The housing squeeze, part two

(Reading time: 8 minutes)

I recently wrote about the housing affordability crisis in our region (although we’re hardly unique) that can be summarized in just two numbers: a median home sales price in February of $330,000 (jumping to $347,250 in March) vs. a median Staunton wage income of $55,023. That puts the average home out of affordable reach of most two-earner households, never mind single-parent households, who then have no recourse but to lease a home—where, no surprise, they put greater upward pressure on that market, pushing local rents above $1,300 a month.

If wage incomes and housing costs were in balance, the market would respond by building more housing until equilibrium is restored. But while a lot of housing is in fact being built, it won’t do anything to relieve the affordability shortage because it costs too much. That’s not because developers are greedy, but because local incomes haven’t increased as much as have labor, materials and the other costs of building new homes. Those new homes will be sold to people moving in from elsewhere—and working elsewhere, where they’ll get paid more. In other words, what we have here is a broken economy.

When other aspects of a local economy are broken, we don’t expect it to miraculously heal itself. We turn to government, with its size and scale, rule-setting powers and taxing authority. If roads must be built or repaired to facilitate commerce, government does that. When economic inducements are needed to lure industry, government provides those. But when it comes to helping people get into affordable housing, well, that’s historically been a different story. People were expected to pull themselves up by their bootstraps, even when they didn’t have boots, and while that attitude is changing, it’s a long, slow process.

To be sure, there are government programs to help with housing—it’s just that they’re relatively few in number and rarely up to the task. Community Development Block Grants, for example, often are touted as one such source of help. But while Staunton has received such grants for several years, you’ll be hard-pressed to point to even one affordable housing unit that exists because of CDBG funding, with most of the money going instead to projects such as fixing sidewalks or getting a new kitchen for the Salvation Army. With the Trump administration now seeking to defund the CDBG program altogether, even those limited expenditures may soon seem fanciful.

Indeed, Trump’s budget proposals are consistent with a stubborn insistence on the extreme right  that we’ll never have sufficient affordable housing until government gets out of the way. “The states should reduce barriers to multifamily housing investment by cutting property taxes and liberalizing zoning and building regulations,” urged a Cato Institute spokesman in Congressional testimony last May, apparently oblivious to the fact that property taxes are set at the local level. Or, for that matter, oblivious to the necessity for raising property taxes in many localities.

Unfortunately, many of the libertarian Cato Institute’s simplistic remedies, and those of its philosophical soulmates, are given legs by their more telling critique of today’s status quo. Take just one example, made topical by a recent legal threat to derail an affordable housing project in Waynesboro, the first in our region since 2020 to benefit from the federal low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC). LIHTC apartments rent at below-market rates to families with incomes below the median income, which in our area are legion. They’re also nothing new to the area, in which developers used LIHTC funds for the first time in 2001 to renovate Fairfax Hall in Waynesboro, and subsequently added 968 rent-subsidized apartments and town homes at 11 separate locations in Waynesboro, Staunton and Augusta County. But getting to that point wasn’t easy, and now is becoming less so.

The way LIHTC works is thus: each year, the Internal Revenue Service distributes credits to the states, which in turn award them to developers to cover part of their costs of constructing or rehabbing apartment buildings. In exchange, the developers agree to cap rents for low-income tenants. The developers then sell the credits to investors to raise cash with which to start construction, giving investors equity in the projects and credits to apply against their tax returns over a 10-year period. That sounds like a win-win for most everyone—except that this process has grown into such a bureaucratic nightmare over the years that most builders won’t even pursue LIHTC projects.

It also provides Cato and other critics with their most powerful ammunition against “the growth of the welfare state.” For example, the LIHTC statute and related IRS regulations are 442 pages in length, the IRS auditing guide for the LIHTC is 344 pages, an IRS guide for LIHTC building compliance is 214 pages.  An industry guidebook to the program runs to 1,942 pages.  That’s a whole lot of deterrence against even applying for LIHTC certification, and it doesn’t end there: once such a project is completed, building owners must adhere to rent caps and tenant income limits for 30 years and keep records of each residents’ income, assets, and family composition.

Because of these and other LIHTC requirements, the cost of such units is significantly above those of non-subsidized housing. Those requirements also result in increasingly complicated financing packages, referred to as “capital stacks,” to underwrite construction. Such stacks consist of an array of government and other subsidies, each of which comes with its own rules and fees, and each of which takes time to cobble together, thus adding to the bottom line. The LIHTC cost disadvantage, according to various estimates, is around 20%, although it can be twice as high in more rural areas. That’s just so much raw meat for the free-market crowd.

No wonder, then, that the LIHTC train ground to a halt locally over the past six years, despite a dozen successful projects completed in the previous decade. Who can handle that kind of aggravation when there’s plenty of demand for new housing at more profitable market rates?

Last year, however, a non-profit developer of affordable homes, Enterprise Community Development, announced it would build Alston Court, a $35 million 96-unit apartment complex near the Texas Roadhouse in Waynesboro. All 96 units would be rented at affordable rates, according to Enterprise, meaning tenants would not pay more than 30% of their income for housing. Eight units would be reserved for households making less than $18,000 a year, which is just 30% of the local median income. An additional 75 units would be set aside for those making less than 60% of local median income, and 13 units would go to households making between 60% and 80% of the median. All that works out to monthly rent topping out at $1,200 a month—and dropping to less than $450 at the low-income end.

But having secured its LIHTC package, Enterprise Community Development had to assemble the capital stack needed to make it all work. It acquired $4.4 million from the state’s Affordable and Special Needs Housing program, a $560,000 grant from the Central Shenandoah Planning District Commission, a commitment of $125,000 from the Community Foundation and another $125,000 in smaller, three-year loans of $10,000 to $25,000 each from a variety of local organizations. It got a commitment from Valley Community Services Board to support 12 to 14 units through its permanent supportive housing program, and a promise from the Waynesboro Redevelopment and Housing Authority to likewise provide housing vouchers for the project. But that still left it $500,000 short of what was needed . . .

. . . and that’s when the City of Waynesboro agreed to pitch in with a grant to meet the shortfall. That’s also when city resident Mary McDermott, a retired telecommunications attorney, decided to get her dander up. As chronicled by the Augusta Free Press, McDermott fired off a letter April 15 protesting a city council vote to “donate” taxpayer dollars and threatening to sue the city in Circuit Court. No grounds for such a suit were outlined in McDermott’s letter, which lacked the rigor one would expect from someone educated at Harvard Law School and which seemed to consist primarily of McDermott’s belief that the grant should have been a loan. Moreover, the whole kerfuffle quickly blew over when McDermott decided just days later—also without much of an explanation—that she wouldn’t sue, after all. If nothing else, however, McDermott demonstrated how precarious such initiatives can be, thanks to their underlying complexity.

Meanwhile, as these numbers illustrate, even an experienced subsidized housing developer like Enterprise Community Development, which already has built more than 19,000 homes across Maryland, Pennsylvania, Washington, D.C., and Virginia, can be hard-pressed to keep its costs down because of the additional costs associated with LIHTC. Alston Court, it should be noted, will pencil out to nearly $365,000 a unit—more than the median sales price of new homes locally, and therefore just the kind of bloated initiative that gets the Cato Institute and its ilk all revved up. Forgoing subsidized housing, on the other hand, only means more people forced to live beyond their means in over-priced housing, many of whom invariably will end up on the street.

Rather than tossing the baby out with the bath water, isn’t it better to repair and streamline the rickety bureaucratic structure that makes affordable housing possible? Because, really, what else is there?

The housing squeeze, part one

(Reading time: 7 minutes)

To the casual observer, it must seem that we’re in the middle of one heckuva residential building boom—and indeed we are. In Staunton, several dozen apartments have been carved out of what were once commercial buildings, 130 apartments have been built off Middlebrook Avenue, and the planning commission is reviewing an application to build 267 single-family homes in a planned residential development at the end of Richie Boulevard. All that pales when compared to what’s going on in Waynesboro, however, where more than 1,200 new apartments, town homes and single-family homes are being built or have been recently completed, and several hundred more are being discussed.

So what’s with all the local angst about a lack of affordable housing? Aren’t we being swamped by new homes and apartments?

The answer to that lies in the word “affordable.” Yes, there’s a lot of ongoing construction, but all of the examples mentioned above are of homes that will be sold or rented at market rates—and the market is a beast. The house price index in Staunton, for example, rose from 100 in the year 2000 to 185 in 2020, which is to say, home prices rose 85% in that period, or an average of just over 4% a year. But by 2025 the index had jumped to 299.48, zipping along at a brisk 23% average annual increase. Translated into dollars, that boosted the February median home sales price in the Staunton-Augusta-Waynesboro (SAW) area to $330,000, according to local realtor Rick Kane, who’s been tracking these stats for a couple of decades.

Nor is renting a bargain. According to the city’s most recent consolidated plan, prepared as a requirement for receiving federal community development block grants, the fair market rent for a two-bedroom apartment—appropriate for a family with at least one child—in 2024 was $1,149 a month. Apartments.com, meanwhile, currently shows Staunton rents as averaging $$1,151 for a one-bedroom and $1,264 for two bedrooms. (Parenthetically, it’s noteworthy that 45% of all Staunton households with children have only one parent present, according to latest U.S. Census Bureau statistics.)

To put those numbers in perspective, consider that the federal standard for housing affordability is less than 30% of household income. Spending more than that puts you in the “cost-burdened” category, while spending more than 50% pushes you into “severely burdened” territory. To reasonably afford that market-rate two-bedroom apartment, a household would have to be earning $46,000 a year. Homeownership, no surprise, is even pricier: the $330,000 median home sales price will require a six-figure annual income unless the buyer comes in with a downpayment upwards of $66,000—and even then he or she will need an annual income of roughly $80,000.

Now consider this. The median annual wage income for Staunton’s full-time, year-round workforce, according to the most recent U.S. Census report, is $55,023. See the problem?

Unless a household has two wage earners, local homeownership is out of reasonable reach for most. So are rentals for the 1,651 full-time workers in Staunton that the U.S. Census says make less than $35,000 a year. A look at the city’s job openings illustrates how new employees almost invariably will be forced into the rental market: elementary school teachers, for example, start at $53,000, police officers at less than $51,000. The starting wage for a water treatment plant operator is $20 an hour, which works out to affordable rent of just $1,000 a month. Good luck finding such a place.

Many households, of course, have more than one wage-earner, which is why Staunton’s household median income is $11,000 higher than the median for wage-earners. And, of course, there is nothing ironclad about the 30% rule. People routinely pay more than 30% of their income to put a roof over their heads—but that’s the problem. The more someone spends on housing, the less there is for all of life’s other essentials, including food, transportation, health care, clothing and childcare. Small wonder, then, that the 2025 Community Needs Health Assessment prepared by Augusta Health reported that 25.8% of Staunton residents don’t have enough cash on hand to cover a $400 emergency expense.

One of the problems with such statistics is that they paint with a broad brush, glossing over the glaring disparities among various subgroups. This is especially true in any discussion of housing affordability, as illustrated by the graph above. Relatively few people making more than $75,000 a year will have trouble finding affordable housing, not only because they make more money but also because the housing market will have more choices for them. Conversely, those who make less than $30,000 are overwhelmingly cost-burdened, not only because they can’t afford much of a home but because they’ll be lucky to find anything in their price range. As a result, two-thirds of them get pushed into the “severely burdened” category, putting them one misstep away from being homeless.*

(While these bar charts are for the U.S. as a whole, they track the local situation pretty closely. For example, a statistically dated Central Shenandoah Planning District housing study released last year reported that more than 42% of Staunton and Waynesboro renters were cost-burdened, or roughly the percentage for 2019 shown above for “all renter households.”)

All of which raises the question: who’s going to be buying or renting all those new homes that are popping up in our two cities? And the obvious answer is: for the most part, not people who are already here. They can’t afford it.

Some of the new housing in Waynesboro undoubtedly will be snapped up by employees of Northrup-Grumman, which has a new plant that is filling more than 300 new jobs paying an average of $94,000 a year—but an estimated 80% of those jobs require four-year college degrees or more, suggesting many if not most will be filled by employees from elsewhere. But Waynesboro also has become increasingly attractive to a better-paid Charlottesville workforce searching for housing that’s more affordable on this side of Afton Mountain—and once you’ve crossed the Blue Ridge, Staunton is just an additional 20 minutes down the road. So presumably the developers behind all the new construction have looked at all that and concluded there’s a market demand they can meet.

The unmet market—the housing market for median wage earners already here—is another story. As the above analysis should illustrate, there are two sides of the affordable housing equation that can be addressed to make things equal: pay people more money, or build cheaper housing. Neither is about to magically happen, but there is a workaround: subsidize housing builders so they can sell or rent at below-market prices.

Unfortunately, that strikes some people as being, um . . . too much like socialism?

*The statement about homelessness is not hyperbolic. The usefulness of this year’s Point in Time (PIT) count of homeless people in the SAW region was limited because it coincided with the extreme ice storm that paralyzed the region, preventing census takers from seeking out those who were unsheltered. But even surveying just those who were in shelters underscored some troubling trends: 39% of the 157 respondents were homeless for the first time, and 29% were 55 or older. Unemployment and eviction were the two most common reasons they provided to explain their homelessness.


Next up: The housing squeeze, part two. Waynesboro leads the way toward a socialist utopia. Can trouble be far behind?

Housing worries are making us sick

(Reading time: 7 minutes)

Tax season is fully upon us, so it’s only natural for people to grumble about the Internal Revenue Service. But here’s one undeniably good thing for which the taxman can take credit: because of an IRS rule dating back more than a decade, tax-exempt hospitals are required to periodically assess the health needs of the communities they serve. That’s the good news. The bad news, for anyone reading Augusta Health’s report card from last year, is that our health in some key areas has declined steadily since 2016, and a significant reason for that decline is housing affordability issues that weren’t even on the radar a decade ago.

Indeed, the most recent Community Health Needs Assessment (CHNA) provides a sharp contrast to the first in a series dating back to 2013. That freshman effort took a notably upbeat approach by noting that Augusta was the 31st most healthy county in the 20th healthiest state in the country. “Augusta County is living up to its motto ‘Let the ages return to the first golden period,’ referring to a period of simplicity and happiness,” it rhapsodized, in less than scientifically detached fashion. “In general, the Augusta County, Staunton, Waynesboro area outperforms the state averages for health status. Where local results fall at or below those levels, we see an opportunity for combined actions that result in improved community ratings.”

But then, in a prescient turn of phrase, it added: “There are several lifestyle gaps that need to be closed to move Augusta County toward greater overall health.”

Fast forward a dozen years, and last year’s CHNA indicates that those gaps not only were not closed, but that some grew into chasms.  While the 2012-13 assessment ranked chronic disease management, as well as health behaviors (“particularly related to obesity and physical activity”) as its top two health priorities, the 2025 ranking vaults mental health to the top spot. And although physical activity and weight retain their number two ranking, right on their heels as number three is housing, which scarcely registered in the earlier assessment.*  Meanwhile, chronic diseases, led by diabetes, trail behind in importance.

To be sure, the 2013 assessment was significantly more superficial than the reports that started coming out in 2016, when the grunt work was handed over to Professional Research Consultants and a 28-page report metastasized into a document nearly nine times as long. Moreover, the greater detail was complemented by a consistency of format, enabling comparisons across the three-year intervals that followed. The problem is that this consistency also highlights just how much backsliding has occurred.   

AMONG THE ASSESSMENT’S housing-related findings for Staunton (anyone wanting to focus more on Waynesboro or Augusta County can peruse the complete assessment here), nearly a third (32.1%) of residents worried or stressed over their rent or mortgage payments in the previous year—apparently with good reason, as 12.3% reported they had been displaced from their housing within the past two years, and 9.9% said they’d been homeless in that same time period. Another 11.2 % said they were living in unhealthy or unsafe conditions.

For the SAW region as a whole, the incidence of unhealthy or unsafe living conditions jumped significantly from 2019 to 2025, from 9.9% to 14%—but even more sharply for renters, to 19.5%, compared to 10.5% of homeowners. An even wider disparity between renters and homeowners was found in response to the question of housing instability, with 17.8% of renters in the SAW region saying they had to find emergency housing in the previous two years, compared to 4.8% of homeowners. Meanwhile, the overall incidence of housing instability in the SAW region doubled, from 5% in 2016 to 10.2% in 2025.

Homelessness in the SAW region—defined as adults reporting “a time in the past two years when they lived on the street, in a car, or in a temporary shelter”—was zero in 2016, then climbed steadily through each reporting period, to 6.8% in 2025.

The health consequences of being homeless or of living in unsafe housing can be intuited by most people, but less immediately obvious is the toll on mental health taken by persistent anxiety over losing the home one already has. And while there are numerous reasons for depression or suicidal ideation, the parallel growth of deteriorating mental health and of insufficient affordable housing strongly suggests a link. Indeed, as housing stress has grown significantly over the past decade, the area’s mental health has taken a dive:

  • Asked to rate their overall mental health, 21.9% of SAW adults believe it is only “fair” or “poor,” a 150% increase since 2016. Staunton leads the way on that metric, with 27.8% reporting fair or poor mental health.
  • A total of 41.7% of SAW adults (and 50.4% of Stauntonians) say they have had two or more years in their lives when they felt depressed or sad most days. The open-ended nature of that measurement would dilute its significance, were it not for the fact that it is nearly double the 21.8% reading in 2016.
  • More than a third (35.5%) of SAW adults say they have been professionally diagnosed as having a depressive disorder, a 138% increase from the 14.9% reported in 2016. Moreover, that incidence jumps to a whopping 47.1% of Staunton’s adults, which is more than twice the 20.4% incidence for Virginia overall.
  • Local residents aren’t just depressed; 17.2% of SAW adults say they feel that most days are “very” or “extremely” stressful—a percentage also up significantly from the 10.5% recorded in 2016. Staunton leads the pack on this metric as well, with 22.1% reporting they feel stressed out.

Such ailments, alas, afflict some demographic groups far more severely than others, with low income and LGBTQ+ respondents greatly over-represented in all negative ratings—demographic groups that also have less visibility within the larger community, and less political clout with which to address the issues that are making them sick. Nor, once they do get sick, are there adequate mental health and related services to provide the care that’s needed.

The CHNA includes literally scores of comments from local doctors, social services providers, community leaders and others, detailing what they believe are the reasons for this intractable morass. To be blunt, there isn’t much that’s revelatory, although some of the anecdotes—a 35-year-old father, working two jobs to house his family in a motel room, dying from a stress-induced heart attack—get at the human cost of the illness permeating our body politic.  And then there’s the occasional assessment item that further drives the point home, such as the finding that 19.3% of local adults acknowledge they have been “hit, slapped, pushed, kicked or otherwise hurt by an intimate partner.” That rate, too, has doubled since the 9.7% reported in 2016.

The problem with health exams, as all too many physicians know, is that patients will yes them to death—exercise, stop smoking, eat more nutritionally, cut down on the booze, yadda-yadda—and then go blithely on as though no red flags had been raised. So it seems with the 2025 CHNA’s section marked “evaluation of past activities.” Number two on its list of previous strategies was meeting the health care needs of the homeless through a four-pronged approach, all of which were implemented in 2023—and all but one, and then only minimally, going unaddressed in 2024, due to a vacant RN Health Educator position.

Vacant since November 2023, that is, or almost two years prior to the 2025 CHNA’s release.

It’s a near certainty that Augusta Health’s unfilled position is a result of budget constraints, but as with all such cuts, choices reflect priorities. Short-term rewards have a way of biting us in the ass down the road, and a high-salt, high-cholesterol diet almost invariably morphs into diabetes and obesity. But what are you going to do when it’s your doc who’s ignoring sound medical advice?

Meanwhile, it’s clear we have to move beyond discussing the lack of sufficient affordable housing simply in economic terms, or of viewing housing issues through a policy-making lens that bogs down in abstract philosophical differences. The lack of sufficient housing for city residents earning what passes for a living wage locally is a serious health issue every bit as insidious as lead poisoning, seeping into the populace largely unseen and unremarked until it explodes in seemingly inexplicable violence, depression and apathy. The 2025 CHNA waved several red flags. How many more such studies will we need to awaken us to the epidemic that’s underway?


* “Scarcely registered,” indeed. The single mention of housing in the 2013 CHNA was in a graph showing the SAW region’s top three health and community issues, in which “affordable housing” came in at no.21 of 22 issues overall.

On some tests a failing grade is better

(Reading time: 3 minutes)

Sometimes you can stumble across the most alarming news in the most unexpected places.

Case in point: Staunton today put out its February activity report, which includes a regular update on how many articles and stories have mentioned Staunton in the past month, as well as how many eyeballs may have seen them. Fourth on the list this time, with a “reach” of more than 40 million, was a piece on Realtor.com headlined, “Best Mountain Towns Where Homes Deliver the Strongest Airbnb Returns.”

Care to guess which “mountain town” came in tenth on the list? That would be Staunton, of course, where homes have a median listing price of either $370,000 or $418,000 (Realtor.com couldn’t settle on a single figure) and an “average annual revenue potential” of $43,000. “We are seeing investors with proven track records buy strategically in Staunton, where they know they can implement their knowledge of the market with robust design and differentiated amenities,” Realtor.com quotes Sydney Robertson, identified as a real estate agent with Loring Woodriff Real Estate Associates—which, as it happens, is based not in Staunton but in Charlottesville.

Robertson may be good at tossing word salads (“robust design and differentiated amenities”?), but it should be noted—especially since it was ignored by Realtor.com—that she also is chief sales officer for Carriage House STR. Carriage House, as of a couple of years ago, was operating scores of Airbnbs across central Virginia, including more than two-dozen in Staunton proper, to which it gave a thumbs-up for the city’s lack of short-term rental restrictions. So, not exactly a disinterested observer.

The list of mountain towns so conducive to making money for “investors” was created by AirDNA, a firm that compiles and analyzes Vrbo and Airbnb data. What makes cities like Staunton so attractive to people who think in terms of balance sheets, according to AirDNA chief economist Jamie Lane, is that all the really hot mountain destinations have gotten too expensive. That makes second-tier cities like ours look like bargains. “The markets on this list tend to benefit from steady, multiseason demand and more affordable home prices than those in top mountain destinations,” Lane elaborated. “That combination can create a more balanced investment profile, with strong revenue potential relative to acquisition costs.”

Just how much of a bargain Staunton represents is encapsulated by AirDNA’s ranking system, which looks at five variables to generate a score between 40 and 100. A score of 90-100 is an A. Waynesboro merited only a 70, Lexington and Winchester notched a slightly higher 74, but Staunton roared to the head of the class with a list-making 93. Which all sounds terrific for Staunton, until you realize that what’s being assessed is Staunton’s attractiveness for people who view housing as financial assets, not as homes.

The five variables feeding into this grade include investability, rental demand, revenue growth, seasonality and regulation—or, more accurately, the lack of regulation. Or to put it in English, Staunton offers high curb appeal year-round, with under-priced real estate compared to what the short-term rental market will pay. That may come as a surprise to Staunton residents who can’t find a house they can afford to buy, but that’s what happens when our housing supply is being picked over by people who don’t have to live here.

All the handwringing about Staunton’s lack of sufficient affordable housing is pointless as long as there’s essentially no city regulation of short-term rentals. Without it, the transformation of homes into business assets will continue, largely unseen and unchecked, and articles like this one reaching as many as 40 million people will only accelerate the process. That may be something for the new Staunton Housing Commission to ponder as it plots its future course.

Thinking of giving? Think carefully

(Reading time: 9 minutes)

At a time when an increasingly frayed “safety net” is in danger of collapsing altogether, starved of funds and overseen by a vastly hollowed out federal bureaucracy, it’s only to be expected that social service agencies will step up their fund-raising efforts. At our household, for example, we get a plea for donations to the Blue Ridge Area Food Bank at least once a month, to which we respond as we’re able. But the line of those in need cuts across all of life’s essentials, and seems to get only longer, and you have to wonder how it will all end.

One thing about which we should not have to wonder, but which is rarely addressed publicly, is the level of institutional need. Yes, people are hungry, and in need of shelter, and wanting for adequate medical care or school supplies or decent clothing. But are the agencies working to help such people equally needy? How well do they apply the funds they raise, and how accountable and transparent are they with their donors? Do some have more than they need to help their constituents? Or have some squandered the donations they’ve received, as was so blatantly true of the now defunct local United Way a couple of years ago? How many local affiliates of national organizations coast on the latter’s reputations, rather than on their actual accomplishments?

These are tough questions to pose, because they threaten to tarnish institutions seen as local champions of the downtrodden. But the reality is that the pot of community goodwill and financial support is finite, and likely to shrink even as the need keeps growing. Giving money to Agency A means there’s less money to give to Agency B. Yet the few local institutionalized sources of such help—such as Community Development Block Grants, the Community Action Partnership of Staunton, Augusta and Waynesboro (CAPSAW) or the Community Foundation of the Central Blue Ridge—pay scant attention to the financial statements of their grant applicants, showing more concern for how many people their contribution might benefit.  Private contributors, meanwhile, are even less likely to do their homework when responding to the latest tug at their heart strings.

SAW Habitat for Humanity

One prominent example of muddled financial accountability is provided by the SAW Habitat for Humanity, which a couple of years ago was roiled by scandal involving its then-executive director, Lance Barton. Initial accusations of sexual assault by Barton were followed by reporting in the Augusta Free Press of years of Barton’s alleged verbal abuse of staff, temper outbursts, uncomfortable conversations about sex, substance abuse, drunken behavior at work and supposed financial irregularities. By late spring of 2024, Barton was out of a job, Habitat’s board of directors had virtually a complete makeover, and an interim director was brought on to manage the transition until a permanent replacement could be recruited.

That replacement was Brad Bryant, a widely respected local builder, teacher and former Habitat board member who was hired almost ten months ago. To be fair, Bryant inherited a mess—but it’s also fair to question his lack of public progress thus far in setting Habitat’s financial house in order. Although Bryant says the organization recently completed its first financial audit on his watch, its findings have not yet been publicized. Meanwhile, the most recent Form 990 tax return posted on Habitat’s website—the IRS form all non-profit organizations are required to submit to maintain their non-profit status, a form that potential contributors can consult before giving their money—is for the fiscal year that ended June 30, 2022. That was almost four years ago.

More recent Form 990s have been filed with the IRS, but Bryant had not seen them before this week. One was for the fiscal year that ended June 30, 2023. A second, following an apparent decision by the interim executive director to change Habitat’s fiscal year to a calendar year, was filed for the year ending Dec. 31, 2023. Depending on how diligently someone in the public searches for financial accountability, then, there’s been a lack of reporting for more than two years, and possibly quite a bit longer.

Some of that gap may get filled when the recent audit results are published, but even then, the report will be notably deficient in at least one material aspect. Among the financial assets in Habitat’s possession are nearly 300 pieces of poster art that were purchased by the disgraced Barton on a junket to Poland, ostensibly as an investment that could be sold to American collectors at a hefty mark-up. The art was purchased with Habitat funds, on a trip underwritten by Habitat that was rationalized as an unconventional but potentially lucrative fund-raiser. The art now sits in a locked room. It has never been shown to the public, and it has yet to be professionally appraised. Whether it’s a significant if unrealized financial asset, or whether it’s just a lot of worthless paper, the product of Barton’s feverish imagination, remains unknown.

In Bryant’s assessment, any fuss over the Polish art is a tempest in a teapot, much ado about nothing at a time when he’s struggling with more substantive issues to make Habitat “viable again.”  He may be right. He may also be markedly wrong. The point is that a somewhat bizarre aspect of Habitat’s bookkeeping is a black box that the organization doesn’t want anyone looking into. When I asked Habitat’s new chairman of the board, Charles Edmond, for an explanation of the Polish art fiasco, his terse response was to say that “due to ongoing litigation, our attorney has advised us to not talk about this issue at this time.”  Yet as Bryant conceded, there actually isn’t any litigation, just repeated failed attempts at getting the Commonwealth’s Attorney to look at the possibility.

There’s no question that Habitat was left in tatters by its departed executive director, and that restoring its luster—not to mention its effectiveness at actually building affordable housing—is a monumental task. But that task is not made easier in the face of financial inscrutability. Not when organizational viability is dependent on the public’s willingness to open its wallet.

Valley Mission

A diametrically opposite set of circumstances is provided by Valley Mission, which provides long-term shelter and case management for our area’s homeless population. It is perpetually over-subscribed, with a waiting list that can stretch for months, and even though the Mission ostensibly has a six-month window within which its clients are encouraged and worked with to obtain permanent housing, the reality is that a year or more of residency is not unusual. There just isn’t enough affordable housing to meet the need.

It may seem paradoxical, therefore, that the Covid pandemic was very good to the Mission’s financial fortunes. Money poured in from various sources, so even as expenses climbed, revenue far outstripped what was needed, jumping from a more or less normal $1.3 million in 2019 to $2.5 million in 2020 to $3 million in 2021. And although income declined somewhat thereafter, it remained significantly higher than pre-pandemic revenue.

Give the Mission a thumbs-up for showing restraint in the face of this bounty: although expenses have continued to climb every year, they have not outstripped the Mission’s two main sources of regular income, contributions and grants, and the income generated by its thrift stores in Staunton and Waynesboro. The surplus has instead been banked, some in cash and some in investments, where it has been generating an enviable amount of interest income: $103,909 in 2023, for example, and an additional $121,642 in 2024.

All told, then, the Mission ended 2024 (its 2025 financials have not been filed yet) with just a tad less than $3 million in cash, $1.6 million in investments, and a total of $5.4 million in unrestricted assets. To put that in context, the Mission’s total expenses in 2024 were $2.3 million—which is to say, the organization is now sitting on enough liquid assets to operate for two years without a single additional dollar coming in the door. It is, in one sense, functioning like an investment bank, which may not be what potential donors want their contributions to fund.

A possibly bigger problem is that even as it hoards a lot of cash, the Mission continues seeking and receiving funding from the same sources used by other local social service agencies, many of which are also trying to help people meet their housing needs. That includes Waynesboro Area Relief Ministries (WARM), Valley Supportive Housing, New Directions Center, and Renewing Homes of Greater Augusta, all of which operate on a shoestring. Meanwhile, in recent years the Mission has been receiving approximately $7,940 annually from Staunton’s Community Development Block Grant, was awarded $11,500 from the Community Foundation in 2024 and $161,000 in 2023, and in the year ending June 30, 2025, received $36,622 from CAPSAW. That’s all money that would have had a far more meaningful impact elsewhere.

There’s another aspect of the Mission’s growing wealth that is problematic. Not only is the Mission not meeting the full demand for the services it already provides, but there are numerous adjacent needs of the homeless population that remain completely unaddressed.  Among the most prominent, for example, is the lack of a day center in the SAW region to provide shelter and services to people who otherwise are left wandering the streets in search of winter warmth, summer shade and refuge from rain and other extreme weather in all seasons.  There are several reasons why this state of affairs exists, but among the most prominent is a lack of adequate funding.

Providing a day center is not the Mission’s responsibility. On the other hand, it’s not unreasonable to think that perhaps the Mission could expand its efforts to answer an unmet need that is entirely aligned with its core mission.  Perhaps it will.

The Mission’s executive director, Susan Richardson, left open that possibility by asserting that the Mission’s board and leadership “makes financial and strategic decisions based on what we believe is best for Valley Mission and the residents we serve.” So . . . not saying no either to expanding the Mission’s facilities to provide more shelter space, or to filling in other holes in the safety net provided to the same generalized population. But also not saying no to bellying up to the financial water hole frequented by all those other critters in the social services ecosystem, which after all is how the system works.

It’s a jungle out there.

A glimmer of hope for housing

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The new Staunton Housing Commission, the city’s attempt to address issues of homelessness and an inadequate supply of affordable housing, got off to a rocky start with its first meeting last week. Two of its nine members were not present, and the meeting itself—one of only four scheduled for this year—occurred two months later than initially scheduled. Moreover, much of the meeting was marked by red flags waved by city planner Rebecca Joyce, who asked commission members to trust her efforts over the next year to steer their work.  

“We have to stay in a certain lane,” Joyce cautioned, warning against scattershot thinking on the one hand and thinking there is a magic formula to fix everything on the other. “Guard rails” were mentioned repeatedly.

For all that, the 30 minutes or so of group discussion that took place during the 75-minute session were the liveliest on the subject since the commission’s progenitor, the Staunton Housing Strategy Group, started meeting 18 months ago. This was, in part, due to the addition of new voices and perspectives that were notably absent from the strategy group, including those of Robin Miller, a developer, and Hans B. Kettering, a young man searching for housing he can afford while working for Fisher Auto Parts. So perhaps there’s hope for some innovative thinking.

One hint of a possible clash of ideas and values came, interestingly enough, from city vice mayor Brad Arrowood, who was an early proponent of creating such a commission. Noting that Staunton has more cows than most cities its size because of its more than 2,000 acres (of less than 13,000 total) zoned for agricultural use, Arrowood suggested that this flat and gently rolling land could eventually be developed for housing.  That contrasted with an observation made later in the meeting by Miller, the developer, who noted that building out a road map—that is, building roads, curbs, sidewalks and utilities, including electric, water and sewer lines, plus storm drains—currently costs between $1,700 and $2,000 a linear foot.

Imagine what that means for an entire traditional subdivision. With the exception of Bell’s Lane, a narrow asphalt road, Staunton’s ag-forestal district has none of that infrastructure, so building housing there will be enormously expensive. So expensive, in fact, that there’s only two ways it can happen: either by building very large, very expensive homes, or by building lots and lots of homes within a much smaller footprint. Easier, cheaper and faster, Miller offered, would be to fill in what’s already here, building on vacant lots in the developed parts of Staunton. Indeed, he added, one of the quickest ways Staunton could generate more affordable housing would be to allow greater density overall, and to allow accessory dwelling units (ADUs) in particular.

ADUs have become exactly the kind of quick-fix housing solution that makes Joyce fret, universally offered as a sure-fire way to get more people housed by allowing property owners to build second or even third homes on their existing lots. They invariably come up in these discussions because they’ve become so widespread—elsewhere. Miller mentioned that Richmond just recently adopted an ADU ordinance, despite heavy opposition. A map I published back in November showed the stark contrast locally, with Staunton and Waynesboro as non-ADU islands surrounded by the ADU-receptive sea of Augusta County.

Although the Staunton Housing Strategy Group ostensibly embraced the ADU approach, the formal housing strategy it presented to city council last fall slow-walks the concept—and one possible reason was advanced by Arrowood, who told last week’s commission meeting that it’s fraught with possible unintended consequences. What if, he suggested, homeowners on large lots put up several ADUs, only to position them as short-term rentals, or Airbnbs?  Staunton would be helpless to prevent a transformation of quiet residential neighborhoods into beehives of transient activity, while scarcely increasing the amount of affordable housing for teachers, fire fighters and other essential workers.

The obvious response is not to obstruct ADUs but to regulate Airbnbs, as other Virginia localities already do. Albemarle County, for example, requires short-term rentals to be on a minimum of five acres with a rural zoning.  But a regulatory approach runs into another philosophical roadblock, which Arrowood also articulated and which goes a long way toward explaining why Staunton is in the spot it’s in: houses are private property. They’re not just homes, but financial assets.  Airbnbs are property owners’ entrepreneurial effort to better themselves, comparable to the boarding houses of yore, when widows would let out their spare rooms to working class stiffs who couldn’t afford their own homes. Any attempt to regulate such enterprise would be downright un-American.

Airbnbs, which are rented by the day, week or month to transient guests, are nothing like boarding houses, but the comparison appeals to a certain rosy nostalgia. It also highlights the tension, albeit not one that was further explored at last week’s commission meeting, between two opposing views of how we move from here. On the one hand, an assertive embrace of a higher density and infill strategy that builds on what already exists; on the other, a long-range contemplation of how a blank canvas, otherwise known as the ag-forestal district, might be shaped while avoiding upsetting the status quo.

As with many such tensions, the outcome most probably will lie somewhere between the two. But it will be interesting, in the months ahead, to see how clearly these differences are articulated by commission members and how they’re resolved. That could make for more of the animated conversation that showed briefly last week, before Joyce threw up those guard rails, and just might lead to a more durable and meaningful consensus.

* * *

March 11 postscript/clarification: I’ve misstated Hans Kettering’s interest in local housing issues, as he wrote to let me know that he has decent housing and an amicable relationship with his landlord. As Hans further noted, “I was speaking for friends and people of the community that can’t find anything in Staunton at a reasonable price.” My apologies for my mistake.

Public housing faces multiple attacks

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As far as the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is concerned, March came in like a lion.

Starting in late February and continuing into this week, the federal agency responsible for most public housing fired off a volley of proposals guaranteed to make its tenants miserable. The timing, as the economy teeters on the edge of a downturn, affordable housing remains more mythical than real and the war on immigrants continues unabated, couldn’t be more heartless.

The first assault came Feb. 20, when HUD published a proposal to prohibit immigrants who are ineligible for housing assistance from living with family members who are eligible, as is the current policy. The ineligibility list includes immigrants who are otherwise in the U.S. legally, such as immigrants with student visas or those with Temporary Protected Status. Such mixed-status families currently receive prorated housing assistance that covers only the eligible members, which means the family as a whole pays proportionally higher rent than fully eligible families. If adopted, the proposal would force mixed-status families to separate or to leave their homes altogether.

A second shoe dropped just a week later, when HUD took steps to repeal a requirement that public housing agencies and private homeowners accepting vouchers provide their tenants with a 30-day notice before filing for eviction for non-payment of rent. The Feb. 26 announcement was designated an “Interim Final Rule,” which in a ready-fire-aim twist, means that despite a comment period that runs through April, the repeal will go into effect March 30. Although HUD’s notice acknowledges that the 30-day eviction notice “provided tenants with longer runways to undertake remedial actions to become current with their rent,” the agency contends that too many tenants simply took advantage of the additional time to go deeper into arrears.

Besides, HUD added, dropping the 30-day window will improve housing access by “opening up housing opportunities” for people on waitlists for affordable housing. Which fits right in with the Orwellian phrase, “War Is Peace. Freedom Is Slavery. Ignorance Is Strength.”

Consider the graph at the top of this page, which shows that a third of all evicted renters have incomes of less than $30,000 a year. Even at the top of that range, monthly rent of more than $750 pushes a tenant into the “rent burdened” category, which leaves little wiggle room for other necessary living expenses or emergencies. Falling behind on rent by even a month creates a nearly insurmountable financial hurdle for catching up.

But that’s not all. While an estimated 80,000 people would lose their housing assistance because of the mixed-status family rule change, and more than 2 million HUD-assisted households will be impacted by the loss of the 30-day eviction notice, an estimated 3.3 million would lose their rental assistance as a result of a March 2 proposal to impose work requirements and time limits on housing assistance. The estimate, based on an analysis by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, includes 1.7 million children who could lose their homes.

The proposed work requirement, long embraced by political conservatives who fret about welfare queens, would require “work eligible” adults to put in up to 40 hours a week at programs and projects that “address local needs and goals.” Failure to comply with work requirements would be grounds to terminate housing assistance. But potentially even more onerous is the proposal to allow PHAs and housing owners to establish two-year limits on housing assistance for non-elderly, non-disabled families.

All of these proposals are more nuanced than these brief summaries reflect, but the bottom line is that there are more than 10 million people in the United States who have a roof over their heads primarily because of federal rental assistance programs. Most people in HUD-assisted housing who can work do work: in Virginia, 81% of non-disabled people without young children worked in the past year, according to the National Low Income Housing Coalition. With the minimum wage in the state set at $12.41 an hour, and Virginia’s fair market rent for a two-bedroom home coming in at $1,749, it should be obvious why subsidized housing is the only way many state residents can have a roof over their heads. Now that’s at increased risk.

Nehemias Velez, executive director of the Staunton Redevelopment and Housing Authority, says he knows of no local families that will be threatened by the proposed mixed-status family proposal. The local effects of the other two proposals, however—not to mention other shots HUD might take in the weeks ahead at the people it ostensibly serves—remain to be seen. But it’s already quite clear that the fragile existence of people depending on federal tax dollars to survive is becoming ever more precarious. And as more of them inevitably get pushed out of their homes, it’s going to be up to municipalities like Staunton to pick up the pieces.

That’s not good. We’re not meeting current demand as it is, with long waiting lists at the housing authority, the Valley Mission and Valley Supportive Housing, so where will the new waves of suddenly homeless people go? How many more emergencies like the one we had in late January will it take before we get serious about developing an adequate supply of affordable housing, as well as providing sufficient transitional emergency shelter spaces to tide people over in the short term? Where is the political leadership we need to start beating the drum on these issues?

The homeless population is graying

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As the number of people pushed into homelessness keeps growing, a worrisome subset of that population is expanding at an even faster pace. Locally, we’re not paying nearly enough attention.

Nationwide, there are more than 16 million people 65 or older living by themselves. That represents 28% of our oldest age group, and the older you are, the higher the likelihood you’re living alone: more than half of households with someone 75 and older consist of only one person.

Being old and alone doesn’t necessarily result in homelessness, of course, but it does increase the odds considerably. Living alone is riskiest for the elderly, who tend to have more accidents, are more prone to neglect their health and are frequent targets of financial scams, all of which can result in the loss of a home. And while many Baby Boomers are living in comfortable retirement, 5 million people over 65 live below the poverty line and an additional 2.6 million were classified in 2020 as “near poor,” meaning their incomes were less than 25% above the poverty line—and far below the amount needed to rent an apartment.

Put it all together, and the number of elderly people becoming homeless for the first time is swelling. Add that to the number of chronically homeless people who are “graduating” into the older population, and the ranks of elderly homeless people are growing to levels not seen in decades. The 2024 national Point in Time (PIT) census, the most recently available, found more than 146,000 homeless people who were 55 or over, or 18.9% of the 771,480 total. And here’s the kicker: more than half of those elderly homeless people were unsheltered, compared with just 36% of the overall homeless population.

Locally, the percentages are even more skewed, in keeping with a population that on average is older than at either national or state levels. (In Staunton, we have more people over the age of 65 than we have under 18.) That same 2024 PIT count, conducted by the Valley Homeless Connection, found 47 people ages 55 and older who were homeless, or roughly 26% of the total. Eight were unsheltered, sleeping in cars, a church vestibule and other make-shift accommodations.

Why do elderly homeless people sleep on the street rather than in a shelter? One obvious reason is that there aren’t enough shelters to go around. In recent weeks, for example, the emergency shelter space offered by the Waynesboro Area Relief Ministry (WARM) has been fully subscribed, with 60 or more people filling both primary and overflow churches.  But even when shelters are available, they often aren’t a good match for a population with mobility and other health issues. Getting in and out of bunks, such as those used at Valley Mission; managing medications, like insulin, that might need refrigerating; or making it to a shared bathroom in time for those with incontinence issues, are just some of the major challenges facing older people.

Conversely, older people are more wary of entering shelters because they recognize how vulnerable they are, and because of their generally lower tolerance for conditions that a younger, more resilient population can handle more readily. The National Alliance to End Homelessness, for example, cites the biggest reasons given by people for avoiding homeless shelters as overcrowding (37%) and the related issues of bugs (30%) and germs (22%).

But recognition of the special needs of an elderly homeless cohort has been slow in coming. The national PIT count, for example, only recently started breaking out the age demographics of those it surveys, after years of lumping everyone older than 24 into one giant category. USAging, a national organization that issues periodic assessments of services for the elderly, as recently as 2020 limited its housing focus primarily to home modifications and repairs that help older adults stay in their homes, thereby preventing homelessness. Last year’s report, on the other hand, finally acknowledged a deeper problem, observing that “more older adults are experiencing housing instability or even homelessness,” the insertion of “even” suggesting a previously unimagined condition.

USAging’s findings are based on a national survey of what are known as Area Agencies on Aging, or AAAs, which were established throughout the country by Congress in 1973 to respond to the needs of Americans age 60 and older. Its 2025 Chartbook includes a new “spotlight” on housing issues that charts “the top housing-related challenges facing older adults.” Number one on the list, submitted by 94% of the AAAs, is a lack of affordable housing, while more than a third (35%) cited “increasing homelessness” as among their top dozen concerns.

That concern, however, has yet to filter down to this part of Virginia in any meaningful way. Our local AAA is the Valley Program for Aging Services (VPAS), which serves a five-county area and its cities, including Augusta, Staunton and Waynesboro. Among its better-known programs are Meals on Wheels, but VPAS also helps the elderly with case management services, Medicare counseling, respite and transportation services, and health and wellness programs. When it comes to housing, however, VPAS comes up blank. Its strategic plan for 2025-2027 doesn’t even mention the word.

VPAS executive director Beth Bland said last week that her agency is “certainly aware” of the housing issue, but contended that the problem is “bigger than any one organization can tackle” and added that VPAS doesn’t have the financial or staffing resources to make a difference. Asked why VPAS doesn’t at least provide leadership in bringing community attention to the problem, Bland demurred. “We are not prepared to be, nor would it be appropriate for us, to take the lead on this issue,” she replied, suggesting that the Community Fund is already doing this. The Community Fund, alas, while it has tried to put a spotlight on the overall lack of affordable housing, has had little to do with homelessness.

Putting aside Bland’s unwillingness to have VPAS take the lead on an issue that clearly falls within the AAA mandate, it’s only fair to acknowledge that the local agency is squarely within the national mainstream. As documented in the 2025 Chartbook, only 8% of the nation’s AAAs have a formal partnership with homelessness or emergency shelters, 7% with coordinated entry systems for the homeless and 6% with an affordable housing coalition. The problem of old people living on the streets apparently will have to become much more egregious before we start paying attention.

There is one slim ray of hope locally, although it’s still many, many months from fruition. The Staunton city council last week approved a rezoning request for a property on West Beverley that has been vacant for at least the past 40 years, changing it from an R-4 to a B-5 zoning category. The R-4 category had frustrated multiple development proposals over the years because of its parking requirements—requirements that are much looser in a B-5 zone, so poof! a bureaucratic hurdle was vanquished just like that. Sometimes all it takes is someone with vision to make things happen.

The rezoning clears the way for the former Dunsmore Business College to be redeveloped as 15 one-bedroom apartments for “extremely low-income” senior citizens. The project is being led by Stu Armstrong, a former Staunton resident who owns the brick building and has a history of renovating other residential properties in the Newtown area. Although he estimates the renovation will cost at least $3 million, Armstrong says he can raise sufficient capital through multiple layers of grants, federal housing programs and private equity funding—and a good thing, too, because if he had to cover his costs through rent income, the apartments would have to list for approximately $2,000 a month.

To be sure, were those apartments available today, they would make only the slightest dent in demand. The Staunton Redevelopment Housing Authority, which is lending its support to Armstrong’s efforts, has a waiting list for its subsidized apartments that includes 137 elderly people with annual incomes, on average, of slightly under $14,000. That’s not enough to rent anything in today’s market. But even if Armstrong’s project reduces the housing authority’s waiting list by just 10%, that’s 15 people who otherwise could very well end up on the street.

And maybe, just maybe, Armstrong’s success could point the way for others to follow suit. Let’s wish him well, because the need he’s addressing is only going to keep growing as all of us keep aging.

You can’t get everything you want

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There’s a sign posted in many small businesses that reads more or less like this: “Fast. Cheap. Quality Work. Pick any two.”

That brevity gets at a simple truth. You can get things fast and cheap, but the quality will suffer. Or you can opt for good quality and fast turnaround, but it won’t be cheap. And maybe, just maybe, you can get good quality at a cheap price, but you’ll have to wait for it.

A different but similar set of trade-offs bedevils efforts to resolve the affordable housing shortage. We can build cheaper houses, for example by increasing zoning density, but at the perceived cost of dragging down overall real estate values—almost invariably provoking local opposition from existing homeowners. Or we can build homes more quickly but at market rates, staving off NIMBYism but failing to meet the need for housing at prices that most people can afford. We can, in other words, view housing either as a form of wealth accumulation or as essential shelter. It’s not at all clear that we can do both.

Because of that simple disconnect, virtually every housing “solution” being tossed around not only misses the mark but often promises to make things worse. In recent weeks, for example, the Trump administration has floated the ideas of allowing 50-year mortgages, of banning institutional investors from buying single-family homes, and of having Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac buy $200 billion in mortgage bonds, a purchase we are assured will “make the cost of owning a home more affordable.” None of these proposals, you’ll note, do anything to increase the actual housing supply. All will, almost assuredly, increase the cost of housing.

“Whenever we subsidize mortgages, guess what? It all gets capitalized into home prices,” Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, real estate and finance professor at Columbia University’s graduate school of business, told The Wall Street Journal. “All these demand subsidies don’t really work in a world where you don’t supply new housing.”

Given a generally agreed-upon shortage of 4 million homes nationally, housing “solutions” that don’t increase housing supply only prolong a game of musical chairs: someone will always be left out, regardless of mortgage terms or rates or whether corporate investors are barred from competing with individual homebuyers. And as in any market in which demand continues to outstrip supply, prices inexorably will move in only one direction. That’s presumably great news for anyone lucky enough to have grabbed a chair, but it’s a growing hardship for those without, and a tragedy for society overall.

Here’s how extreme things have become: Sen. Elissa Slotkin, D-Michigan, last week introduced a bill calling on the Trump administration to declare a national emergency over the housing crisis. For a Democrat to urge this administration to declare any kind of national emergency is like handing a gallon of gasoline to an arsonist, but the National Housing Emergency Act nevertheless seeks to prohibit state and local governments from imposing regulations that place “a substantial burden” on housing production, including many traditional zoning and other regulatory restrictions. The “period of the emergency” is to last until 2031, or until a goal of 4 million new housing units is met.

Slotkin’s bill springboards off the Defense Production Act (DPA) of 1950, which gives the U.S. president the authority to require businesses and corporations “to prioritize and accept contracts for materials and services as necessary to promote the national defense”—shifting housing intervention under the same umbrella of federal overreach as the Trumpian rationale for bombing fishing boats and its incursion into Venezuela. So, for example, the proposed National Housing Emergency Act would extend the DPA’s “materials and services” coverage to include not just lumber and steel but also manufactured housing.

But the act goes further. It also introduces a “pro-growth requirement” for state and local governments to receive federal block grant funding. And, significantly, it pushes states and localities to change their laws to allow commercial properties to be turned into housing, eliminate single-family zoning and allow for accessory dwelling units, sometimes referred to as “in-law suites” or “granny flats.” It also bars states and localities from passing laws, rules or regulations that would impair the build-out or rehab of housing during the emergency—arguably all desirable provisions, but at the cost of severely slashing local autonomy in an area long regarded as outside of state and federal control.

It’s too early to tell whether Slotkin’s bill will make any headway, although its lack of bipartisan support suggests not. But think of it as a canary in the coal mine, a warning signal of a growing sense of helplessness and frustration at the national level over a crisis that historically has been beyond federal purview. It also attests to the willingness of at least some Democrats to have the federal government throw its weight around at a grassroots level, in which case we’ll have only ourselves to blame. Zoning, building codes, land-use patterns—these are all local responsibilities, or have been until now, but failure to meet those responsibilities adequately invites intervention.

Fast. Cheap. Quality work. There are always trade-offs. We can act on an understanding that everyone needs a place where they can live within their means; or we can continue to view our homes as wealth generators that must be protected as investments. If we don’t mediate that conflict at a local level, and soon, we run the risk of having someone else do it for us.

Zoning: new wine in old wineskins

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It’s only human to think that the way things are is the way they’ve always been—until they’re not. That may seem like an incongruous statement, given the extraordinarily dynamic world we’re living in. Constant social and political upheaval, as well as ever-changing rules about appropriate behavior and how we maintain relationships, can seduce us into thinking we’ve mastered this change thing—that we’ve learned how to be light on our feet as we bob and weave through everything that’s being thrown at us.

Which is true enough, as far as it goes. But learning how to respond to shifting expectations and responsibilities is not the same as learning how to effect change. Adaptation is all about reaction, not about proactively creating the world we want to see—to being able to think outside of the box, changing our circumstances to better serve our needs rather than merely responding to the world’s demands on us.

What brings all this to mind is a subject I’ve touched on in the past, albeit briefly, which is the realization that our zoning code is a decades-old strait jacket that almost invisibly shapes our built environment. Decisions that were made in the 1960s about how Staunton should be laid out, and its various land uses apportioned, have become so engrained that we rarely think about how they constrain our efforts to meet modern challenges. As a result, discussions and studies about how best to create more affordable housing, or how to make Staunton more walkable and bicycle friendly, or how to better integrate small businesses, homes and professional offices, invariably overlook root causes.

Because of this blind spot, city planners can make absurd statements about Staunton’s lack of available land for further development. The Staunton housing strategy group can meet for a year with only short mention of the zoning code, and then only to acknowledge its restrictions, without any discussion of whether those restrictions still make sense or how they can be changed to meet contemporary needs. The city’s recently adopted 11-point housing strategy mentions zoning only once, as part of an “exploration” of what might be needed to encourage additional housing options on existing properties. And it remains to be seen whether Staunton’s revision of its Comprehensive Plan will address this most fundamental issue.

That the city’s demographics and housing needs have undergone significant changes since 1969, when the current zoning code was adopted, should go without saying. Households are significantly smaller and the population overall skews significantly older. The city itself has more than doubled in geographic size, following the 1986 annexation of 11 square miles from Augusta County—yet while both Augusta County (+76%) and Waynesboro (+35%) have seen not insignificant population increases over the past half-century, Staunton’s has inched up just 5%, and all of that over just the past decade. The amount of new housing permitted in a city with 12,352 housing units is measured most years in mere dozens (see graph above or here).

 One way to describe all this is “stagnation.” Indeed, at the most recent Virginia Governor’s Housing Conference, one of the supposedly most cautionary statistics—because of its implications for future housing needs—served up by a keynote speaker was the projection that by 2050, 22% of all Americans will be senior citizens. Staunton has all but reached that mark already, at 21%—more than two decades ahead of schedule.

Older people neither want (in most cases) nor need as much house as they did when they were raising families. Smaller households—the result of more adults of all ages living alone, or with just one other person—likewise need smaller homes. And Stauntonians of all ages have emphasized repeatedly their desire to have homes within walking distance of essential shopping, as well as of cultural and recreational amenities. But none of that is possible in more than half of the city, where zoning allows only bigger homes than needed on lots that are spaced more widely apart than is conducive to walking. Moreover, that limitation means rents and home prices in the other, more desired half of the city are at more of a premium than they otherwise would be.

All this suggests that a comprehensive review of Staunton’s zoning code should be a fundamental prerequisite for any serious attempt to tackle the city’s shortage of affordable housing, but the city’s blind spot in this regard has left it spinning its wheels. Although it’s been more than five years since the state’s Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission (JLARC) directed its staff to analyze Virginia’s affordable housing needs, its conclusions have gone largely ignored locally—including the observation that “local zoning ordinances can be a substantial barrier” to “construction of new affordable housing.”

As the JLARC report also observed, “Very few localities zone more than 50 percent of their land for multifamily housing, which is the housing that is most needed in Virginia.” Although that finding is aimed primarily at the state’s more urban northern crescent, it’s worth noting that less than a fifth of Staunton’s zoned land fits that description.

Our zoning ordinances are much to blame for the fix we’re in today, but they also can ease the way out—once we recognize just how much they’re hobbling our housing market. What man has made, man can change.