing predates 1939, and 41.6% of all Staunton homes are 65 or older. Age alone is not an indicator of problems, of course, but according to this year’s report from the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University, nearly 50% of renter-occupied units built before 1939 have repair needs, as do 46% of rental units built between 1940 and 1969.

Staunton’s approximately 4,600 renter-occupied dwellings therefore may reasonably be expected to include upwards of a thousand homes that need some amount of repair. That isn’t merely a matter of discomfort—it’s a health issue. Homes in disrepair can result in people getting sick, and rental homes are far more likely to fall into that category than owner-occupied dwellings. The 2025 Augusta Health assessment of community health needs, for example, found that 14% of local residents reported living in unhealthy or unsafe housing during 2025, a proportion “significantly higher” than in 2019. But a closer look at the responses reveals greater extremes: 19.5% of renters reported unsafe conditions, or double the proportion of homeowners. And very-low-income respondents were even more likely to fall into that category, at 31.4%.

The National Low Income Housing Coalition released in June a national renter survey that found 49% of the nation’s 46 million renter households were cost-burdened last year—and 26% were severely cost burdened, meaning they were paying more than 50% of their income for shelter. Moreover, two of every five of those renters lived in homes that needed at least one repair, according to the survey, while nearly 8% lived in homes with multiple physical deficiencies. Leading the list of top complaints: pests (cockroaches, mice, rats, bedbugs), electrical problems, and broken or missing essential fixtures, including sinks, bathtubs, windows, doors, locks and steps.

Alarming though that is, one of the coalition survey’s more illuminating findings was that despite these problems, nearly a third of renters avoid asking a landlord for help when they have a problem. (And more than a quarter of those who did complain said their landlord either responded but didn’t do anything or failed to respond altogether.) Why the reluctance to complain? Simple economics. Renters who wouldn’t raise their concerns said they feared the landlord would respond by raising the rent (18%) or would actually charge the tenant for fixing a problem (14.2%).

People with relatively comfortable incomes simply might opt, under those circumstances, to look for someplace else to live, but that’s a far less likely option for the economically disadvantaged. Not only is the local rental market extremely tight, with few listings and high rents, but more than three-quarters of all low-income renters are burdened by low or no credit scores, according to the coalition. A significant fraction, 15.7%, also have an eviction history—often for missing rent payments—which further limits their mobility.

So what’s a renter faced with substandard and even potentially hazardous living conditions to do? Most, unsurprisingly, will just suck it up and tolerate their situation, regardless of threats to their health and safety. A few—a very few—will complain to city officials, with mixed results, as noted in a section below. And the great majority presumably will nod in agreement with the coalition’s survey finding that “about four in every five renters (79.9%) agreed that rental homes should be required to pass periodic inspections conducted by an authorized agency to ensure those homes are safe to live in.”

Just don’t look for that in Staunton.

IT’S NO LONGER REVELATORY to observe that Staunton has a long tradition of a hands-off attitude toward housing issues. This remains true even where Virginia has loosened its regulatory grip, as with its provision in the Statewide Uniform Building Code that empowers state localities to adopt a rental inspection ordinance “to promote safe, decent and sanitary housing for its citizens.”

To be sure, only 18 Virginia localities, as assessed by Charlottesville Tomorrow in a recent series by  Erin O’Hare, have in fact taken up that offer. State history suggests that rental inspection is a political hot potato that most municipalities either quickly drop—as Waynesboro did three years ago—or that can take decades to enact. Roanoke, for example, took almost two decades to adopt an inspection program, in 1996, and did so only after an apparently preventable fire swept through a house divided into apartments, killing four children and their grandmother. The blaze broke out just months after a group of 72 landlords, owning a total of more than 3,000 properties, had banded together to oppose such inspections, declaring they would fight the city all the way to the Supreme Court to protect their property rights.

Adding to those difficulties are the law’s attempts to walk a regulatory tightrope by imposing various restrictions that discourage some officials from pursuing the idea. Most notable among these is the  requirement that an inspection program cannot be applied to an entire locality but only to a specified “inspection district” within a city or county—presumably a blighted or lower-income neighborhood deserving of such government scrutiny. Just defining such a district therefore can become a politically charged exercise, and even if that’s accomplished, the law is vague on just what kind of compliance can be required from the district’s landlords.

Yet whether these obstacles are worth tackling in Staunton in pursuit of a greater good is not part of any conversation. Instead, the city’s attitude was summed up by John Glover, before his recent retirement as Staunton’s Building Official, when he wrote in an email that such a program “has been explored in the past and staff decided it was not necessary.” A rental inspection program would require additional city staffing and possibly result in higher rents, “which is detrimental to affordable housing,” Glover contended, adding: “We think our complaint-based enforcement of the Virginia Property Maintenance code (which is optional in the state of Virginia) is adequate to ensure safe sanitary rentals to our residents. . . . This approach has proven to be very effective for many years.”

There are, however, at least three problems with these assertions, the first two already identified above. The first is that a complaint-based system is not prophylactic. It allows an adverse situation to develop to the point at which it creates a hazard, threatening health and safety, instead of seeking to nip such hazards in the bud.

The second is that a complaint-based system requires some of society’s most vulnerable members to call attention to themselves in a way that many will find threatening. As already noted, people with marginal incomes, often with physical limitations because of poor health or old age, are unlikely to risk losing their homes in the forlorn hope that the city will compel a remedy of their unsafe or unsanitary living conditions—and are even less likely to do so when a likely outcome is that they’ll end up on the street.

But the third and biggest problem with Glover’s rationale is that it’s made without any factual evidence to back it up. There are no city statistics about the extent or severity of housing deficiencies—indeed, the city still has no inventory of vacant homes, much less occupied homes that have serious deficiencies. A claim that Staunton’s approach to property code enforcement “has proven to be very effective for many years” is akin to saying that the city’s wolf eradication campaign has been a smashing success: we have no unaddressed problems of unsafe and unsanitary rentals, and we have no wolves. The statement is absurd on its face, but say it loudly enough and with sufficient conviction and you’ll win over those who are just looking for an excuse not to do anything.

IF THERE’S ONE THING at which Staunton excels when it comes to housing, it’s the city’s ability to avoid gathering data that might force some kind of reckoning. So if, for example, one were seeking to determine just how many complaints of violations of the state’s Maintenance Code have been filed by renters, under the city’s “very effective” complaint-based enforcement policy, the answer would be—a null set. The city does not “keep or document who makes the complaint,” according to David Smithgall, Glover’s successor as Building Official as of July 1, nor does it record who’s a renter. On the other hand, he added, the number is undoubtedly very low—on the order of 1% to 3%, according to an estimate from Matt Sheaves, the city’s property maintenance inspector.

As it turns out, the city keeps remarkably little documentation of any kind about its inspections, and the little it was logging became even more limited late last year, when apparently it changed the reporting format. So, for example, a request for all property maintenance inspection records for a 12-month period produces one kind of spreadsheet through early August 2025 and a second spreadsheet thereafter. The more recent, more concise spreadsheet no longer includes a brief description of the complaint, such as those quoted at the start of this report, restricting itself to one-word categories like “unsafe” or “sanitation.” The new format also  completely eliminates any reference to the source of a complaint, how a complaint was made or anything identifying the complainant.

Most critically, the newer spreadsheet identifies the name but no longer provides the address of the property owner.

That last point is important because it offers a way, albeit an imperfect one, to identify most rental properties. Any house owned by a limited liability company is all but guaranteed to be an investment property. So is a house owned by someone who doesn’t live in it. Fortunately, while those addresses are no longer conveniently provided in the building department’s spreadsheets, they can be obtained from the city’s GIS website. It just takes a little work.

So what can be gleaned from the city’s complaint investigation spreadsheets? Starting on Feb. 10, 2025 and ending Feb. 6, 2026, the city received a total of 187 complaints of possible violations of the maintenance code. More than half were for “grass and weeds,” and approximately a dozen were for non-residential properties. Stripping both those categories out of the spreadsheets and concentrating on the more serious alleged deficiencies leaves 77 residential complaints over those 12 months—and of those, 44 met the criteria of likely rental properties. In other words, far, far more than 1% to 3%.

How serious were the violations? Hard to say since last summer, because that information is no longer recorded, but the excerpts quoted at the start of this report from the first few months of this study suggest some can be very serious indeed. How have the violations been remedied? Also hard to say, because while some were marked as coming into compliance, others didn’t have an inspector assigned even a year later—even, in a couple of cases, two rental houses marked simply “unsafe.”

But here’s another notable finding to be extracted from this mishmash of data: plot the 44 likely rentals on a map, and 26 of them fit squarely within the confines of the West End study area. Which, of course, is where the preponderance of Staunton’s oldest homes are located. A potential rental inspection district for Staunton couldn’t be more obviously designed.

IT’S NOT A STRETCH TO STATE that 44 rental properties with alleged maintenance code violations are just the tip of the iceberg. Staunton’s aging housing stock suggests as much, as do national statistics, as does Augusta Health’s assessment—indeed, as does common sense. Yet building officials who one might think would be closest to the problem seem most deeply in denial, low-balling the numbers, cutting back on documentation and declining to question the obvious deficiencies in the city’s record-keeping.

The two main arguments against a rental inspection program that John Glover advanced—that the city would need more inspectors and that inspections might drive up rents—are from a standard playbook that is quoted by municipal employees every time such a proposal is made. Indeed, those were exactly the main points made by Waynesboro’s city manager in 2023, when that city’s chapter of Virginia Organizing was calling for a rental inspection program and thought it had the city manager’s support—right up to the moment he cut their legs out from under them.

Of course, both those arguments could be made about any program that safeguards the public. Programs cost money and staff to implement. Compliance requirements affecting the private sector often will increase costs that may then be passed on to consumers. Yet those increased costs, both public and private, are rarely as extreme as opponents would have us believe. And whatever incremental costs are incurred should be balanced against the benefits derived, although that’s hard to do fairly when those expected benefits are dismissed out of hand as negligible.

Virginia cities both larger and smaller than Staunton, recognizing that they have an obligation to their most vulnerable residents, have implemented rental inspection programs, from Colonial Heights (population 18,200) and Hopewell (23,100) to Winchester (28,000), Petersburg (33,000) and Roanoke (100,000). But if concern for one’s neighbors isn’t sufficient motivation to follow the path these cities have taken, maybe a more self-serving one will do the job: failing to ensure that homes are adequately maintained inevitably leads to urban blight and lower property values for everyone nearby, in an ever-widening gyre. Maybe enlightened self-interest can show the way where compassion falters.

Zombies in our housing market

(Reading time: 3 minutes)

One of the most puzzling aspects of the local housing market is the number of vacant homes in and around Staunton. Despite an ostensibly tight housing market, anywhere from 2% to 8% of the city’s housing stock sits empty (no one has a good handle on the actual number), in some cases for years on end. Some of that stock consists of second homes, owned by affluent city dwellers elsewhere who have the money to maintain a small-town retreat. Some is “vacant” only in the sense that the homes are unoccupied more often than not, owned by investors who use them as short-term rentals.

But some of those homes, it turns out, are simply waiting for someone to die.

That insight comes from an April story in The New York Times, which quoted an estimate from Flock Homes, a real estate investment service, that there are roughly 7.2 million vacant single-family homes nationwide that are deliberately kept off the market. These so-called “zombie homes”—it’s unclear from the article whether that’s the writer’s label, or whether he picked it up from Flock—typically are owned by retirees who have paid off the mortgage but no longer live there. Some may be in nursing homes or assisted living facilities, some may have moved in with their children or to a second, smaller home that better meets their needs.

Whatever the reason, the house sits empty because the tax bill triggered by a sale would far exceed the cost of leaving it vacant. That exit penalty primarily includes capital gains taxes, paid on the increased value of a home that’s sold, but in some cases might include depreciation recapture taxes, which apply to sellers of rental properties. In the biggest markets, the total tax liability can add up to more than $100,000, compared with annual costs of less than $10,000 for insurance, maintenance and real estate taxes on a vacant property.

Real estate that get passed down to heirs, on the other hand, is inherited on a “stepped-up basis” to the current market value, effectively eliminating the tax overhang. Under those circumstances, it makes perfect economic sense to leave a house sitting empty rather than putting it on the market, since even a decade in limbo may mean less of a financial bite than a quick sale. Indeed, Flock’s analysis concludes that in Los Angeles, where 34% of the homeowning population is 65 or older, it would take 19 years before carrying expenses exceed exit taxes.

Locally, our carrying costs and exit taxes presumably are lower, but that doesn’t mean Staunton or the wider SAW region have escaped the zombie problem. Indeed, real estate values have climbed so sharply since the pandemic that the temptation not to sell grows larger with each passing year. “Our market does have ‘zombie’ houses, even though I had not heard of that term,” a local realtor acknowledged for me in an email exchange. “I have my eye on two, and when I say ‘my eye on,’ it’s obituaries, because the families are waiting until their loved one dies in the nursing home they have moved into.” The realtor added that there’s no estimate of how prevalent the phenomenon may be locally, but it’s “probably more than we realize.”

Meanwhile, it’s worth remembering that vacant homes generally don’t fare well, and even less so when family members are trying to minimize maintenance expenses over a period of several years. Indeed, if you Google “zombie homes,” the top definition refers to bank foreclosures that result from properties being abandoned and subsequently becoming dilapidated and run-down. From there, it’s just a few steps to more widespread urban blight, suggesting that city officials and homeowners’ groups should take a livelier interest in identifying the zombies in our midst.

Kicking the ADU can down the road

(Reading time: 8 minutes)

To better understand why Staunton can’t get a handle on its lack of sufficient affordable housing, consider the June 18 meeting of its Planning Commission. Dominating the 90-minute session was a meandering and inconclusive conversation about a subject the commission has largely ignored, over which it has little control, but about which it is willing to entertain dystopian fantasies. In doing so, it made an inadvertent argument for renaming itself, perhaps as the Reaction Commission. Or the Let’s-First-See-What-Everyone-Else-Is-Doing Commission.

Among Staunton’s most pressing problems is its largely acknowledged if imprecisely documented shortage of housing that local residents making local wages can actually afford. There just isn’t enough of it to go around in the first place, so what’s available is priced out of reach. The obvious solution is to build more housing that is smaller and less expensive, leading to the equally obvious question: why isn’t that happening? And the obvious candidate to answer that question is the provocatively named Planning Commission (there’s also the newly formed Housing Commission, but that bunch is still trying to figure out what it’s doing), which one might think is currently consumed with trying to cut the Gordian knot of failed housing policy. One would be mistaken.

True, there are numerous reasons why Staunton has an insufficient housing supply, reasons that are at work all across the country and most of which are quite out of reach of a mere five Stauntonians meeting once a month, mostly to review rezoning requests. The cost of construction materials has sky-rocketed since the pandemic, the ranks of skilled construction workers have been depleted by Trump’s xenophobic deportation policies, interest rates are high and apparently poised to go higher. Those aren’t things a local planning commission can affect. But there’s also the matter of housing design and density, and that fits squarely within the planning commission’s wheelhouse. It’s also something the commission avoids looking at too closely.

Strange though it might seem, there’s not enough land available for building small homes in Staunton. With an average population density of just over two people per acre, it might appear that Staunton has lots of room for additional housing. But parks and agricultural districts and heavy industry whittle down the amount of land suitable for development. So too with land devoted to roads and parking lots, as well as land that’s too steep or too rocky or subject to flooding. There is land available for sizeable developments, as evidenced by the recently announced 267-home  McIntosh Village, but that’s big money chasing market-rate housing that will be too big and too expensive for empty nesters or service worker paychecks.

But then there’s our fondness for zoning that deliberately spaces homes far apart, allowing few homes per acre and dictating setbacks and minimum lot sizes and maximum lot coverage—our self-imposed limitations on what’s possible, in other words. Not geography or geology, but the very sort of thing that a planning commission concerned about an adequate housing supply for its existing population should be examining.

Just how inadequately it is doing so was on display June 18, when the commission was presented with a proposed amendment of the city zoning code that would clear the way for accessory dwelling units (ADUs) to be built pretty much anywhere Staunton allows housing.  The proposed revision was not something the Planning Commission had solicited. Nor was it sought by the Housing Commission, which has been slow-walking the ADU idea to some future chin-stroking evaluation. It was instead mandated by the Virginia General Assembly, which to its credit got fed up with all the wheel-spinning in the provinces and adopted this past session a bill that overrides local zoning authority.

Most succinctly, the state is mandating that as of July 1, 2027, ADUs are to be permitted by right—that is, without requiring “May I?” special-use review—in all zoning districts throughout the Commonwealth that allow single family use. ADUs are defined as “an attached or detached dwelling” that provides “complete independent living facilities for one or more individuals.” There are restrictions on size and placement, as well as parking and building code requirements, but basically the new law opens the door for homeowners to double their capacity. It could be with a backyard cottage, a basement apartment, a garage with a second-floor apartment. The additional space could be rented out, or it could house an aging parent or adult child. Best of all, the increase in the city’s housing stock will come without requiring any of the new roads, storm water management, water and sewer lines and other infrastructure that come with a new subdivision.

Planning commission reaction? Mixed but generally aghast. Commission member Dale Hansen, fantasizing about slap-dash cabins with hot plates and composting toilets popping up in backyards, said he wants to see some kind of allowance for ADUs “but not getting too crazy, and I don’t know how to regulate crazy,” eliciting sympathetic chuckles from other commissioners. The way the law is written, Hansen complained, “It’s sort of the Wild West—anyone who wants one can get one.” Well, yeah. That’s the idea.

Commission chair Jessica Robinson summarized the commission’s approach to the idea of getting ahead of an issue by asserting, “I don’t want to be a trailblazer.” No fear there—the state has already taken on that mantle—but because Staunton doesn’t have to amend its zoning code before next July, Robinson clearly is hoping to kick the can down the road. “I don’t think it’s impossible that people will start pushing back on this and that at the next General Assembly session it gets put off further?” she suggested, albeit on a questioning note. “And I think we should wait and see and make sure it survives all that.”

There was talk among the commissioners about seeing what zoning amendments other cities are writing—“Let them fail first, before we fail,” Hansen offered helpfully—and a suggestion that perhaps the Housing Commission could provide helpful insights. There was musing about feeling like “deer in the headlights.” None of it grappled with the fact that Virginia now has an explicit law to which Staunton must conform, without a lot of room for creative embellishments or escape clauses, which means there are only so many ways the city’s zoning code can be amended to be in compliance. The rest is wishful thinking.

Unfortunately, it’s not at all clear that the planning commission comprehends just how much the regulatory landscape is shifting beneath its feet. For the state to wade into a zoning issue—one of the few areas of responsibility reserved for localities—is huge. (See also the new state law that gives churches the by-right power to build affordable housing on their property.) At the same time, the commission’s tone-deaf approach to ADUs suggests its members haven’t been paying attention either to the ADU concept or to the housing needs of their neighbors.  ADUs as a relief valve for housing pressures have been around for years—long enough to be a significant part of the conversation at last year’s Virginia Governor’s Housing Conference, as I wrote last fall, and long enough to be discussed by the city’s Housing Strategy Group and in Comprehensive Plan ruminations. The problem locally is that it’s been just that—talk—and little more, as if a bunch of old folks were sitting around discussing the desirability of going to heaven.

The green and (to a lesser extent) the black area in the graph above are prime sources of potential tenants for ADUs and now comprise substantially more than 50% of all households.

Nor will ADUs be the end of it. In addition to having a high percentage of relatively low-wage workers, Staunton has a higher percentage of elderly residents than the national average. It’s sobering, therefore, to learn that the fastest growing group of people entering homelessness are those 55 and older—people increasingly on fixed incomes, often in poor health, who can no longer afford to live in the city in which they were raised or worked or raised their own families. ADUs are not only more appropriately sized for these populations, which don’t need multiple bedrooms or a backyard, but can be built more cheaply and therefore rented for less than single-family homes. But they’re only one possible approach.

Other housing variations that are excluded from permitted uses within current zoning regulations, such as cottage courts, may be next. Expect pressure to grow for allowing single-family home conversions into duplexes or triplexes by right, or for eliminating lot size minimums in established neighborhoods, or for eliminating all parking mandates for housing, thereby freeing up more land for infill development. None of these are novel concepts in the wider world, although they are locally. All should enter into the planning (and housing) commission’s awareness if it wants to avoid future “deer in the headlights” moments, and if it intends to take seriously the “planning” part of its mandate.    

Instead, the commission won’t be meeting again until August, when it’s not clear whether the proposed ADU revisions to the city code it receives will be substantively different from what it’s already seen. The city’s community development planners have been given next to no guidance on what changes to make, beyond a vaguely worded request to “keep refining it.” At some point the commission will have to hold a public hearing on the proposed changes; next April was suggested as a good choice.

No sense in rushing things. Or starting them, for that matter.

Warring against willful ignorance

(Reading time: 11 minutes)

Staunton’s census tracts, showing homeownership percentages (in black) and poverty levels (in red), with Census Tract 2 highlighted in pink at left; from Anna Leavitt’s presentation to Staunton City Council on June 25.

For several weeks now—ever since the latest American Community Survey statistics were released—I’ve been thinking about writing something tentatively titled “A Tale of Two Cities.” The piece would have focused on the West End generally, and on Census Tract 2 specifically, and on the various disparities between that area writ small and Staunton overall. And then this past week Anna Leavitt beat me to the punch, at least partly, with a presentation to city council that was an unexpected and bright counterpoint to Staunton’s generally sluggish approach to such matters.

Leavitt, former director of CAPSAW (Community Action Partnership of Staunton, Augusta and Waynesboro), apparently has an affinity for complex acronyms: these days she identifies herself as Staunton’s EMOSA, which stands for Economic Mobility and Opportunity Special Assistant. She’s been in that position only since January, yet already has done more to fill in the terra incognita portions of Staunton’s demographic map than any of the numerous studies and plans generated over the past decade. That’s truly good news. But it’s only a start.

The bottom line in Leavitt’s presentation on Thursday was that it doesn’t matter where you live in Staunton, a median household income is no longer enough to buy you affordable housing. That holds true regardless of whether you’re a lower-income single parent with one child, a two-earner moderate- or middle-income household with two children, or a retired senior living on a fixed income: in each case, expenses outstrip income by several hundred dollars a month. In some parts of the city, however, the deficits are larger than others, and Leavitt’s analysis thus far is only scratching the surface of what that means.

Look at the statistics for Staunton’s seven census tracts, and you’ll be immediately struck by the extremes of Census Tract 2. This is the area south of West Beverley Street often recognized as a major part of the West End, which as defined by the city also includes a hefty chunk of Census Tract 3, on the north side of West Beverley. But Census Tract 2 is considerably more immiserated than its counterpart, as evidenced by median household incomes—$49,470 for tract 2, $80,914 for tract 3—and other indicators of economic well-being. As a result, discussions about the West End generally blur many significant variations; they also obscure the even more stark comparisons between Census Tract 2 and Staunton overall.

For starters (and as Leavitt pointed out), Census Tract 2 has the highest poverty rate of any Staunton census tract, at 19.2%, compared to the city’s overall rate of 12.6%. It also has one of the city’s lowest homeownership rates, at 43%, compared to a citywide average of 61%. That means nearly three of every five homes in Census Tract 2 are owned by someone who lives elsewhere, whether that’s in the house next door or in Virginia Beach, accounting for the large number of complaints from area residents about absentee landlords and neglected properties. It also means the tract’s 4,000 residents have limited financial resources, and therefore limited mobility, to improve their living conditions.

Moreover, the housing that exists, for renters and homeowners alike, ain’t that grand. Of the census tract’s approximately 1,120 rentals, nearly half have what the Census Bureau calls a “condition”: either a lack of complete bathroom facilities, a lack of complete kitchen facilities, an occupancy higher than one person per room, or rent that takes more than 30% of their tenants’ income. Homeowners aren’t faring a whole lot better, with nearly a quarter living in a home with a “condition.” Overall, then, it’s safe to conclude that a huge chunk of Census Tract 2 residents are living in crowded conditions or are paying way more for housing than is financially sustainable for the long term.

 Other Census Tract 2 statistics further underscore the challenges its residents face. Eleven percent of the population was without healthcare coverage in 2024—a percentage sure to have climbed this year because of the federal government’s decision to end Obamacare subsidies—as against 6.4% for Staunton overall. Sixteen percent of Census Tract 2 residents are disabled, which is not that much higher than the city’s rate of 15.2%, but which is more consequential in the context of all the other problems they face. It’s also noteworthy that 45.5% of Census Tract 2 residents have never married, a metric typically associated with household stability and individual health and longevity, compared with a citywide average of 33.9%. And a bit more than 15% of the area’s adults older than 25 don’t have high school diplomas.

The residents of Census Tract 2, in other words, face numerous obstacles that are more limiting than those found elsewhere in the city.  

THE POOR HOUSING SITUATION in the West End generally, and in Census Tract 2 specifically, is no secret. Indeed, having recognized the area’s potential to go into an economic tailspin, the city in 2020 embarked on a four-year exercise to forestall disaster by studying the area and formulating a remediation plan. The result was the 115-page West End Revitalization Plan that the Staunton city council formally adopted at the end of 2024. Woven throughout the plan are the concerns and complaints of area residents about a lack of available and affordable housing, as well as the widespread deterioration of existing housing stock.

But housing, as it turned out, was only a small part of the plan’s remit. And the final plan’s remedial housing recommendations are . . . superficial, to say the least. The leading “action item” regarding housing, for instance, calls for connecting West End homeowners “to existing resources” that would help them address “building and property maintenance code violations.” Only one of the plan’s proposals directly addresses renters, and then by suggesting they should be educated about their rights, presumably so they could hold their landlords accountable for providing decent, safe and sanitary quarters. Indeed, when you parse the handful of housing-related recommendations, it all boils down to a lot of talk but no action or any commitment to provide new city assistance.

It should go without saying that people one step away from being homeless are hardly in a position to insist that their rights be respected. When you’re scraping by at a job that pays less than $20 an hour but still have to fork over more than $1,000 a month for rent because there’s nothing available for less, your airy “rights” take a back seat to more pressing concerns when your landlord won’t get around to fixing the AC. You suck it up. And as I wrote 18 months ago, while the wool-gathering that went into the West End Revitalization Plan encountered repeated complaints of unscrupulous landlords and neglected properties, little of that got more than a passing acknowledgment in the plan itself, apparently because anecdotal stories are easier to ignore than hard numbers.

The lack of hard data should by now be a matter of civic embarrassment. Roughly six years after the revitalization study was started, city planners still do not have an inventory of vacant and developable land in the West End, or an inventory of deteriorating or abandoned dwellings that should be refurbished or condemned. (The city tax assessor presumably has that data, but that speaks to another city problem, of siloed information.) The city has no idea how many rental properties are owned by people who live outside of Staunton. And then there’s the problem of information bias creeping into studies like the Revitalization Plan: of approximately 170 responses to a community survey conducted for the plan, for example, only 78% were from people who actually live in the West End—and of those, nearly 90% were homeowners. In other words, responses from the renters comprising the majority of Census Tract 2 residents were vanishingly few.

Little wonder, then, that the revitalization plan’s proposed remedies regarding housing instability are so toothless. A meaningful recommendation, for example, might have called for adoption of a rental inspection program specifically targeting Census Tract 2, similar to programs operating in Roanoke, Winchester, Hopewell, Colonial Heights, Petersburg—cities throughout the Commonwealth that are both larger and smaller than Staunton. Such programs focus on specific areas in each city where older residences, absentee ownership and low incomes create an environment conducive to property neglect and housing deterioration.

Although the Virginia Landlord and Tenant Act makes landlords largely responsible for the living conditions in their properties, it doesn’t have a mechanism for tenants to enforce its provisions when a landlord ignores complaints. So a tenant’s options when faced with an intolerable living situation are to move—not exactly an alternative in the current market—or to file a lawsuit, which is an even more burdensome proposition. In cities that have rental inspection programs, however, rental units are subject to periodic inspections to ensure they conform with the state’s Maintenance Code, providing some assurance that such problems are less likely to crop up in the first place.

Waynesboro seemed about to adopt such a program three years ago, but then scrapped the effort amid claims that it would be too expensive to implement and that it would raise the already high cost of housing. That sounds remarkably like the fallacious arguments often made against increasing the minimum wage, serving mainly as a rationale for paying people slave wages or, in this instance, keeping them in blighted housing. But it gets repeated uncritically by those who don’t believe government should get involved in housing issues in the first place.

So, for example, asked why Staunton doesn’t have a rental inspection program, John Glover, whose job title is Building Official in the city’s Community Development department, replied that city staff had looked at the possibility in the past and “decided it was not necessary.” Having such a program, he wrote in an email that echoed Waynesboro’s rationale, “can increase the cost of rentals, which is detrimental to affordable housing.” It would require additional staffing, “which can be costly for the city.” A more cost-effective approach, he maintained, is complaint-based enforcement of the state’s Maintenance Code, which can result in the city taking legal action against property owners who don’t remedy violations.

Without providing any specifics about how many complaints have been investigated or how many times a property owner has been taken to court, Glover concludes that “this approach has proven to be very effective for many years.” Perhaps. But as with so many city responses to the West End’s problems, that assertion is made without a factual grounding. It assumes that people living in deficient housing not only know of the city’s complaint-based enforcement of the Maintenance Code—a code that gets only a single, unexplained mention in the Revitalization Plan—but that they have enough courage or desperation to risk calling attention to themselves by filing a complaint. A scarcity of complaints does not necessarily indicate the lack of a problem.   

ALL OF THE ABOVE presupposes that indeed there are unattended housing problems in Census Tract 2. Given the area’s general economic data and the anecdotal feedback received by the Revitalization Plan, that seems like a pretty safe bet. But that very wobbly assertion also attests to the city’s willingness to not look at things too closely.

If you can say with a straight face that you don’t see a problem, then no one can fault you for not fixing it, and that’s pretty much how Staunton has approached its housing problems in the past. That’s true city-wide, but especially so in the West End, and Census Tract 2 more specifically. That’s why the hard data is so spotty. It’s why city staff can so blithely declare that city intervention or oversight “is not necessary.” It’s how residents’  feedback can be superficially acknowledged but ignored when spending and policy-making decisions are made. It’s why planning study after planning study ends up gathering dust on a shelf somewhere.

That changes are afoot, albeit at a glacial pace, is not due to any sudden epiphany, but because at some point being oblivious stopped being an option. Our homeless population is not going away, and indeed—as may be confirmed mid-July in a special Point in Time census—appears to be growing. The state, which historically has left zoning decisions up to localities, is now mandating that Staunton and other cities allow construction of accessory dwelling units—essentially a second home—anywhere they allow single-family homes, an option over which Staunton has been dithering for at least the past year. Another state initiative, signed into law last month, allows churches and other tax-exempt nonprofits to build affordable multifamily housing on their property without prior city approval. And meanwhile the gap between what people are paid and what they have to pay to keep body and soul together is widening.

Staunton’s new EMOSA seems intent on plugging some of those data holes, which will make a deliberate ignoring of the problem much, much harder to sustain. Good luck, Anna!

Follow the colored-dot road . . .

(Reading time: 17 minutes)

A draft of Staunton’s revised and updated Comprehensive Plan is out for review, following 18 months of data collection, meetings and pulse-taking—including hundreds of colored dots on a wall of easels—and presumably is heading for rapid city council adoption in early June. Public comments are being received until May 26. We should hope there are many.

As plans go, this latest iteration is an improvement over the original, which was adopted July 11, 2019—before Covid and before the post-pandemic explosion in real estate prices, an affordable housing crisis, devastating downtown floods and numerous other shifts in the firmament. That initial “plan” was far more descriptive than prescriptive, more a gazeteer than a road map suitable for navigating two decades. Its conservative approach meant the original plan avoided being derailed by the Covid era, but even on those few occasions when it tried to peer into the future it often missed the mark, as when it projected that Staunton’s population in 2040 would be 25,442—a number the current draft revises upward by 10%.

Predicting the future is tricky business, to be sure. But the 2019 plan also was hindered by its blinkered view of what properly falls within the city government’s scope of responsibilities, a perspective shaped at least as much by philosophy as by financial limitations. The plan’s view of housing, as “primarily a private system that is influenced by factors beyond those controlled by local government,” is perhaps the most egregious example of a hands-off attitude that produced a planning document with obvious blind spots. The result was a soulless slab of prose, devoid of vision or inspiration, suffocated by the expectation that the Staunton of 2040 would be just like Staunton in 2020 only more so.

The new draft, by contrast, takes a more expansive view of the city’s role, which is a welcome change. But it also goes to the opposite emotional extreme, so devoted to “vision” that it often reads like a romantic ode, a fulsome psalm to a city that is welcoming, vibrant, empowering, resilient, inclusive, thriving, harmonious, sustainable . . .  and on and on.  Fair enough—who wouldn’t want to live in a place like that?—but at some point it does become a repetitive blur. The new draft also is big on graphics and states forthrightly it intends to “minimize text,” which may be a nod to shortened attention spans but which undermines its credibility as a planning document. We think, analyze and plan more with words than with images, although images do provide a better complement to the whole “vision” thing.

But whether dry or frothy, both the original and the revision fall short of being either “comprehensive” or of being a “plan.” The update is more aspirational than the original, to be sure, but its attention to detail is erratic and uneven, ranging from the highly specific—even providing exact dollar amounts for specific sidewalk expenditures—to the kind of broad-brush statements of intent with which no one can quibble but with little or no guidance regarding how to get there. The lack of sufficient affordable housing, to offer just one example, is acknowledged as being “a foundational theme that touches nearly all chapters” of the plan, yet the housing section has the least number of proposed “tactics” of any of them, and even those few are wan at best.

Does it matter? On the plan’s own terms, it should. The Comprehensive Plan, according to its introduction, “guides Staunton’s efforts to update local ordinances, justifies city programs and initiatives, helps officials set budget priorities, and directs decisions or development applications.” In other words, the plan defines what’s important and what isn’t. If something isn’t in the plan, it doesn’t exist and stands a good chance of being overlooked. Any evaluation of the plan therefore should pay as much attention to what isn’t there as to what is.

Land Use

In the news business, it’s called burying the lede: starting a story with peripheral details, only getting around to the core concept many paragraphs later.  In the section on land use, the lede is buried in a grey table of “tactics” that makes passing but repeated mention of “updates to the Zoning Ordinance” to solve various problems (infill, residential development in commercial districts, cottage courts, accessory dwelling units, etc.) without any prior narrative introduction of the ordinance, its limitations, or whether the whole thing should be overhauled rather than be subjected to a thousand tweaks and cuts. Instead, the explanatory text preceding the “tactics” (recommendations) is replete with mostly generic drawings of various land uses and how they might be improved, seemingly borrowed from the Cincinnati Urban Design and Architecture Studio, together with concepts like “building to street ratios” that it doesn’t explain. It’s all very colorful, but given the lack of a comprehensive review of the zoning code, mostly unhelpful.

How much more useful would this have been if the plan’s drawings were of actual Staunton city blocks, the streets and existing buildings clearly labeled, together with a vigorous discussion of how Staunton currently assigns land use and how it might do so differently? As it is, an ostensibly comprehensive plan casually presents information that should—but doesn’t—elicit sharp questioning, such as its unquestioned endorsement of reserving nearly a quarter of the city’s land for “heritage farmland.” Should it?  Why? How is it sensible to set aside municipal acreage for cattle grazing when we’re surrounded by the state’s second largest agricultural county?

That’s not to say that the misleadingly labeled “ag-forestal” (much more ag than forest) corner of the city should be turned into suburbs, but that there is no sign that the comprehensive plan even considered alternative uses for the land.  It also plays into repeated nonsense like this statement: “Trends analysis indicates that roughly 86% of Staunton’s land is already developed, meaning future housing growth will rely primarily on reinvestment, infill development, and reuse of existing structures.”  That sounds dire, doesn’t it? But given that 22% of Staunton’s land mass is, as just noted, undeveloped agricultural land, it’s also absurd.

A more accurate—and helpful!—statement would be that “roughly 86% of Staunton’s land is already developed under current zoning constraints,” which opens the door to all kinds of fresh possibilities.  Zoning is something we invented. It’s something we could change. And if we did, it’s amazing how much land would abruptly be available for all sorts of urban designs.

Farmland aside, there are numerous examples of ostensibly “developed” but underutilized land in Staunton. Consider, for example, the commercially zoned dog-leg rectangle between N. Central and Augusta that runs from West Frederick to Pump Street. Covering approximately 7.5 acres, this three-block area is immediately adjacent to the much more densely occupied multi-use downtown area that is generally regarded as an example of enlightened land use. But what do we find here? Five financial institutions, two fast-food restaurants and a store-front church—eight buildings altogether, with a combined footprint a tad over 35,000 square feet, covering just 11% of the land they occupy. As for the other 289,000 square feet of that “developed” land? Mostly asphalt parking lots and driveways.

Imagine if, instead of all those borrowed graphics, the plan had mapped out this three-block expanse and showed how it could be redeveloped for maximum use and return on the dollar. Yes, the land is privately owned. But the private sector, more readily than government, recognizes how it benefits economically from greater density and its synergistic effect on business. What the private sector doesn’t have is the overarching vision and resources to assemble such a transformation. That’s where the comprehensive plan could make a difference.

Blind Spots

The unquestioned acceptance of continuing the ag-forestal land-use designation is symptomatic of a bigger problem within the comprehensive plan: that of failing to see or question what’s right in front of our faces.

Decaying churches

Staunton is chock-a-block with churches, many with congregations that are aging out and increasingly unable to support large sanctuaries. Some are relatively modest, others may include spacious grounds and additional buildings. But like aging parents with a house stuffed full of belongings that no one will know what to do with when they die, too many will pass away without proper dispensation of their assets.  For one example of what that looks like, see the former Bibleway Community Church on West Beverley, vacant for all of this decade and increasingly showing it.

Aging churches can be revitalized or repurposed in various ways, most notably but not solely as affordable housing. But whatever transformation may occur often requires the intervention of an outside agency, such as the city, working from an inventory that assesses which churches can continue to flourish and which ones need hospice care. Most critically, repurposing church properties typically requires someone else to initiate the conversation, since most aging congregations are reluctant to acknowledge they can no longer support their long-established houses of worship. That’s an understandably delicate exchange to have, but it only gets harder the longer it’s postponed.

Even without an inventory of an estimated 76 Staunton churches, there are a couple of obvious places where the comprehensive plan could get the ball rolling. The Marquis Memorial United Methodist Church on West Beverley, for instance, has more than two acres fronting on one of the city’s principal gateways, as well as several vacant and near-vacant buildings. It also has a dwindling congregation and can afford only a part-time pastor. Heating and cooling costs for its large sanctuary are so high that the church frequently holds services in other spaces on the property that have lower ceilings. How much more productively could that property be used?

Or consider Christ United Methodist Church on Churchville Avenue, also a Staunton gateway. A potential candidate for revitalization rather than repurposing, Christ United sits on five acres that present several development possibilities. Some of that land, for example, could be used for housing or a mixed-use development that would generate revenue for the church, thereby creating an income stream that offsets declining financial support from a diminishing congregation. But here, too, it might take creative city outreach to set such a change in motion.

Other iffy assets

Numerous though they are, Staunton’s churches are hardly the only large buildings that are under-utilized or facing obsolescence. Two of the most notable are the vacant and decaying Ingleside Resort, on the north end of town, and the spooky, shuttered sanitarium next to the Frontier Culture Museum. The former apparently is mentioned nowhere in the comprehensive plan. The latter gets a nod in one of the two appendices, in which attendees at an open house suggested the “DeJarnette campus” has development potential. No explanation or context is provided for that description, which would be meaningless for Staunton residents without a good historical grounding, and no attempt is made in the plan to explore the development potential of either property.

An even larger property within the city, widely referenced by the plan as a notable asset while avoiding a direct examination of its precarious outlook, is Mary Baldwin University. The plan does make a brief suggestion that the city should “develop plans for what to do if the worst-case scenarios unfold,” but then fails to describe what those scenarios might be or how the city might respond. That’s unfortunate. The university encompasses 58 acres of prime land and multiple buildings, including dorms that could be repurposed as low-income housing. While closing the campus would be a significant loss to the city, it would open other possibilities to which Staunton should be ready to respond in a timely fashion.

In addition to such major examples, Staunton has numerous vacant buildings whose existence the plan acknowledges but doesn’t address, beyond mentioning that it would be a good idea to inventory them. We’ve known that for years, of course, but for some reason such an inventory has yet to be assembled, which means the city is often flying blind when trying to match unmet needs with unused assets. One example is the city’s recurring failure to find space for a day shelter for the homeless—even though there is, and has been for quite some time, a vacant storefront right next to city hall, as well as several vacant buildings on South Augusta Street, all of which would be more than sufficient for the purpose. And then there’s the former Coca Cola bottling plant at the intersection of Augusta and Churchville streets, which at one point was eyed as a possible brewery but which remains empty year after year.

How is that we have people who need a roof over their heads, and buildings that have roofs but no tenants? And how is it that such an obvious pairing of needs and resources goes unaddressed in the city’s “comprehensive” plan?

Infrastructure

Sewer and stormwater systems are among the infrastructure elements that make it possible for more than 25,000 people to live in close and supportive proximity to each other. But so is the network of water mains and pipes that delivers potable water to every city home and business, and while the comprehensive plan has much to say about storm water it is almost entirely silent about the drinking kind.

That may be the inevitable result of the very visible destruction caused by recent flooding, leading to the plan’s emphasis on storm water management, versus the comparative invisibility of the water that’s being moved underground. On the other hand, last year’s major water-main break came in the middle of the comprehensive plan’s drafting process and should have been top of mind. Instead, the plan says nothing at all about pipes that are now more than a century old, or about a water delivery system that loses more than one in every four gallons that are pumped into it—a rate nearly twice the national average—or about the $40 million to $50 million the city says it will need to fix these problems.

The city shows no sign of knowing where that money will come from. This plan won’t be any help in that regard.

Economic development

To read the comprehensive plan, you might think that the only economic vitality in Staunton is centered on the downtown area, and that the only kind of business the city wants to attract is the kind that plays well with tourists: outdoor recreation, arts and music festivals, restaurants, galleries, theaters, pop-up markets and so on. If the city wants to attract manufacturing of any sort, you wouldn’t know it from this document. Nor would you know what kind of business development the city would like to see along Greenville Avenue or Route 250.

But the plan’s biggest economic oversight is the blind-eye it turns toward Staunton Crossing, which it mentions not at all despite the millions of dollars already poured into that industrial park’s development. That may be because among the park’s targeted industries is a data center, with all the electricity and water consumption issues and controversy that entails—reason enough, perhaps, to just pretend that there’s no “there” there. Unfortunately, that also means there is no consideration in the plan of possible alternatives for the park, such as manufactured housing or solar panels and batteries, which would create many more long-term jobs than a data center and at a far lower social and environmental cost.  

 Ignoring the inevitable

Unlike blind spots, which refer to things the plan simply doesn’t acknowledge, there are several problems or issues the comprehensive plan does see—and then ignores.  

Homelessness

As mentioned above, the new comprehensive plan goes where the old one didn’t by recognizing the centrality of housing to virtually every aspect of the city’s vitality, from economic development to meeting educational needs to community health. And as have other plans that seek community input, the draft plan acknowledges public concern about the consequences of inadequate affordable housing. When plan consultants conducted what they describe as “public intercepts,” housing was the number one concern voiced by the people they encountered, by far. Attendees at an open house highlighted “the lack of focus on vulnerable populations, particularly homelessness, in current plans.”   Vision statements for the city called for “more services for the unhoused.”

So it comes as a surprise that the comprehensive plan presents not even one suggestion for meeting the needs of people who lose their homes, even as it gives pro forma recognition to “the challenges faced by people facing homelessness.” Instead, it deflects. Housing is a “national issue,” the plan explains, presumably as much beyond local control as climate change. “Local efforts are unlikely to ‘solve’ the housing affordability problem.” (Bye-bye, Staunton Housing Commission?)

But failing to “solve” the housing affordability problem, it should go without saying, only guarantees that the number of people who are homeless will continue to grow. Indeed, Alec Gunn, executive director of the Waynesboro Area Relief Ministries, says that demand this past winter for overnight emergency shelter grew 26% over the previous year, even as the number of churches willing to provide such shelter is declining. Efforts to create a day shelter for the homeless have been even more ragged, with a church that was intermittently open for that purpose last summer—a first—declining to do so again this year.

Regarding all this and more having to do with homelessness, the comprehensive plan is silent.

Student population growth

While the plan draft acknowledges that Staunton’s public schools are at or beyond “functional capacity,” its forecast of what that means for the future is tentative at best—even as it cites the possibility of “urgent space management.” “If” current population growth continues, the plan states, “further modular units and long-term facility expansions will be necessary.” But the plan makes no effort to project how much the student population may grow, or in what parts of the city, basically deferring to Staunton City Schools to “assess current conditions and identify future infrastructure, modernization and capacity needs.”

That may be appropriate in jurisdictions where there is greater distance between municipal and pedagogical governance, but the two are intertwined more tightly in Staunton. The city, because of its planning and zoning responsibilities, is in a better position than the school district to assess future growth patterns. At the same time, the city inevitably will be involved in whatever financing is needed for new school buildings, and possibly for expansion or renovation of existing facilities, suggesting that city planning for such developments should be more proactive than the comprehensive plan contemplates.

In closing . . .

To the extent that the revised comprehensive plan is more user-friendly than its predecessor, thanks to more graphics and minimized text, it may pull in more eyeballs and thereby increase public engagement. That’s a good thing. The not-so-good thing is that such overly visual and summarized presentations tend to diminish critical analysis, acting like cotton candy for the brain: long on mouth-feel, but neither filling nor nutritious.

Much of what the comprehensive plan presents is a distillation of the aspirational and critical comments it received from the public in multiple forums—and yes, that’s also a good thing. But most of that feedback was in response to alternatives presented by the plan’s architects (for this feature, do you prefer A or B?), which means public input was largely limited to the subjects and choices it was given. That’s why the plan has so many blind spots, and presumably many more than the few I’ve offered. And when the public was given a more open-ended opportunity to voice concerns, subjects it raised that didn’t fit within the plan’s parameters often would be acknowledged but then ignored.

Making 20-year decisions based on how many colored dots ended up on a series of easels, which was one of the primary methods used to solicit public feedback,  is better than casting a series of animal bones onto a blanket to divine the future. But not that much better.

The housing squeeze, part two

(Reading time: 8 minutes)

I recently wrote about the housing affordability crisis in our region (although we’re hardly unique) that can be summarized in just two numbers: a median home sales price in February of $330,000 (jumping to $347,250 in March) vs. a median Staunton wage income of $55,023. That puts the average home out of affordable reach of most two-earner households, never mind single-parent households, who then have no recourse but to lease a home—where, no surprise, they put greater upward pressure on that market, pushing local rents above $1,300 a month.

If wage incomes and housing costs were in balance, the market would respond by building more housing until equilibrium is restored. But while a lot of housing is in fact being built, it won’t do anything to relieve the affordability shortage because it costs too much. That’s not because developers are greedy, but because local incomes haven’t increased as much as have labor, materials and the other costs of building new homes. Those new homes will be sold to people moving in from elsewhere—and working elsewhere, where they’ll get paid more. In other words, what we have here is a broken economy.

When other aspects of a local economy are broken, we don’t expect it to miraculously heal itself. We turn to government, with its size and scale, rule-setting powers and taxing authority. If roads must be built or repaired to facilitate commerce, government does that. When economic inducements are needed to lure industry, government provides those. But when it comes to helping people get into affordable housing, well, that’s historically been a different story. People were expected to pull themselves up by their bootstraps, even when they didn’t have boots, and while that attitude is changing, it’s a long, slow process.

To be sure, there are government programs to help with housing—it’s just that they’re relatively few in number and rarely up to the task. Community Development Block Grants, for example, often are touted as one such source of help. But while Staunton has received such grants for several years, you’ll be hard-pressed to point to even one affordable housing unit that exists because of CDBG funding, with most of the money going instead to projects such as fixing sidewalks or getting a new kitchen for the Salvation Army. With the Trump administration now seeking to defund the CDBG program altogether, even those limited expenditures may soon seem fanciful.

Indeed, Trump’s budget proposals are consistent with a stubborn insistence on the extreme right  that we’ll never have sufficient affordable housing until government gets out of the way. “The states should reduce barriers to multifamily housing investment by cutting property taxes and liberalizing zoning and building regulations,” urged a Cato Institute spokesman in Congressional testimony last May, apparently oblivious to the fact that property taxes are set at the local level. Or, for that matter, oblivious to the necessity for raising property taxes in many localities.

Unfortunately, many of the libertarian Cato Institute’s simplistic remedies, and those of its philosophical soulmates, are given legs by their more telling critique of today’s status quo. Take just one example, made topical by a recent legal threat to derail an affordable housing project in Waynesboro, the first in our region since 2020 to benefit from the federal low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC). LIHTC apartments rent at below-market rates to families with incomes below the median income, which in our area are legion. They’re also nothing new to the area, in which developers used LIHTC funds for the first time in 2001 to renovate Fairfax Hall in Waynesboro, and subsequently added 968 rent-subsidized apartments and town homes at 11 separate locations in Waynesboro, Staunton and Augusta County. But getting to that point wasn’t easy, and now is becoming less so.

The way LIHTC works is thus: each year, the Internal Revenue Service distributes credits to the states, which in turn award them to developers to cover part of their costs of constructing or rehabbing apartment buildings. In exchange, the developers agree to cap rents for low-income tenants. The developers then sell the credits to investors to raise cash with which to start construction, giving investors equity in the projects and credits to apply against their tax returns over a 10-year period. That sounds like a win-win for most everyone—except that this process has grown into such a bureaucratic nightmare over the years that most builders won’t even pursue LIHTC projects.

It also provides Cato and other critics with their most powerful ammunition against “the growth of the welfare state.” For example, the LIHTC statute and related IRS regulations are 442 pages in length, the IRS auditing guide for the LIHTC is 344 pages, an IRS guide for LIHTC building compliance is 214 pages.  An industry guidebook to the program runs to 1,942 pages.  That’s a whole lot of deterrence against even applying for LIHTC certification, and it doesn’t end there: once such a project is completed, building owners must adhere to rent caps and tenant income limits for 30 years and keep records of each residents’ income, assets, and family composition.

Because of these and other LIHTC requirements, the cost of such units is significantly above those of non-subsidized housing. Those requirements also result in increasingly complicated financing packages, referred to as “capital stacks,” to underwrite construction. Such stacks consist of an array of government and other subsidies, each of which comes with its own rules and fees, and each of which takes time to cobble together, thus adding to the bottom line. The LIHTC cost disadvantage, according to various estimates, is around 20%, although it can be twice as high in more rural areas. That’s just so much raw meat for the free-market crowd.

No wonder, then, that the LIHTC train ground to a halt locally over the past six years, despite a dozen successful projects completed in the previous decade. Who can handle that kind of aggravation when there’s plenty of demand for new housing at more profitable market rates?

Last year, however, a non-profit developer of affordable homes, Enterprise Community Development, announced it would build Alston Court, a $35 million 96-unit apartment complex near the Texas Roadhouse in Waynesboro. All 96 units would be rented at affordable rates, according to Enterprise, meaning tenants would not pay more than 30% of their income for housing. Eight units would be reserved for households making less than $18,000 a year, which is just 30% of the local median income. An additional 75 units would be set aside for those making less than 60% of local median income, and 13 units would go to households making between 60% and 80% of the median. All that works out to monthly rent topping out at $1,200 a month—and dropping to less than $450 at the low-income end.

But having secured its LIHTC package, Enterprise Community Development had to assemble the capital stack needed to make it all work. It acquired $4.4 million from the state’s Affordable and Special Needs Housing program, a $560,000 grant from the Central Shenandoah Planning District Commission, a commitment of $125,000 from the Community Foundation and another $125,000 in smaller, three-year loans of $10,000 to $25,000 each from a variety of local organizations. It got a commitment from Valley Community Services Board to support 12 to 14 units through its permanent supportive housing program, and a promise from the Waynesboro Redevelopment and Housing Authority to likewise provide housing vouchers for the project. But that still left it $500,000 short of what was needed . . .

. . . and that’s when the City of Waynesboro agreed to pitch in with a grant to meet the shortfall. That’s also when city resident Mary McDermott, a retired telecommunications attorney, decided to get her dander up. As chronicled by the Augusta Free Press, McDermott fired off a letter April 15 protesting a city council vote to “donate” taxpayer dollars and threatening to sue the city in Circuit Court. No grounds for such a suit were outlined in McDermott’s letter, which lacked the rigor one would expect from someone educated at Harvard Law School and which seemed to consist primarily of McDermott’s belief that the grant should have been a loan. Moreover, the whole kerfuffle quickly blew over when McDermott decided just days later—also without much of an explanation—that she wouldn’t sue, after all. If nothing else, however, McDermott demonstrated how precarious such initiatives can be, thanks to their underlying complexity.

Meanwhile, as these numbers illustrate, even an experienced subsidized housing developer like Enterprise Community Development, which already has built more than 19,000 homes across Maryland, Pennsylvania, Washington, D.C., and Virginia, can be hard-pressed to keep its costs down because of the additional costs associated with LIHTC. Alston Court, it should be noted, will pencil out to nearly $365,000 a unit—more than the median sales price of new homes locally, and therefore just the kind of bloated initiative that gets the Cato Institute and its ilk all revved up. Forgoing subsidized housing, on the other hand, only means more people forced to live beyond their means in over-priced housing, many of whom invariably will end up on the street.

Rather than tossing the baby out with the bath water, isn’t it better to repair and streamline the rickety bureaucratic structure that makes affordable housing possible? Because, really, what else is there?

The housing squeeze, part one

(Reading time: 7 minutes)

To the casual observer, it must seem that we’re in the middle of one heckuva residential building boom—and indeed we are. In Staunton, several dozen apartments have been carved out of what were once commercial buildings, 130 apartments have been built off Middlebrook Avenue, and the planning commission is reviewing an application to build 267 single-family homes in a planned residential development at the end of Richie Boulevard. All that pales when compared to what’s going on in Waynesboro, however, where more than 1,200 new apartments, town homes and single-family homes are being built or have been recently completed, and several hundred more are being discussed.

So what’s with all the local angst about a lack of affordable housing? Aren’t we being swamped by new homes and apartments?

The answer to that lies in the word “affordable.” Yes, there’s a lot of ongoing construction, but all of the examples mentioned above are of homes that will be sold or rented at market rates—and the market is a beast. The house price index in Staunton, for example, rose from 100 in the year 2000 to 185 in 2020, which is to say, home prices rose 85% in that period, or an average of just over 4% a year. But by 2025 the index had jumped to 299.48, zipping along at a brisk 23% average annual increase. Translated into dollars, that boosted the February median home sales price in the Staunton-Augusta-Waynesboro (SAW) area to $330,000, according to local realtor Rick Kane, who’s been tracking these stats for a couple of decades.

Nor is renting a bargain. According to the city’s most recent consolidated plan, prepared as a requirement for receiving federal community development block grants, the fair market rent for a two-bedroom apartment—appropriate for a family with at least one child—in 2024 was $1,149 a month. Apartments.com, meanwhile, currently shows Staunton rents as averaging $$1,151 for a one-bedroom and $1,264 for two bedrooms. (Parenthetically, it’s noteworthy that 45% of all Staunton households with children have only one parent present, according to latest U.S. Census Bureau statistics.)

To put those numbers in perspective, consider that the federal standard for housing affordability is less than 30% of household income. Spending more than that puts you in the “cost-burdened” category, while spending more than 50% pushes you into “severely burdened” territory. To reasonably afford that market-rate two-bedroom apartment, a household would have to be earning $46,000 a year. Homeownership, no surprise, is even pricier: the $330,000 median home sales price will require a six-figure annual income unless the buyer comes in with a downpayment upwards of $66,000—and even then he or she will need an annual income of roughly $80,000.

Now consider this. The median annual wage income for Staunton’s full-time, year-round workforce, according to the most recent U.S. Census report, is $55,023. See the problem?

Unless a household has two wage earners, local homeownership is out of reasonable reach for most. So are rentals for the 1,651 full-time workers in Staunton that the U.S. Census says make less than $35,000 a year. A look at the city’s job openings illustrates how new employees almost invariably will be forced into the rental market: elementary school teachers, for example, start at $53,000, police officers at less than $51,000. The starting wage for a water treatment plant operator is $20 an hour, which works out to affordable rent of just $1,000 a month. Good luck finding such a place.

Many households, of course, have more than one wage-earner, which is why Staunton’s household median income is $11,000 higher than the median for wage-earners. And, of course, there is nothing ironclad about the 30% rule. People routinely pay more than 30% of their income to put a roof over their heads—but that’s the problem. The more someone spends on housing, the less there is for all of life’s other essentials, including food, transportation, health care, clothing and childcare. Small wonder, then, that the 2025 Community Needs Health Assessment prepared by Augusta Health reported that 25.8% of Staunton residents don’t have enough cash on hand to cover a $400 emergency expense.

One of the problems with such statistics is that they paint with a broad brush, glossing over the glaring disparities among various subgroups. This is especially true in any discussion of housing affordability, as illustrated by the graph above. Relatively few people making more than $75,000 a year will have trouble finding affordable housing, not only because they make more money but also because the housing market will have more choices for them. Conversely, those who make less than $30,000 are overwhelmingly cost-burdened, not only because they can’t afford much of a home but because they’ll be lucky to find anything in their price range. As a result, two-thirds of them get pushed into the “severely burdened” category, putting them one misstep away from being homeless.*

(While these bar charts are for the U.S. as a whole, they track the local situation pretty closely. For example, a statistically dated Central Shenandoah Planning District housing study released last year reported that more than 42% of Staunton and Waynesboro renters were cost-burdened, or roughly the percentage for 2019 shown above for “all renter households.”)

All of which raises the question: who’s going to be buying or renting all those new homes that are popping up in our two cities? And the obvious answer is: for the most part, not people who are already here. They can’t afford it.

Some of the new housing in Waynesboro undoubtedly will be snapped up by employees of Northrup-Grumman, which has a new plant that is filling more than 300 new jobs paying an average of $94,000 a year—but an estimated 80% of those jobs require four-year college degrees or more, suggesting many if not most will be filled by employees from elsewhere. But Waynesboro also has become increasingly attractive to a better-paid Charlottesville workforce searching for housing that’s more affordable on this side of Afton Mountain—and once you’ve crossed the Blue Ridge, Staunton is just an additional 20 minutes down the road. So presumably the developers behind all the new construction have looked at all that and concluded there’s a market demand they can meet.

The unmet market—the housing market for median wage earners already here—is another story. As the above analysis should illustrate, there are two sides of the affordable housing equation that can be addressed to make things equal: pay people more money, or build cheaper housing. Neither is about to magically happen, but there is a workaround: subsidize housing builders so they can sell or rent at below-market prices.

Unfortunately, that strikes some people as being, um . . . too much like socialism?

*The statement about homelessness is not hyperbolic. The usefulness of this year’s Point in Time (PIT) count of homeless people in the SAW region was limited because it coincided with the extreme ice storm that paralyzed the region, preventing census takers from seeking out those who were unsheltered. But even surveying just those who were in shelters underscored some troubling trends: 39% of the 157 respondents were homeless for the first time, and 29% were 55 or older. Unemployment and eviction were the two most common reasons they provided to explain their homelessness.

Next up: The housing squeeze, part two. Waynesboro leads the way toward a socialist utopia. Can trouble be far behind?

Housing worries are making us sick

(Reading time: 7 minutes)

Tax season is fully upon us, so it’s only natural for people to grumble about the Internal Revenue Service. But here’s one undeniably good thing for which the taxman can take credit: because of an IRS rule dating back more than a decade, tax-exempt hospitals are required to periodically assess the health needs of the communities they serve. That’s the good news. The bad news, for anyone reading Augusta Health’s report card from last year, is that our health in some key areas has declined steadily since 2016, and a significant reason for that decline is housing affordability issues that weren’t even on the radar a decade ago.

Indeed, the most recent Community Health Needs Assessment (CHNA) provides a sharp contrast to the first in a series dating back to 2013. That freshman effort took a notably upbeat approach by noting that Augusta was the 31st most healthy county in the 20th healthiest state in the country. “Augusta County is living up to its motto ‘Let the ages return to the first golden period,’ referring to a period of simplicity and happiness,” it rhapsodized, in less than scientifically detached fashion. “In general, the Augusta County, Staunton, Waynesboro area outperforms the state averages for health status. Where local results fall at or below those levels, we see an opportunity for combined actions that result in improved community ratings.”

But then, in a prescient turn of phrase, it added: “There are several lifestyle gaps that need to be closed to move Augusta County toward greater overall health.”

Fast forward a dozen years, and last year’s CHNA indicates that those gaps not only were not closed, but that some grew into chasms.  While the 2012-13 assessment ranked chronic disease management, as well as health behaviors (“particularly related to obesity and physical activity”) as its top two health priorities, the 2025 ranking vaults mental health to the top spot. And although physical activity and weight retain their number two ranking, right on their heels as number three is housing, which scarcely registered in the earlier assessment.*  Meanwhile, chronic diseases, led by diabetes, trail behind in importance.

To be sure, the 2013 assessment was significantly more superficial than the reports that started coming out in 2016, when the grunt work was handed over to Professional Research Consultants and a 28-page report metastasized into a document nearly nine times as long. Moreover, the greater detail was complemented by a consistency of format, enabling comparisons across the three-year intervals that followed. The problem is that this consistency also highlights just how much backsliding has occurred.   

AMONG THE ASSESSMENT’S housing-related findings for Staunton (anyone wanting to focus more on Waynesboro or Augusta County can peruse the complete assessment here), nearly a third (32.1%) of residents worried or stressed over their rent or mortgage payments in the previous year—apparently with good reason, as 12.3% reported they had been displaced from their housing within the past two years, and 9.9% said they’d been homeless in that same time period. Another 11.2 % said they were living in unhealthy or unsafe conditions.

For the SAW region as a whole, the incidence of unhealthy or unsafe living conditions jumped significantly from 2019 to 2025, from 9.9% to 14%—but even more sharply for renters, to 19.5%, compared to 10.5% of homeowners. An even wider disparity between renters and homeowners was found in response to the question of housing instability, with 17.8% of renters in the SAW region saying they had to find emergency housing in the previous two years, compared to 4.8% of homeowners. Meanwhile, the overall incidence of housing instability in the SAW region doubled, from 5% in 2016 to 10.2% in 2025.

Homelessness in the SAW region—defined as adults reporting “a time in the past two years when they lived on the street, in a car, or in a temporary shelter”—was zero in 2016, then climbed steadily through each reporting period, to 6.8% in 2025.

The health consequences of being homeless or of living in unsafe housing can be intuited by most people, but less immediately obvious is the toll on mental health taken by persistent anxiety over losing the home one already has. And while there are numerous reasons for depression or suicidal ideation, the parallel growth of deteriorating mental health and of insufficient affordable housing strongly suggests a link. Indeed, as housing stress has grown significantly over the past decade, the area’s mental health has taken a dive:

  • Asked to rate their overall mental health, 21.9% of SAW adults believe it is only “fair” or “poor,” a 150% increase since 2016. Staunton leads the way on that metric, with 27.8% reporting fair or poor mental health.
  • A total of 41.7% of SAW adults (and 50.4% of Stauntonians) say they have had two or more years in their lives when they felt depressed or sad most days. The open-ended nature of that measurement would dilute its significance, were it not for the fact that it is nearly double the 21.8% reading in 2016.
  • More than a third (35.5%) of SAW adults say they have been professionally diagnosed as having a depressive disorder, a 138% increase from the 14.9% reported in 2016. Moreover, that incidence jumps to a whopping 47.1% of Staunton’s adults, which is more than twice the 20.4% incidence for Virginia overall.
  • Local residents aren’t just depressed; 17.2% of SAW adults say they feel that most days are “very” or “extremely” stressful—a percentage also up significantly from the 10.5% recorded in 2016. Staunton leads the pack on this metric as well, with 22.1% reporting they feel stressed out.

Such ailments, alas, afflict some demographic groups far more severely than others, with low income and LGBTQ+ respondents greatly over-represented in all negative ratings—demographic groups that also have less visibility within the larger community, and less political clout with which to address the issues that are making them sick. Nor, once they do get sick, are there adequate mental health and related services to provide the care that’s needed.

The CHNA includes literally scores of comments from local doctors, social services providers, community leaders and others, detailing what they believe are the reasons for this intractable morass. To be blunt, there isn’t much that’s revelatory, although some of the anecdotes—a 35-year-old father, working two jobs to house his family in a motel room, dying from a stress-induced heart attack—get at the human cost of the illness permeating our body politic.  And then there’s the occasional assessment item that further drives the point home, such as the finding that 19.3% of local adults acknowledge they have been “hit, slapped, pushed, kicked or otherwise hurt by an intimate partner.” That rate, too, has doubled since the 9.7% reported in 2016.

The problem with health exams, as all too many physicians know, is that patients will yes them to death—exercise, stop smoking, eat more nutritionally, cut down on the booze, yadda-yadda—and then go blithely on as though no red flags had been raised. So it seems with the 2025 CHNA’s section marked “evaluation of past activities.” Number two on its list of previous strategies was meeting the health care needs of the homeless through a four-pronged approach, all of which were implemented in 2023—and all but one, and then only minimally, going unaddressed in 2024, due to a vacant RN Health Educator position.

Vacant since November 2023, that is, or almost two years prior to the 2025 CHNA’s release.

It’s a near certainty that Augusta Health’s unfilled position is a result of budget constraints, but as with all such cuts, choices reflect priorities. Short-term rewards have a way of biting us in the ass down the road, and a high-salt, high-cholesterol diet almost invariably morphs into diabetes and obesity. But what are you going to do when it’s your doc who’s ignoring sound medical advice?

Meanwhile, it’s clear we have to move beyond discussing the lack of sufficient affordable housing simply in economic terms, or of viewing housing issues through a policy-making lens that bogs down in abstract philosophical differences. The lack of sufficient housing for city residents earning what passes for a living wage locally is a serious health issue every bit as insidious as lead poisoning, seeping into the populace largely unseen and unremarked until it explodes in seemingly inexplicable violence, depression and apathy. The 2025 CHNA waved several red flags. How many more such studies will we need to awaken us to the epidemic that’s underway?

* “Scarcely registered,” indeed. The single mention of housing in the 2013 CHNA was in a graph showing the SAW region’s top three health and community issues, in which “affordable housing” came in at no.21 of 22 issues overall.

On some tests a failing grade is better

(Reading time: 3 minutes)

Sometimes you can stumble across the most alarming news in the most unexpected places.

Case in point: Staunton today put out its February activity report, which includes a regular update on how many articles and stories have mentioned Staunton in the past month, as well as how many eyeballs may have seen them. Fourth on the list this time, with a “reach” of more than 40 million, was a piece on Realtor.com headlined, “Best Mountain Towns Where Homes Deliver the Strongest Airbnb Returns.”

Care to guess which “mountain town” came in tenth on the list? That would be Staunton, of course, where homes have a median listing price of either $370,000 or $418,000 (Realtor.com couldn’t settle on a single figure) and an “average annual revenue potential” of $43,000. “We are seeing investors with proven track records buy strategically in Staunton, where they know they can implement their knowledge of the market with robust design and differentiated amenities,” Realtor.com quotes Sydney Robertson, identified as a real estate agent with Loring Woodriff Real Estate Associates—which, as it happens, is based not in Staunton but in Charlottesville.

Robertson may be good at tossing word salads (“robust design and differentiated amenities”?), but it should be noted—especially since it was ignored by Realtor.com—that she also is chief sales officer for Carriage House STR. Carriage House, as of a couple of years ago, was operating scores of Airbnbs across central Virginia, including more than two-dozen in Staunton proper, to which it gave a thumbs-up for the city’s lack of short-term rental restrictions. So, not exactly a disinterested observer.

The list of mountain towns so conducive to making money for “investors” was created by AirDNA, a firm that compiles and analyzes Vrbo and Airbnb data. What makes cities like Staunton so attractive to people who think in terms of balance sheets, according to AirDNA chief economist Jamie Lane, is that all the really hot mountain destinations have gotten too expensive. That makes second-tier cities like ours look like bargains. “The markets on this list tend to benefit from steady, multiseason demand and more affordable home prices than those in top mountain destinations,” Lane elaborated. “That combination can create a more balanced investment profile, with strong revenue potential relative to acquisition costs.”

Just how much of a bargain Staunton represents is encapsulated by AirDNA’s ranking system, which looks at five variables to generate a score between 40 and 100. A score of 90-100 is an A. Waynesboro merited only a 70, Lexington and Winchester notched a slightly higher 74, but Staunton roared to the head of the class with a list-making 93. Which all sounds terrific for Staunton, until you realize that what’s being assessed is Staunton’s attractiveness for people who view housing as financial assets, not as homes.

The five variables feeding into this grade include investability, rental demand, revenue growth, seasonality and regulation—or, more accurately, the lack of regulation. Or to put it in English, Staunton offers high curb appeal year-round, with under-priced real estate compared to what the short-term rental market will pay. That may come as a surprise to Staunton residents who can’t find a house they can afford to buy, but that’s what happens when our housing supply is being picked over by people who don’t have to live here.

All the handwringing about Staunton’s lack of sufficient affordable housing is pointless as long as there’s essentially no city regulation of short-term rentals. Without it, the transformation of homes into business assets will continue, largely unseen and unchecked, and articles like this one reaching as many as 40 million people will only accelerate the process. That may be something for the new Staunton Housing Commission to ponder as it plots its future course.