Uncategorized – Page 4 – Looking askance

Let’s not send water into the cloud

(Reading time: 7 minutes)

Sometimes it’s hard to grasp just how quickly the world is changing, and how slow we can be in adjusting. Perhaps that’s not a big deal on a personal level. Tell people you don’t use a cell phone or go on social media and they’ll just think you’re quirky, or old. But being out of step becomes a really huge deal when it involves spending millions of dollars and making decisions that will have a ripple effect for decades.

Case in point: that ambitious effort to attract investment dollars, currently marked by a towering column just 350 feet off I-81, known as Staunton Crossing. By this time next summer the concrete pillar will be crowned by a ginormous billboard advertising the city, painted onto a 1-million-gallon water storage tank that will be 70 feet in diameter and, at its top, 240 feet above the ridge on which it sits. A critical structural failure would make one helluva splash on the highway below.

The aesthetics of such boosterism come down to a matter of taste and judgment, but there should be less subjectivity regarding the water tank itself, which together with its ancillary plumbing carries a hefty $10 million price tag. Who knew a cistern in the sky could be so expensive? For context, $10 million is enough to replace approximately one-fourth of the 13 miles of pipeline that supply Staunton with its drinking water—including, ironically, the water that will fill the new tank. Replacing the pipeline is becoming a critical issue because it’s more than a century old, but where the city will obtain $41.5 million to do the job, or an additional $8 million to drill backup wells, is anybody’s guess.

Meanwhile, although there are plausible reasons to build a new water storage tank on the east end of the city, the primary impetus for this massive venture is Staunton Crossing itself. And, more specifically, a desire by city officials to include a so-called “data center” on its freshly primed real estate. Why the scare quotes around “data centers”? Because the label, while conveying a cutting-edge sense of cleanliness and efficiency, obscures the fact that these contemporary data factories are voracious consumers of power and water, more accurately described as resource vampires.

Offices and manufacturing plants—the development’s other proposed tenants—also need water and electricity, of course, but data centers really need them. The master plan for Staunton Crossing calls for 375,000 square feet of data center space, projected to require 187,500 gallons of water a day. That compares to more than twice as much proposed square footage for manufacturing, which would require only 12% more water—or a proposed 605,000 square feet of office space, using a mere 60,000 gallons a day. (Moreover, most of the data center water evaporates, which means less is available for recycling—good for the sewer system, but not so good for water conservation.)

The planners who conceived this project knew all that, of course, which is why their top infrastructure priority was water. “Prospects need to know that pressure and capacity are adequate for their needs,” they wrote. “Nothing else matters more than water, particularly in the area of manufacturing and data center pursuits.” Ergo, the water tower, enabling the city to assure business prospects that it can deliver 2 million gallons a day, as well as 4.2 megawatts of power.

But that was six years ago, and as noted at the top of this column, the world is moving ever more quickly. What seemed like a reasonable concept in 2019 has become increasingly outdated, as computer users from the smallest to the largest increasingly turn to “the cloud”—an ethereal marketing term for data centers—for their data storage needs. More recently, the post-Covid ascendance of energy-hungry artificial intelligence (AI) has blown up all previous forecasts of national power consumption.

Based on their projections for Staunton Crossing, the planners were envisioning a 10-megawatt data center, which at that time was an average size for the centers that were sprouting up in northern Virginia. But the reason why Ashburn, for example, today has 133 data centers is because these smaller centers need to cluster around a high-speed network infrastructure to reduce latency, a critical aspect of a seemingly seamless “cloud.” On this side of the Blue Ridge, on the other hand, we still have areas without decent internet service, never mind the kind of fiber connections that would enable cloud computing.

AI’s massive energy needs, meanwhile, require hyperscale centers measured in the hundreds of megawatts. One such center currently in development in Culpeper, for example, will have 1.4 million square feet providing initial support for 216 megawatts of critical load, eventually expandable to 432 megawatts. That’s clearly a whole new ball game, in which Staunton Crossing can’t compete.

These limitations suggest that the Crossing’s quixotic pursuit of a data center won’t get out of the starting gate, too small for a hyperscale center but too isolated to plug into the cloud network. Indeed, it’s worth noting that while much of the marketing strategy behind Staunton Crossing has been to emphasize its proximity to two interstate highways, a railroad and Virginia’s inland port in Winchester, absolutely none of it addresses virtual connectivity. So: nothing to worry about, right? Unless, of course, it’s to fret about the time and money wasted on ill-fated marketing efforts, or on building a possibly over-engineered water tank.

Still, there’s always the danger that these sorts of projects take on a life of their own, lurching onward long after someone should have cut off their heads. And putting a data center in Staunton, while of debatable value in 2019, makes even less sense today. Although we’ve had a relatively wet spring and early summer, Staunton had repeated drought warnings and advisories the previous several years, underscoring the city’s vulnerability to water shortages in an age of ever more extreme climate change. Meanwhile, the 4.2-megawatts of electricity that Staunton Crossing currently promises won’t begin to address the energy needs of a data center (or a serious manufacturing plant, for that matter), which means Dominion Power will be expected to build a new transmission line—with construction costs distributed among current users.

What would Staunton get in return? Once a data center is up and running, relatively little. Local employment, as measured by vehicle trips per day, would be a scant 375, as laid out in the master plan—compared to more than 5,000 a day for a manufacturing plant, and 6,400 to 11,000 a day for office workers. More vehicle trips, more local employment. The other potentially significant upside could be the tax revenue generated by such a capital-intensive project, were it not for the fact that taxing data centers has become a race to the bottom. Or as Staunton Crossing’s planners advised the city, slashing taxes for data centers would signal the industry “that it is specifically desired in Staunton.” Maybe that’s a signal we shouldn’t want to send.

At the very least, it would be prudent for the city to revisit the Staunton Crossing master plan and determine if changing circumstances have rendered some of it obsolete. Ditch the idea of having a data center. Perhaps revisit the idea of incorporating housing into the plan, a concept that was part of the original planning but then inexplicably dropped, and one that subsequently has become more urgent. Safeguard a precarious water supply.

We’d still be left with one of the state’s biggest billboards, so it won’t have been a total loss. (Sorry, Lady Bird.)

If you don’t sell it, it won’t sell

(Reading time: 5 minutes)

Here’s how self-fulfilling prophecies work.

A couple of weeks ago, alarmed by the Trump administration’s decision to eighty-six every possible renewable energy incentive so we can continue burning the residue of dead plants and animals, I visited our local GM dealership. We had installed solar panels when we bought our Staunton home four years ago, and it had been my plan at that time to eventually buy an electric vehicle as well. But now, with passage of the Big Ugly Bill (no, not Trump’s cellmate), I realized that the $7,500 federal tax credit for U.S.-built EVs was about to expire. Time to get a move on!

I did my homework online, then visited the showroom. “Can I help you?” asked a helpful salesman as I strolled in. “Sure,” I replied. “Can you show me your Blazer EVs and Equinox EVs.” Silence, then, “I’d like to, but we don’t have any.”

That was a surprise for at least two reasons. Number one, the Obaugh Chevrolet dealership has scores, if not hundreds, of new vehicles on its lot; could it be that not one of them was from the nameplate’s two top-selling SUV EVs? And number two, I had walked right past a brand-new white Equinox EV parked in front of the showroom. Could it be that this car had already been sold and was simply there for servicing?

As it turned out, the Equinox was a) the only SUV EV on the lot; and b) was indeed unsold and l0oking for a buyer. But the fact that the salesman did not know his inventory was only the tip of the iceberg: he also did not know anything about the vehicle itself, resulting in a mutual journey of discovery as the two of us figured out how to take a test drive. Nor was he in some way unusual, as became achingly clear when I returned to the dealership a couple of days after buying the solitary Equinox with just one of the many questions for which I couldn’t find an answer.

The plastic key fob, as is true of all new cars with remote door openers, incorporates a thin metal key that can be withdrawn and inserted into a door handle for access in case the battery goes dead. That’s helpful. What’s not helpful is the lack of any guidance on where that insertion should be made, since the Equinox door handles are flat and recessed and don’t have any holes, obvious or otherwise. (Trust me: I looked a long time before making a fool of myself by returning to the dealership with so silly a query. I shouldn’t have worried.)

What ensued looked like a Keystone Kops segment, with first one, then a second, than a third and fourth dealership employee converging on the Equinox in response to their co-workers calling for help. Two frantically scrolled through their cellphones, while one leafed through the scanty documentation that GM now grudgingly provides for its vehicles. The fourth peered at the emergency key with the kind of fascination with which early primates pawed at the obelisk in 2001: A Space Odyssey. The 20-page booklet, with less information than comes with a new microwave, clearly showed how to fit the key—if you were trying to get into a Cadillac Lyriq, which in addition to having a much heftier price tag has door handles that aren’t as cool as those on the Equinox; they have key holes.

Eventually, after about 20 minutes, the mystery was solved. The Equinox’s mystery key hole is nowhere near the handles it unlocks. It’s in the back, on the bottom left edge of the trunk lid, visible only if you lie on the ground and look up. It’s covered by a plastic cap that must be pried off. What could be less intuitive?

Early on, while filling out the purchase papers, I commented to the person taking my money, “Well, I guess you don’t sell many EVs.” “No,” he replied, “we just don’t have much demand for them.”

I can see why. Reminds me of the probably apocryphal story of the shoe company, looking to expand its market, sending two salesmen to different parts of Africa. The first quickly wired back (this is an old story), “Wasted trip! No one here wears shoes.”

The second took a little longer, but eventually wired: “Crank up production! Great market—no one here wears shoes.”

P.S. The Equinox is a wonderful car, although making the switch to an EV takes some getting used to: it’s basically a computer and large battery on wheels. But it’s super quiet, handles well, accelerates briskly and has a range of more than 325 miles on a full charge. Best of all, after the tax rebate, a $1,000 discount because of my Costco executive membership and an additional $1,500 dealer discount, the bottom line was less than $27,000. That’s really hard to beat—but the federal tax credit expires at the end of September.

As for my other questions, I realized trying to get them answered by the dealership is a waste of time, since it knows as little as I do. I did find and download a 361-page manual online, though.

Tell ’em the Greeks sent you

(Reading time: 7 minutes)

Throughout all the various discussions of the past year about how best to cope with the SAW region’s shortage of affordable housing, most attention has gone to the “housing” half of that phrase. ADUs, modular construction techniques, pocket neighborhoods, land banks and land trusts, restrictions on short-term rentals—all these and other strategies that have been kicked around have focused, by and large, on how best to increase housing supply. Comparatively little attention has been given to the issue of affordability.

That may simply reflect the intractability of the problem. Housing can be made more affordable either by increasing wages or by lowering the cost of homes—but raising wages is a much bigger socio-economic challenge than even the most dedicated housing advocates can tackle. And efforts to lower the cost of housing sooner or later encounter an inherent paradox: housing in the U.S. is both a consumption and an investment good. Enhancing one almost invariably diminishes the other, which is why efforts to introduce cheaper (i.e. affordable) housing so often encounter fierce resistance from established homeowners, who see their property values under attack.

The result has been an increasingly pricey real estate market, defined by tight supply and constantly rising prices, both nationally and locally. Last year, for example, homebuyers on average were paying more than five times their annual incomes for a home, up sharply from 1965, when their purchase price was less than three times income. The average age of the first-time homebuyer was 35, up from 31 just 10 years earlier. Unable to affect labor market economics and equally ineffectual at promoting cheap housing, affordable housing advocates frequently are left agitating simply for more housing, in the forlorn hope that increased supply may by itself bring down prices. So far, it hasn’t worked out that way.

So what’s to be done?

One possible starting point is to look at how new construction is financed. For developers, site acquisition costs may represent just 10% of projected outlays, but that cost comes up-front, before any money comes in, and therefore often is financed through loans. Not only does that make the outlay more expensive when interest rates are high, but land acquisition loans are an overhang that grows with every construction delay, whether caused by permitting issues, bad weather, supply interruptions or labor shortages. Meanwhile, there are only a limited number of financing sources, including government, banks and possibly local lenders, and in our area government funding for housing is not only scarce but increasingly precarious.

But we’re not the first society to face this conundrum. Consider the Greek city of Athens, which just 200 years ago was a “ramshackle village” of perhaps 4,000 residents. It grew steadily over the next century, but an influx of Greek refugees from Turkey upon dissolution of the Ottoman Empire more than doubled the population in just a few months, to 500,000. That was followed by World War II, which devastated the city’s housing stock, after which migration from the countryside again doubled the population. By the late 1940s, Athens was home to more than a million people with insufficient housing and few job prospects, and what housing was available tended to lack basic plumbing or heating.

Against that dismal backdrop, the Greek population—not the government—developed an informal approach to housing called antiparochi, which roughly translates as “mutual exchange,” also sometimes described as “flats for land.” As explained by the BBC in 2019: “Here’s how it worked. A contractor would approach the owner of a house and offer him a deal. He would knock down his house, and build a block of flats in its place. In return, the homeowner would be given a certain number of flats (usually two or three), while the contractor would then make his money by selling the remaining flats to Greeks who were seeking accommodation.”

Such an arrangement, in which no money was exchanged (and, indeed, without the protection of a contract) was largely ignored by the government for more than 20 years, with only minor regulations, such as height limitations and a ban on building over archaeological sites. The result was a win-win-win on multiple levels. The government was able to focus its limited resources on developing infrastructure. The original homeowner realized the equity in his property by having not only a new home—with plumbing!—to live in, but with a second or even third home that he could rent or sell. The builder could start construction with minimal upfront outlays, funding his construction expenses with deposits from prospective buyers only too eager to lock in a home. And as home building took off, the resulting construction boom energized the Athenian economy.

As might be expected, such a free-for-all wasn’t entirely a one-sided success story. As the antiparochi phenomenon became more widespread, architect-free construction became so standardized that the Athenian landscape was transformed into a bleak monotony of drab concrete blocks that still shocks first-time visitors. Developers began cutting corners, not just by eliminating decorative elements but by using insufficient or substandard materials. Yet as the population kept surging, reaching almost two million in the late ’70s, the antiparochi approach kept pace, with housing bank loans comprising just 16% of gross capital formation. And today, the Greeks’ homeownership rate is roughly 65%—almost exactly that of the U.S.

The antiparochi approach eventually was undone by government imposition of an 18% value added tax, applied to the apartments the original homeowners received from the builders. The government also ended a policy that had taxed property transfers but not new construction, which had disincentivized the buying of existing buildings. Behind the changes was at least some civic guilt. “Most people thought that antiparochi was bad for the city and that it destroyed the architecture of the city, but that is not entirely true,” contends Elxis, a contemporary Greek real estate service. “The antiparochi system provided a roof for very low-income families in Greece, who lived in a country without a housing policy.”

Whether the antiparochi approach would work locally is, of course, debatable. The tax policy that led to its near demise in Greece already exists here: while the U.S. tax code allows a swap of one real estate investment property for another while deferring capital gains taxes under Section 1031, there is no such break for homeowners. Nor would the rough-and-tumble approach to building in Athens go down in a society of building codes and inspections. Our shortage of affordable housing doesn’t approach the deprivation faced by post-war Athenians, which pressured government officials into their hands-off attitude.

Yet for all those differences, the Athenian experiment demonstrates that a fresh way of looking at problems can yield unexpectedly creative solutions, and that innovation can be stifled by overly restrictive policies. There are lots of things Virginia’s local governments can’t control, in a state that maintains tight control over most municipal decision-making, but zoning restrictions remain largely within their wheelhouse. So do many tax policies, especially having to do with real estate and personal property. The challenge, therefore, is to look for ways to modify zoning and tax codes in such a way that property owners can unlock their equity productively.

Consider, for example, the large number of Staunton homes built half-a-century or more ago, many occupied by aging empty-nesters who would like to down-size—but who can’t afford to move to a smaller, more manageable home because their own aging property hasn’t sufficiently appreciated in value. How much of the city’s housing stock deteriorates each year as those house-rich but cash-poor couples—and widows and widowers—are unable to upgrade and maintain their property? How much real estate potential is being wasted for lack of anything like the Athenian model?

Houses of God, homes for people

(Reading time: 8 minutes)

New York City is undergoing a “transformational” change in its commercial building sector, The Wall Street Journal reported yesterday, with a projected 40 million square feet of offices scheduled for conversion into apartments and other uses over the next five to 10 years. That’s a huge amount of residential space in the offing, but while New York is an extreme example, it’s hardly alone: the pace of office conversions is picking up across the country, “thanks to the rapidly falling prices of obsolete office buildings, changes to zoning rules that allow for more residential construction, and government incentives that help bring down costs.”

All well and good for white-collar metropolitan areas, you might think, but of what relevance is that to a small, tourist-oriented city like Staunton (or to blue-collar Waynesboro)? It’s not like our diminutive urban cores are bursting with empty space abandoned by accountants, financial managers, software developers, research analysts or other practitioners of the “knowledge economy.” True enough—but here’s what Staunton has that New York doesn’t: a bumper crop of churches, many of which are similarly hollowed-out.

There are 76 of them in Staunton, by one local clergyman’s count. Big churches, little churches, old churches, storefront churches—one church for every 334 Stauntonians, or roughly three times the national average. That’s not because we’re more sinful (although we might be) but simply a result of having been around longer. The result is predictable: while some churches have robust congregations and full calendars, many are lucky to get more than 50 people in their pews on Sunday mornings. We have churches so diminished that they have to share a minister, and churches that have been deconsecrated by congregations that finally couldn’t deny the handwriting on the wall. The rot, all too often, is sinking in.

It’s not just deteriorating church buildings that are going to waste; so is the land they sit on. While some churches have a footprint scarcely smaller than the plot they’re sited on, others own sprawling empty parking lots and overgrown greenery that at their worst contribute to a sense of urban blight. Consider the Marquis Memorial United Methodist Church, which except for one small corner parcel owns an entire city block fronting West Beverley, as well as half-a-dozen vacant house lots across Stoneburner. Much of its two-plus acres sits empty—as does a small, strip-mall type of building that also sits on church land but is used solely for storage—contributing to the overall run-down appearance of the West End.

Although there does not appear to be a comprehensive survey of church properties in Staunton, the Virginia Interfaith Center for Public Policy last November released a study looking at land in Virginia owned by faith-based organizations. Among its findings: that of more than 4 million parcels in the state, 22,543 are owned by such organizations, totaling more than 74,000 acres. “To put this in context,” it noted, “the City of Richmond is roughly 40,000 acres, meaning the identified parcels amount to nearly twice the size of Richmond.” (Staunton, by comparison, comprises roughly 12,500 acres.)

Some of those parcels, as noted, barely exceed a church’s footprint. But 51% exceed half an acre and 38% are larger than one acre, which the report contends is big enough to suggest “meaningful development potential” for housing. And while the study isn’t granular enough for our portion of the state to tease out Staunton-specific statistics, it does report that the Central Shenandoah Planning District, which encompasses the SAW region, has 970 parcels owned by faith-based organizations, totaling 2,741 acres. The median size of these parcels is 0.69 acres, or less than one-third of the Marquis Memorial UMC property—or one-seventh the size of the five-acre parcel occupied by the Christ United Methodist Church, which has more than a thousand feet of frontage on Churchville Avenue.

There apparently is no comparable inventory of church buildings themselves, although national statistics are suggestive. A denomination in one unnamed state, cited by consultant Richard Reinhard (about whom more to come), rated 20% of its 530 churches in “critical condition” (not paying their bills) and an additional 40% in “serious condition.” Or consider the city of Gary, Indiana, which has only 67,000 residents—after decades of decline from a peak of 178,000—but more than 250 empty churches, according to its planning director. Staunton has a more stable population, but that hasn’t insulated it from an overall decline in church membership, and even more sharply so among younger generations. That means that not only are congregations getting smaller, they’re also greyer.

The consequences of these trends vary, and are complicated by other factors. The 75-member Allen Chapel AME congregation, for example, decided to move out of its West Beverley church in 1997, ostensibly because of limited parking and poor accessibility for the handicapped—conditions that were hardly new in 1997 but which became less tolerable as churchgoers aged; that building now houses two Airbnb rental units. But the Bibleway Community Church, directly across the street, appears to have been sitting vacant at least since 2020, when it was purchased by a woman who currently has a West Virginia address. How many other Staunton churches are in similarly precarious circumstances?

Rick Reinhard, quoted above, is former chief administrative officer of a social justice agency of the global United Methodist Church, where he first started grappling with many of these issues. These days he is chief consultant for a Rockville, MD-based group that among other things advocates for a fledgling YIGBY (Yes in God’s Backyard) movement to use church real estate—whether the land or the building itself—for affordable housing.

“Religious faiths face a great mismatch between small, aging congregations and large, deteriorating properties,” he wrote last year. “Developing intelligent reuses and redevelopment of these properties will make the difference between a community flourishing and struggling. Housing advocates view underused faith properties as natural sites to develop projects that help close the great national gap on affordable housing.”

Yet as Reinhard concedes, convincing congregants to convert their houses of worship into houses of a more conventional nature is a huge task: “All too often houses of worship are stricken immobile by their declining congregations. Convincing an elderly congregation to close or even alter the sacred places where they were married, their parents were memorialized, and their children were baptized can be a heavy lift. Faith leaders are schooled in neither real estate nor finance in divinity schools, and sometimes find it anathema to their beliefs.”

For all that, a growing number of churches find themselves in the same financial position as someone working for less than a livable wage, just one leaky roof or burst boiler away from closing. Reinhard estimates it costs upwards of $7 a square foot annually to operate a church (which doesn’t pay real estate taxes), which means a modestly sized 10,000-square-foot building will eat up approximately $70,000 a year just to adequately maintain the structure. Small wonder that older, declining congregations are worshiping in crumbling buildings, or—ironically—that “Small burghs are discovering that the churches found front and center on their towns’ postcards [sound familiar?] are falling into disrepair with uncertain futures.”

A few congregations locally, although none in Staunton, are showing what else is possible. In Roanoke, the former Belmont Baptist Church was converted into affordable apartment units that hit the market late last year. And Trinity United Methodist Church, also in Roanoke, started converting its Sunday school building into 15 affordable rental units this past February. Seven of the units will be reserved for seniors coming out of homelessness, while the balance will be rented to older couples on limited incomes. Prompting the move was a recognition that the dwindling congregation could no longer afford routine maintenance and insurance costs, much less pay for repairs to the sanctuary’s leaky plaster roof.

“Our building was no longer serving us, it was the master of us,” the church’s pastor told a reporter.

Closer to home, meanwhile, the former Wayne Hills United Methodist Church in Waynesboro is now owned by Embrace, a church-affiliated non-profit that has repositioned the property as a community center and food garden. Last year it hosted “Blitz Build 2024,” during which nine tiny homes were built in nine days to house otherwise homeless people in the region. This year its director, Jenelle Watson, is developing a more ambitious plan for approximately two dozen homes to be sited on a third of the 3.3-acre parcel, also for people transitioning out of homelessness.

The conversion of New York’s temples of commerce into affordable housing may seem of remote interest in Staunton, but we would do well to pay heed. “The acceleration of office conversions won’t sharply reduce the overall supply of office buildings any time soon,” the Wall Street Journal acknowledged. “But conversions are already starting to benefit neighborhoods where they take place. By bringing in new residents, these projects are restoring street life, shopping and entertainment venues where obsolete office buildings used to stand.”

As much could be said of Staunton’s less secular temples—with, of course, the added benefit of creating much needed housing.

West End: nothing to BRAG about

(Reading time: 7 minutes)

For anyone looking to understand why civic improvements in Staunton move at a snail’s pace, a good place to start one’s education is with the West End.

Long recognized as the city’s neglected quarter, its vitality sapped by construction of the Woodrow Wilson Parkway decades ago, the West End was targeted by the city council in 2020 as a “high priority zone” for revitalization. That same year, the city applied to the EPA for a three-year, $300,000 Brownfields Assessment Grant. The purpose of the grant, as explained by city staff, was “to return vacant or underutilized properties to productive reuse” by assessing for possible environmental hazards, often from industrial waste but also from asbestos, underground gas tanks, lead paint or other contamination. Site remediation would then “incentivize investment and jumpstart redevelopment and area-wide revitalization.”

Initial progress was promising. The EPA signed off on the grant the following spring, with the study scheduled for completion by September 30, 2024. Draper Aden Associates, a Virginia-based consulting engineer, was retained for the heavy lifting. And in keeping with an announced emphasis on “community engagement,” the city and its consultants planned a series of public meetings over a six-month period “to position the impacted community at the forefront as champions for these revitalization initiatives.”

Study oversight and community engagement was to be provided by the Brownfields Redevelopment Advisory Group (BRAG), a consortium of nine “partners” that would “take an active role in leading the City’s Brownfields Program.” Several BRAG members—including the Valley Mission, the Salvation Army and the Staunton Redevelopment/Housing Authority—dealt with housing issues, holding out the promise that this would not be a neglected focus in a process that could easily favor commercial interests. The West End Business Association and Staunton’s West End Alliance, meanwhile, were singled out as being “strongly committed to the preservation and revitalization of West End and will take an active role in leading the City’s Brownfields Program.”

Indeed, BRAG was to play a crucial role in ensuring that the West End wouldn’t simply become a colonial outpost for a bunch of remote planners parachuting in. It would “meet quarterly to assist City staff in site selection and cleanup/reuse planning,” according to the grant application, which added that BRAG and the city would involve representatives “of neighborhoods most directly impacted by proposed redevelopment projects.” Moreover, “partner organizations like the Salvation Army and Valley Mission will represent disadvantaged communities to communicate their needs and disseminate information, which will be beneficial for constituents with limited internet and/or phone access.”

But of course, man plans and God laughs.

Four years on, the brownfields study is still incomplete. Draper Aden Associates has been gobbled up by a larger firm which, if city staff are to be believed, is extremely slow in responding to information requests about its activities. The planned series of public hearings was severely whittled down over Covid concerns. And BRAG? Never happened. The West End Alliance apparently no longer exists as a separate entity. The other BRAG “partners” never met as a group, had nothing to do with selecting brownfield sites for study, and indeed seem largely ignorant of their supposed role.

The disadvantaged communities presumably remain just that.

THERE IS ONE SILVER LINING to this $300,000 brown cloud, and that’s the redevelopment of the former Chestnut Hill Shopping Center. As it happens, this was one of three “priority” sites identified by the grant application because of “their potential to catalyze additional investment and revitalization of West End, as well as to extend redevelopment opportunities.” That the vacant shopping center happened to meet the city’s need for some place to build a new courthouse was a fortuitous accident, not the result of careful planning, but you take your wins where you can. Will a courthouse turn out to be the best use of that property in the interests of West End revitalization? Maybe, maybe not, but in any case a moot point now.

But what of the other two “priority” sites that were identified by the grant application, carefully picked from among more than 25 candidates chosen for their “potential to change the blighted landscape and revitalize the stagnant economy in the target area”? The first is a one-acre site of a salvage yard that closed in 2011, apparently targeted because of its high potential for contaminating Lewis Creek with heavy metals, PCBs and volatile organic compounds. In other words, not much redevelopment potential but a possible environmental disaster if not attended.

The third of the three sites, however, amounts to an enormous blank slate that could accommodate the most ambitious of developments. Bounded by Morris Mill Road on the north and east, the former Unifi Manufacturing site spans approximately 50 acres and has been vacant since 2008. Immediately to its south is a vacant, wooded tract of an additional 27 acres, which backs onto a Food Lion supermarket, while a connecting vacant lot on the east side of the Food Lion could give direct access to West Beverley Street. Ware Elementary and Shelburne Middle schools are within easy walking distance.

All of which is to say, the West End has a void that screams for development. City maps of the West End core study area and of a proposed enterprise zone look like an upside-down saucepan, with the handle running from downtown along West Beverley, then flaring out along Morris Mill Road to the city boundary. The West End Revitalization Plan has a map on page 28 that includes a large green area, matching exactly the description provided in the preceding paragraph, labeled “redevelopable parcels.” As the grant application summarized, “the site’s proximity to schools and residences make it a high priority for investigation and redevelopment.”

Indeed—but no. The UniFi site is history. Just don’t try to figure out why.

Consider the grant application’s effusive embrace of community engagement: “To maintain progress throughout the grant period, the QEP [Qualified Environmental Professional] will prepare monthly reports to the City and BRAG in compliance with the approved EPA Cooperative Agreement Work Plan, which will summarize activities, e.g. milestones achieved, issues encountered, and budget/schedule updates. These will be used to gauge progress, communicate with constituents and prepare quarterly performance reports.”

Those quarterly reports, however, are too sketchy to be of use to anyone. For example, the decision to extend the initial three-year grant by an additional year is described thus: “An Extension Amendment Request was submitted to EPA as well as updated contact sheet siting a new Grant Recipient Representative.” No reason given why more time was needed—but at least the change was noted. Not so for the UniFi site, which after more than a year of investigation, abruptly dropped off the radar at the end of 2023. The quarterly reports don’t even acknowledge the deep-sixing of its largest “high priority” site, much less a reason for the radical change. On the other hand, the quarterly reports do make sporadic mention of other possible brownfields sites, such as Don’s Auto Repair and Gypsy Hill Park, but again without any explanation.

Does anyone living or working in the West End have the slightest idea that the brownfield study is still chugging along? Highly unlikely. But just as much in the dark are city leaders and planners, all of whom—from council members to the city manager to the head of the planning department—are new to their positions since the grant application was submitted and unable to answer even basic questions, such as why Gypsy Hill Park belatedly became part of a West End brownfield study. This is a ship that has been set adrift, and one can only hope it will eventually touch shore undamaged.

The good news, if one can call it that, is that as of the end of March the study had eaten up only 54% of the original grant money. Of course, that does raise the question of how the city will reasonably spend the remaining $138,000 before Sept. 30—or whether it will seek yet another extension. Maybe it should turn to the West End’s residents for answers. Just don’t look to BRAG for help.

Seeking your thoughts—kinda

(Reading time: 7 minutes)

It’s a fair guess that most Stauntonians have never heard of the city’s comprehensive plan, much less seen it, and that’s not really surprising. The 450-page document states quite explicitly on its cover page that it was prepared for the Staunton Planning Commission, which makes it sound more arcane than it is. The current version is five years old, so a whole lot of water has gone under the bridge—quite literally, in the case of downtown—since it was drafted. And all the people who you might expect would be most involved in its implementation are no longer there: every city council member, the city manager and the city’s director of community development have moved on since the plan was completed.

Then again, much of Staunton’s Comprehensive Plan actually doesn’t, well . . . plan anything, so it’s easy to ignore. While the Commonwealth of Virginia requires every municipality to prepare such plans “with the purpose of guiding and accomplishing a coordinated, adjusted and harmonious development of the territory,” the Commonwealth Code also states that that the plan should be a survey of that municipality’s assets and challenges—and that’s the basket in which Staunton placed most of its eggs. The result is more descriptive than prescriptive, an inventory of the Staunton that existed in 2018 but with few attempts at guidance for the near future, never mind to the plan’s supposed end date of 2040.

But now we have a chance for a do-over. Starting last year, city staff, consultants and a small group of Staunton residents have been revising the plan to make it more up-to-date and, we can hope, make it more of a planning tool than it has been. That process has included seeking input from Stauntonians as to what they think should be in the plan, through online surveys and a series of public meetings, and the next such meeting—an open house at Staunton High School—is less than a month off. Anyone concerned about the city’s future should make an effort to be there: Wednesday, June 25, between 5:30 and 7 p.m.

That said, I wouldn’t be my usual curmudgeonly self if I didn’t add a cautionary note. Despite the city’s apparently diligent attempts to solicit public opinion about various plans, these efforts often have an unfortunately performative aspect to them. The ritual involves lots of easels covered with large white sheets of paper, lots of small stick-on dots in various colors, and an abundance of post-its of obviously limited size on which to scribble fresh ideas. Those in attendance are asked to respond to various questions about whatever the city thinks should be of greatest concern to them, and the answers are subsequently collated, summarized, mentioned in final plan documents—and, generally, thereafter ignored.

Does that sound harsh? Consider, then, the West End Revitalization Plan, completed last summer and subsequently adopted by the city council. That plan also went through a pro forma attempt to get input from West End residents, including public meetings and an online survey. The meetings made it abundantly clear that public “concerns about property upkeep and affordable housing” were among the area’s most notable “challenges.” The online survey disclosed that of eight possible concerns, West End respondents thought that “improved upkeep of existing housing” was the second most “important” or “very important,” just four votes behind the 194 cast for “adding new shops, stores and services.”

How seriously were those views taken? The final, adopted plan is big on retail improvements but scarcely gives a nod to housing concerns. Indeed, only one of 17 proposed actions in the plan directly addresses housing rehabilitation, and does so in the most dismissive way possible by suggesting simply that the city “connect residents to existing resources.” Which is to say, the West End doesn’t have a problem with property upkeep and affordable housing, it has a communication problem.

It therefore will be interesting to see to what extent public input registers in this far broader, city-wide planning document. One possible marker was provided by the Jan. 22 open house, the first of three, when 106 local residents registered their attendance (although city officials believe the actual number attending was higher) and repeatedly voiced support for mixed-use development. Attendees emphasized “the need for mixed-use areas that integrate homes, shops, and parks to create vibrant neighborhoods,” according to a summary of comments under “land use.” Similarly, in a summary under “economic resources & development,” attendees “highlighted the need for increased mixed-use development and support for small businesses in less densely populated areas.”

The summarized comments about housing, meanwhile, illustrate an increasingly sophisticated understanding of what it takes to create a truly dynamic community. Attendees “highlighted the need for affordable housing for their workforce, concerns about rising prices, the lack of options for low-income and middle-income households, and . . . a pressing need for better connectivity between residential areas [and] increased density of housing.”

The emphasis on mixed-use developments and increased housing density, in a city largely mired in a century-old land-use philosophy known as Euclidean zoning, is in some ways revolutionary. Euclidean zoning (the name comes from a village in Ohio, not the Greek mathematician) separates land uses by type—residential, commercial, retail, industrial, etc.—each into their own zones or areas. That may be desirable in preventing a factory or a slaughterhouse from being plopped down next to a church or apartment complex, but it also creates the largely fragmented land-use pattern we have today, with the notable exception of downtown. Add to that a residential zoning preference for detached single-family homes, with broad swaths of the city’s 20 square miles zoned R-1 (maximum of three homes per acre) and R-2 (maximum of five), and the result is a pleasantly bland, dispersed suburban landscape on which builders can’t afford to build homes for low- and middle-income families.

One possible work-around for developers is to seek special use permits so they can build the mixed-use and denser housing that city residents attending these sessions say we need—but for several presumably obvious reasons, that’s not an attractive option. Nor is it happening in any meaningful way. The alternative, therefore, is for those working on the comprehensive plan update to rework the city’s zoning code—to revise the rules and maps that keep things the way they are—so that standards for higher density and mixed-use developments are written into the code, creating “by right” options for developers. No more having to say “Mother, may I please?”

Whether that in fact will happen is . . . let’s just say not likely. One problem with these sounding-board sessions with the public is that they come at a time when the plan revisions are already well underway, so there’s a natural resistance to taking on big new projects—and rewriting zoning ordinances is just about as big as they come. Then there’s the problem of public backlash. Although the Stauntonians attending these open houses may be largely in favor of such changes, they also tend to be more actively engaged in civic affairs than the majority of the population—and a lot of those folks would be aghast at the idea that there could be a wholesale reordering of the land-use landscape ( just one of the problems facing developers seeking special use permits). Winning them over, or at least muting their resistance, would take time, public education and reassurance.

So I’m not optimistic that these open houses and other attempts to solicit public input will make any meaningful difference. The ship’s course is fairly well set, and any comments that might adjust its bearings are no more likely to change the outcome than occurred with the West End Revitalization Plan. But still. The arguments are worth making, if only to lay one more brick against the day when they finally will make a difference.

What we need is a matchmaker

(Reading time: 13 minutes)

The growing mismatch between people’s needs and the resources available to them keeps growing, and with Congressional Republicans hell-bent on adopting a “big, beautiful bill” that will slash Medicaid and other social spending, the gap is certain to keep widening. Care to guess who’s getting hurt the most?

Actually, there’s no need for guesses. Dr. Ryan Barber, whose increasingly sad job it is to ensure that homeless school children have their educations disrupted as little as possible, has been speaking out a lot about an increasingly fraught situation. Barber works for the Waynesboro School District, where at this time last year there were 100 children sleeping in cars or hotels or on a relative’s couch. A few weeks ago that number was 107, continuing a steady upward trend. Staunton, meanwhile, has seen a 50% increase in student homelessness over the past three years.

Traumatized children are not likely to be good students, so public servants like Barber do their best to keep disrupted young lives on an even keel. Local public schools have laundry machines for washing limited wardrobes, give out new clothing to replace what’s worn out or embarrassingly unfashionable, provide food for after-school consumption. If a student’s family is forced to shelter outside the district, Barber and his counterparts will pay for transportation so a child can keep attending the same school, with its familiar teachers, friends and routine.

Yet all that costs money—a surprising amount of it. In one case Barber recounted at a recent SAW housing luncheon, a Waynesboro student whose family moved in with relatives in Swoope continued to attend her same school—at a cost to the district of $250 a day for transportation. Funding for such expenses comes partly from Project Hope, a state program that last year disbursed a total of approximately $45,000 to Staunton, Augusta County and Waynesboro schools—a drop in the bucket when $5,000 of that can get eaten up by driving a single student.

Paltry though it is, however, Project Hope is among the funding sources getting cut. So is Title 1 money, which is federal assistance for schools with children from low-income families, of which there is no lack locally. Ditto for Title 6b, which provided funding for educating students with disabilities, which as Barber noted, is a people-intensive business. So too with a slew of other federal programs that have provided Waynesboro schools with $2.9 million a year, the loss of which would mean losing as many as 30 staff positions.

It’s not just public schools that are getting whacked, although their casualties will be the most poignant. Speaking at a Building Bridges for the Greater Good event three weeks ago—at which Barber also appeared—Staunton city manager Leslie Beauregard summarized the current budget cycle as “the most difficult ever.” There won’t be any FEMA funding to repair severe flood damage under the Wharf parking lot, money for digitizing the city library’s archives has evaporated, and Covid-related funding that paid for approximately 10% of local health staffing has been cut as well.

Meanwhile, Beauregard added, the city received $140,000 in additional requests for new funding from non-profits that were casting about for whatever financial help they could get. A grant for extending water and sewer lines to Uniontown is in jeopardy. And while the city’s annual Community Development Block Grant seems stable at the moment, “if that goes away, it will affect our housing programs greatly.”

These are, in other words, bleak and troubled times. So what’s to be done?

MONEY IS ALWAYS NICE, of course, and many times it’s indispensable. But the other great resource available to almost every community is . . . the community. The people who sometimes open their wallets to others, but who also can contribute their time and energy to help each other. Some people can afford to write a check but don’t have the time to do volunteer work, and some people are just scraping by financially but have time on their hands that they can contribute to their neighbors.

It’s this latter group we need to do a better job of recruiting. And enabling.

When Dr. Barber disclosed that it costs $250 a day to transport a student from Swoope to Waynesboro, the obvious question from an audience member was why that service couldn’t be provided by community volunteers. Oh, that simply wouldn’t be practical, came the flustered response (not from Barber, it should be emphasized), what with liability and insurance issues and the problem of ensuring reliable pick-up and drop-off times and, well . . . on to another topic. And just like that, a potential gift horse was smacked on its butt and sent on its way.

In plush times, which these are not, that might be an understandable if still unfortunate response. Volunteers can be a real pain in the ass. They don’t always donate their time for the best reasons, they sometimes acquire an off-putting sense of entitlement, they can be fickle and unreliable. Scheduling them can be a nightmare, you can’t always know how they’re representing your organization to the public, and the turnover rate can be nightmarishly high. How much more convenient just to pay someone to do a job!

Yet for all those headaches, fiscally strapped communities have long depended on volunteers to provide some of their most essential services. Even today, a substantial number of volunteers staff ambulances and fire apparatus in the SAW region, working alongside career staff whose ranks are kept lean because of budgetary constraints. Volunteers pick up, sort and distribute groceries at food pantries, swing hammers and saw lumber for home-repair non-profits, deliver blood and plasma for the Red Cross, cook and serve meals at shelters, and perform a hundred other tasks that quite often remain invisible to the general public.

Asserting that volunteers are an impractical resource is a lazy dismissal, and especially so in miserly times like these, when the only alternative may be nothing at all.

Consider, for example, the need for some kind of daytime refuge for the area’s unsheltered homeless population. Some homeless people have jobs to go to during the day, but many don’t and are left to roam the streets, regardless of extreme summer heat or winter cold. Where do they end up going? To the public library or the YMCA, to a Hardees or McDonalds, or riding a Brite bus interminably—to wherever they can keep cool or warm and dry, even if they discomfit those around them.

How much more humane would it be to provide a day shelter, complementing the emergency night shelters that the Waynesboro Area Refuge Ministry operates from November through March each year?

Several initiatives are underway locally to create just such a facility, including one spearheaded by Staunton Mayor Michele Edwards. A local church has offered use of its space, Edwards and a WARM representative are discussing whether that agency can staff the operation, and the mayor has said city council might be able to provide some start-up funding. There’s also talk of Augusta Health providing visits by a mobile clinic, and of Mary Baldwin social work students playing some role.

It all sounds promising, but look more closely and you’ll see some cracks. The church in question has scheduling conflicts. WARM is in a financial hole following this past winter’s severe weather and seems unlikely to afford additional personnel costs. And Edwards has emphasized that the city won’t be able to cover operating costs, which means that once this boat is pushed into the river, it’s on its own and with no readily identifiable captain to steer it.

Perhaps for these reasons, there are a couple of other preliminary efforts underway to achieve the same goal. Yet woven through all of these initiatives is the same hurdle: who’s going to man the ship? Who’s going to unlock the doors, fill the coffee pot, ensure that the bathrooms are clean, maintain order, provide counsel to those who look for it, sweep the floors and put out the trash? There’s really only one answer: it will have to be community volunteers, and more than just a couple of Mary Baldwin students. But where will they come from?

WHICH BRINGS ME, at long last, to the underlying thesis of this essay: in Staunton, we do a poor to nonexistent job of matching people willing to work on behalf of others with people who need that help. And we do a similarly poor job of matching people who need help to resources—including volunteers—that could give them what they need.

Consider for a moment that you’re a first-time visitor to Staunton, a tourist, and you want to know what’s worth seeing or doing in the neighborhood. What’s a good place to eat? How can I get to the Frontier Culture Museum? Are there any antique outlets locally? Hey—you’re in luck! The city elders have thoughtfully funded and staffed a centrally located store-front where you can get answers to all these and any other questions you might have, plus brochures, maps, web sites and QR codes that put the entire area at your fingertips.

But if you’re a local without money but with a problem? Good luck finding an equally accessible and helpful resource center.

Got a leaky roof that you can’t afford to repair but don’t know how to tap into possible help? How about needing free food but not knowing where local food pantries are located or their hours of operation? Or what if you don’t have a car but need to get to Augusta Health for medical attention, and you know there’s a Brite bus that might take you there but not where to catch it or what kind of schedule it follows—and if you go to the new, much ballyhooed “Lewis Street Transit Hub,” there’s neither a route map nor an operating schedule for you to look at? (Huh? How dumb is that?)

Tourists bring money, so perhaps it’s not surprising that we make information so much more accessible to them than to our own residents —unsurprising, but sad, nonetheless. But equally frustrating is that the reverse information flow is also stymied.

Live in Staunton, have some time and want to give back to the community? Maybe you’re a retired accountant or bookkeeper willing to tutor someone in basic financial literacy. Or perhaps you’ve got basic handyman skills and could spend four hours a day for three days a week helping someone with home repairs. Or you’ve got a clean driving record and are willing to spend a day or two a week or month delivering food to the homebound, shuttling supplies for a non-profit, or transporting elderly patients for medical appointments. Maybe you’re even willing to staff a day shelter for the homeless?

Terrific—but you’re on your own figuring out which local agency would benefit most from what you’re willing to offer, much less whom to contact and how to present yourself.

What these examples illustrate is a hole in Staunton’s social fabric whose existence has gone unnoticed. What the city lacks is an information broker to match people who have something to offer with people or organizations who need that something. We do that for visitors via the Staunton Visitor Center, offering a place for strangers to ask questions and get expert help in getting what they want while also providing local businesses and attractions with a way to advertise what they have available. What we don’t have is a Staunton Resource Center that can perform the same services for our neighbors.

Such a resource center could, for example, maintain an inventory of potential volunteers, together with descriptions of what they’re willing to do and their general availability. The center’s data banks would include such basic personal information as age, sex, educational level and any physical limitations, a description of the kind of volunteer work desired, and preferred work environments, such as indoors or outdoors, or working alone or with a group. Each entry would also describe a volunteer’s special skills or abilities, past volunteer work, language fluency, driving record and other relevant details. With that information in hand, a broker could let a church, school, social agency or other organization know of the best possible candidates for volunteer positions they may be trying to fill, or let a potential volunteer know what openings matching their interests are available.

Conversely, Staunton residents who are thinking of finding a volunteer position could review requests filed with the resource center by local agencies seeking help.

In addition, the staff at such a resource center could respond to local residents’ needs by providing basic information, be it as simple as a bus schedule or as complex as a list of contacts most helpful to someone who’s about to get evicted: legal assistance, emergency shelter, transportation, school personnel, and so on. By engaging one-on-one with people walking in off the street, resource center staff could identify needs that someone caught up in the emotional turmoil of a crisis hasn’t yet recognized, offering proactive rather than merely reactive assistance.

Yes, a resource center of this sort would cost money—just as the visitor center costs money, currently budgeted at a bit more than $62,000 a year. (That’s in addition to the city’s $665,000 budget for tourism in general.) But just as the money spent on tourism is viewed as seed corn, returning many times more than is expended through visitor spending on local restaurants, lodging, entertainment and so on, so a resource center to mobilize volunteer time and efforts should be recognized as enriching the community.

Unfortunately, the reflexive response to such suggestions is the pretense that online resources and cell phone apps can substitute for face-to-face assistance—which, yes, is cheaper, but hardly effective, as the city itself underscores with its spending on the visitor center. Not everyone has a cell phone, or a charged cell phone. Not everyone is skillful at using digital devices to obtain needed information. Most critically, people who need help often don’t know what they need to know—they don’t know what questions to ask. That’s where human intervention can be critical.

Meanwhile, the brokerage aspect of such a resource center presumably could have an online presence—as the real estate market has, with Zillow and Realtor.com—but ultimately, it’s human beings who create the most productive connections. We’ve got to find a better way to make that human link.

We’re only beginning to see the deprivation that lies ahead, as federal money dries up, the economy stumbles toward possible stagflation and critical community needs go unfunded. This is the time to figure out how we’re going to compensate for the loss of money that typically lubricates our social machinery, and really, the only alternative is the time, effort and concern we have for each other. The days when we can spend $250 a day to transport a homeless student to school are coming to an end, and yet it takes hardly any imagination at all to think of an alternative—it just needs organization.

Developers finally get a seat

(Reading time: 8 minutes)

The past year has not been kind to people concerned about Staunton’s shortage of affordable and working-class housing. Despite an initial outpouring of interest about the issue, with a couple of hundred people turning out for two housing “summits” focused on the Staunton-Augusta-Waynesboro (SAW) region, attendance at working groups spun off by the summits has dwindled month by month. A much-awaited regional housing study, expected last summer, was finally released a couple of months ago and promptly sank from sight due to its leaden content. Staunton’s housing strategy group managed to stretch four 90-minute meetings across seven months without anything more to show for its efforts than a dozen “strategies” that could have been cooked up over a weekend, most of them built on on verbs like “explore” and “develop”—strategies, in other words, that are still in the early conceptual stage.

And then, of course, there’s this year’s federal torching of an already inadequate social safety net of grants, vouchers and other resources that much of the local planning didn’t anticipate. Expect much back-pedaling and wheel-spinning in the months ahead.

It therefore may come as a surprise, amid all the doom and gloom, to learn that this past Thursday’s meeting of the SAW housing stock working group had a breakthrough, of sorts, with the invited presence of two local developers. Although it might seem obvious that any serious exploration of housing issues would require participation from the supply side of the demand-supply equation, virtually all local discussions on the subject have been dominated by everyone except those who actually plan, build and sell the housing that everyone else laments is in short supply. So—genius. And good news, too.

The bad news is that this belated course correction was attended by only half-a-dozen working group members, with three more patching in via Zoom. The further good news is that the entire session was taped, and is accessible here: SAW Housing Stock Work Group Meeting-20250508_100405-Meeting Recording.mp4.

The developers who broke out of their comfort zone were Scott Williams, of the Crescent Development Group in Charlottesville, and Tommy Shields of Ivy Ridge Developers, in Waynesboro. That their attendance was unusual was evidenced by group member Rick Kane’s earlier efforts to recruit three other developers to address the group, none of whom could be bothered to respond to his first and second emails, Kane’s long history as a local real estate broker and former builder notwithstanding. Developers, as Williams readily acknowledged, tend to keep a low profile. Virtually anything they say, no matter how responsive to community concerns, tends to be quickly discounted as self-serving, and no one wants to be a punching bag.

Yet that’s been our loss. Who else, after all, is better positioned to tell us what it would take to get more affordable housing built?

THE EASIEST ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION, according to both Williams and Shields, is simply this: encourage greater housing density.

While not dismissing other development hurdles, such as a shortage of skilled workers or high fees and interest rates, the two developers agreed that the quickest way to get more housing is to increase the allowable “number of units per linear foot of road.” That’s why so much recent construction in the SAW region is of townhouses, which require lots that are only 20 feet wide, versus the 80 or 90 feet that a single-family home needs. Smaller frontage requirements mean more housing units per acre. And more housing units mean a broader base over which to spread costs, resulting in a lower cost per unit. Fifteen or 20 homes on one acre can be sold at a significantly lower price than just two or three single-family homes built on the same lot.

But off-setting the construction math is an equally straight-forward political calculus that occurs when high-density development is proposed for an area of low- or even medium-density zoning—and in Staunton, that covers a lot of ground. (The city’s most recent comprehensive plan indicates that 63% of Staunton’s vacant/undeveloped land is zoned for residential use, with two-thirds of it designated R-1 or R-2, both low-density classifications that allow only detached single-family homes on large lots with extensive setbacks.) Any developer seeking a waiver to exceed density limits can expect an angry crowd of nearby homeowners, gripped by visions of plummeting property values, to descend en masse at public hearings to oppose any change. And public officials, no less than developers, don’t want to be punching bags.

The upshot? Despite a successful downtown core of relatively dense, mixed-use development that exists only because it predates current zoning restrictions, much of Staunton resembles a suburb more than an urban district. Absent, by and large, is what developers refer to as “the missing middle” of housing options, a diverse palette of housing options along the affordability spectrum that includes duplexes, fourplexes, bungalows, cluster homes, cottage courts, courtyard apartments and living/working combinations, such as apartments above street-level stores and businesses. Nor, despite all the recent attention to the issue, is that likely to change, given widespread fears of public backlash—yet as Williams observed, “If you create policy based on never having the phone ring, we’ll never get to where we need to be.”

Indeed, Staunton’s housing market has been shaped by decades of these and other policy decisions baked into its zoning code that send a clear, if not always intended, signal to developers. Many municipalities, for example, have ordinances enabling the creation of planned unit developments, which can include a wide variety of housing styles as well as commercial and office space. Staunton does not. And while city officials say they are open to such designs, developers must file for special-use permits each time they want to build a mixed-use development, sending a very clear message that this is not a normal course of business. Small wonder that little changes.

City housing planner Rebecca Joyce attempted to put a positive spin on this approach by explaining that requiring special-use permits enables city planners to “help the developers tailor their projects” to Staunton’s often quirky lots and challenging topography. But this presupposes that developers aren’t up to the task on their own, or that they won’t ask for help if they need it. Moreover, as Williams pointed out, every special-use permit application amounts to a bespoke mini-ordinance, eating up city staff time and causing costly delays for developers, whose financing costs don’t get suspended while the bureaucracy grinds on.

What became clear Thursday, as Williams and Shields shared their frustrations, is that Staunton is caught between a relatively inflexible approach to zoning that is more suitable for suburbia, on the one hand, and an exploding need for the kind of housing that suburban zoning can’t accommodate, on the other. The city can have one or the other, but it’s hard to see how it can have both.

DESPITE THIS BASIC BUT LARGELY UNNOTICED TENSION, Staunton has in fact made some strides recently towards grappling with its growing housing needs. Perhaps most notably: whereas just a few years ago the city maintained it had no role in assuring an adequate housing supply, there now is at least a recognition that city policies and regulations can enhance or hinder how the private sector plays its role.

So, for example, the city council recently reduced its parking space requirements for new construction, thereby allowing more developable land to be used for housing rather than asphalt. It has started exploring the possibility of creating a land bank and a land trust, which would enable the city to condemn abandoned properties and rehabilitate them. It is discussing adoption of an accessory dwelling unit (ADU) ordinance, which would allow homeowners to build or to convert part of their property into a second, smaller dwelling. It is contemplating establishment of a city housing commission.

But if the housing strategy workgroup it created last year is any indication, progress on these and other initiatives will be slow and fitful. Aside from its leisurely meeting schedule, the workgroup—like the SAW working groups—was further hampered by the conspicuous absence of builders and developers at the table. Its agenda was set entirely by the city planning department, with no noticeable initiative by group members, no examination of competing values or perspectives and little if any dissent from agenda assumptions. No wonder, then, that the city’s own role in creating the current, unacceptable housing crisis was never questioned, much less addressed.

While creation of the housing strategy workgroup can be viewed in theory as a progressive step forward, its undifferentiated makeup and spoon-fed content ensured a conservation of the bureaucratic status quo. In the absence of anyone like Scott Williams or Tommy Shields, city planners had no one holding up a mirror for them to contemplate their own role in perpetuating the problems they purportedly were addressing.

Get serious about the stats we use

(Reading time: 9 minutes)

The housing stock working group has been tasked with two assignments in advance of its May meeting. The first is to collect ideas on misconceptions about—well, that’s not entirely clear, but it has to do with housing. The second is to review a supposedly detailed study that analyzes the costs of home building regulations. This is the “study,” formulated by the National Association of Home Builders, which concluded that regulatory costs and fees add $94,000 to the price of a new home.

It seems, therefore, that our second assignment fortuitously satisfies the first. The idea that the NAHB study is either detailed or has any relevance to the SAW region is a glaring misconception that the working group should be wary of promoting in any way.

As I wrote earlier, the NAHB study is deeply flawed because its respondents were woefully few in number and were self-selecting; because it is completely opaque about where the respondents were located or what kinds of housing they had built; and because it is, in any case, using data that predates the pandemic and the subsequent run-ups in housing costs, wages and interest rates. Its only apparent virtue is that it provides an easy if meaningless talking point, which endows it with a zombie-like persistence.

The question of whether regulatory costs and fees are excessive and therefore contributing to the unaffordability of new housing is a legitimate one, deserving of serious consideration. Unfortunately, doing anything in a serious way usually takes work, and it’s really tempting to avoid that kind of exertion when a supposed authority or expert offers an answer already gift-wrapped and tied up in a bow. So let me counter with another study, one that will take some effort to peruse and which superficially, at least, has even less relevance to the SAW region than the NAHB effort. For all that, however, I promise it can teach us all something useful.

“The High Cost of Producing Multifamily Housing in California,” which can be downloaded at https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3743-1.html, was published earlier this month by the RAND Corporation’s Center on Housing and Homelessness. Its mathematically dense goal is “to identify policy reforms than can lower production costs and increase housing affordability in California,” which as the authors note, had seven of the ten most expensive metro regions in the U.S. in 2021. It does this by looking at data from more than 100 multifamily housing projects in California, Colorado and Texas and—hold on, here comes the wonky stuff—uses a regression-based statistical model to account for differences in development costs according to building type, size, whether financing was private or public and other variables.

In other words, the RAND study takes great pains to describe its sample base and methodology in a way that the NAHB doesn’t even acknowledge, much less detail. And while its greatest relevance is to California policy makers, its conceptual framework and analysis are applicable to all housing markets. At the very least, therefore, the RAND study provides a model for how to interrogate our own housing needs.

WHAT DISTINGUISHES THE RAND effort from its anemic NAHB cousin is its understanding—and willingness to explain—the complex interplay of cost-drivers that result in a final price tag for a housing unit. How much does it cost to build a multifamily housing project? Well, there are construction costs, which include labor and materials. There is the cost of the land itself. And there are “soft” costs, which include architectural, engineering and legal fees, the costs incurred by filing required environmental reports, inspection fees and regulatory compliance costs, financing costs and, in many jurisdictions, development or impact fees. The RAND study finds that, on average, 70% of the cost of a multifamily housing project is tied up in construction, 10% in the land and 20% in soft costs.

It is this last category that many people think about when they refer to burdensome regulatory costs, and there is some basis for that. Inspection fees, regulatory compliance costs and impact fees are all obviously the result of policy decisions that can be increased, modified or erased, depending on community standards. Likewise, architectural and engineering fees are sensitive to a community’s design and permitting requirements.

But land and construction costs are also sensitive to community policies. Restrictive zoning can easily drive up the cost of land. Hard costs can be driven higher by building codes that require certain construction materials or installation of life safety systems, like alarms or sprinklers, as well as landscaping or parking requirements. And labor costs can vary considerably, depending on minimum wage laws and whether subsidized housing projects are required to meet prevailing wage rates.

The point of detailing all these factors is to underscore the difficulty of teasing out how much a project’s costs are the result of regulatory and other policy decisions, which are almost always unique to that project in that location at that point in time. That’s why the NAHB “study” is so pointless, and why there is nothing comparable on a state or county level. There are too many variables, and it’s a moving target to boot.

So does that mean we’ve hit a brick wall? Not exactly. Not if we collect a significant amount of data in a targeted area and sort it according to certain specific categories. That’s what RAND did, categorizing multifamily units into four groups by dwelling size across the three states it targeted, further divided between those built with private funding and those participating in the low-income housing tax credit program. The results were starkly disparate:

Total development costs (TDC) per net rentable square foot (NRSF) for market-rate developments in Texas were $167, compared with $531 in San Francisco (2019 dollars). TDC for low-income tax subsidized units was $236 in Texas, versus $731 in San Francisco.
Total development costs per apartment in Texas averaged $133,000 for the market-rate units, $96,000 for the subsidized ones, indicating that the latter were considerably smaller in size. The comparable figures for San Francisco were $485,000 and $487,000, again indicating a sharp reduction in size of the subsidized units.
Average predevelopment time in Texas was 13.1 months, average construction time was 13.9 months, for a total time to completion of 27 months. The California (not just San Francisco) equivalents were 27.9 months in predevelopment and 21 months in construction, for a total time of more than four years before a project is completed.

Keeping in mind the earlier discussion about unique variables affecting every project, it should be noted that these comparisons are hardly apples to apples. Construction costs in San Francisco, to pick just one of the most obvious differences, are affected by seismic standards that you won’t find in Dallas. Real estate costs more in California, wages are higher, etc. etc.

Yet for all that, the disparities are too great to be explained away by such factors alone, as RAND’s regression analysis found, and their consequences are that average rental prices in California are nearly twice those in Texas. Why? Lower construction costs leave room for lower rents. And according to RAND, “Discretionary local impact fees are dramatically lower in the state [of Texas], at least in part because of strict oversight of these fees. But substantially lower levels of regulation overall and state policies that tightly constrain approval times likely play the most important role.”

WE CAN LEARN AT LEAST TWO things from all this.

First, the Texas and California statistics provide us with two extreme data points for total development costs, as well as extremes of production time. If local builders report development costs or production times closer to those found in Texas, there’s probably not a whole lot to be gained by second-guessing existing regulatory policies and procedures. Any gains from doing so would be marginal.

If, on the other hand, local production times and development costs are more comparable to California’s, clearly that opens up some ideas for addressing our affordable housing deficit. The RAND report’s recommendations, although explicitly intended to lower multifamily housing production costs in California, could have relevance to us, depending on which excessive regulatory cost-drivers are identified locally. Among the more intriguing:

Adoption of a policy, similar to state law in Texas, requiring local jurisdictions to approve or deny a proposal for a housing development within 30 days of submission. Failure to meet the 30-day deadline would result in automatic approval.
Promotion of policies to speed construction timelines, such as having synchronized rather than sequential inspections.
The returns on municipal impact and development fees, if any, should be weighed against potential gains from increased property tax revenue and other revenue and welfare gains from more new housing.
Adoption of large-scale upzoning to lower per-unit land prices and increase overall production. Even modest reforms, such as allowing duplexes or fourplexes where only single-family homes are allowed, can make a significant difference.

There doubtless are other conclusions that can be drawn from this study—it runs to 58 pages, and there’s a separate 48-page annex for anyone who really wants to get in the weeds—and there is abundant talent within our group to make that happen. But that will take work.

That work also would benefit from the input of developers and builders who looked to build in our area but have concluded they just couldn’t make their ideas pencil out—assuming, of course, that this has happened. If our group has had one continuing weak spot, it has been the lack of an industry voice to identify what could be done at the policy-setting level to encourage more affordable housing construction. That’s not entirely our fault—one of our members invited three different developers/builders “to join in the discussion about cost of regulations/what we can do for them/holdups in construction processes/etc.” but none responded—but it does create an information vacuum.

As a result, we don’t really know if a “regulatory burden” is an important reason why we don’t have developers breaking down our doors to build multifamily homes. The RAND study should at least help us formulate the right questions to ask, and also could help us decide that this is an area of inquiry that isn’t worth our efforts.

Don’t expect much from United Way

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The past week’s announcement that United Way of Harrisonburg and Rockingham County (UWHR) is expanding into the SAW region doubtless was greeted with relief by many local social service agencies. The demise last fall of the SAW United Way eliminated a relatively small but not insignificant source of funding for some non-profits in the region, at a time when demand for food, housing, mental services and other basic needs is rapidly growing. And with political turmoil in Washington squeezing or eliminating much critical federal funding, any fresh source of financial support is to be welcomed.

But the news isn’t all that rosy. The fact is, only a small fraction of the money collected by United Way ever makes it to the people and programs on whose behalf it’s raised. Most of what’s collected stays with United Way, for salaries and other payroll expenses, office overhead and rainy-day savings accounts. And while the SAW United Way closed its doors amid allegations of fiscal improprieties, that was only one layer of a nearly impermeable filter that already exists between United Way donors and its recipients.

Consider, for example, that the SAW United Way raised $589,152 in contributions for the fiscal year that ended June 30, 2023, the last time it filed its 990 federal tax form. Of that amount, only a third—$196,405—was disbursed to area social service providers, while payroll expenses consumed $258,617, including a $83,250 salary for chapter president Kristi Williams; the balance went to office expenses and travel. Among the recipients of the chapter’s largesse that year was Renewing Homes of Greater Augusta, awarded a whopping $7,167, and Valley Supportive Housing, which got $15,000.

UWHR is not beset by similar hints of financial hanky-panky, but the imbalance between contributions to the agency and contributions made by the agency is even more pronounced than it was in the SAW region. According to UWHR’s most recent Form 990, for the fiscal year ending April 30, 2024, the Harrisonburg-Rockbridge chapter received $691,655 in cash contributions, in addition to reaping $24,538 in investment income, for a total of $716,193. Cash awards made that same fiscal year? Just $92,139, spread among six daycare and early learning centers.

UWHR payroll expenses, meanwhile, despite CEO Amanda Leech’s more moderate salary of $65,919, amounted to $335,864. Office and other expenses claimed another $223,317, which means that the agency kept 80% of all the money it took in for itself. At that rate, the working poor are destined to be with us for a long, long time.

These stark contrasts may explain, to the extent that the public knows such things, why UWHR’s fund-raising has plummeted over at least the past five years, albeit with a minor bump up in 2023. Contributions received in 2019 amounted to $1.3 million—then steadily ticked down with each passing year, to $905,000 in 2020, $767,000 in 2021 and $653,000 in 2022, or a plunge of roughly 50% over four years. In 2023-24 the inflow rebounded a bit, to $691,655.

Given those numbers, it may come as a surprise to learn that UWHR is sitting on a pile of cash, with $201,301 in savings and $987,436 in securities, or substantially more than it receives in annual contributions. Aside from generating some investment income, the purpose for this nest egg is unclear. It isn’t mentioned in any of the agency’s public-facing documents, and Leech did not respond to my inquiries about her plans for those reserves, or why she thinks it’s appropriate for a charitable organization serving the working poor to have squirreled away more than a year’s worth of revenues.

Assuming that UWHR operates in the SAW region much as it has in its own backyard, it’s clear that local social service providers should rein in any expectations about what they’ll get. Moreover, note should be taken of one other aspect of UWHR’s decision-making, a so-called “focused” approach to dispensing funds. As already noted above, for example, all six of its current major recipients are devoted to young children: First Step, Generations Crossing, Harrisonburg-Rockingham Child Day Care, Plains Area Day Care Center, Second Home and Connections Early Learning Center. All those recipients undoubtedly need those funds, but that focus also means any non-child oriented social service agency can only hope that its focus aligns with UWHR’s the next go-round.

Of the dozen or so recipients of the now-defunct SAW United Way’s last funding cycle, only three would have been eligible for UWHR grants this year. Leech has said that the United Way will hold listening sessions over the next few months to figure out how to best serve its expanded region, so it’s possible UWHR will take a different approach in the SAW region—if local agencies make themselves heard. Even 20% of a donated dollar is better than nothing. On the other hand, potential donors are best advised to just cut out the middleman and make their contributions directly to the social service agency of their choice. Renewing Homes of Greater Augusta and Valley Supportive housing are good places to start. So is WARM, the Waynesboro Area Relief Ministry, which is SAW’s only provider of emergency shelters for the homeless during winter months and which was hit especially hard financially by this past season’s bitter cold.